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Preface
With the increasing importance of structural adjustment programs in
developing countries, more attention has been paid to the effects that
macroeconomic policies have on the structure of incentives for different
sectors of the economy. In this context, the domestic agricultural terms
of trade that result from industrial protection and from exchange rate,
fiscal and monetary policies emerge as a key issue, as they affect the
composition of agricultural output and trade as well as the balance of
payments and growth. A major consideration in structural adjustment
programs is, therefore, the degree of discrimination that has to be offset
in order to assure the long-run viability of the sector.
It is the purpose of this study to analyze how macroeconomic
policies and agricultural pricing policies have affected the magnitude and
structure of agricultural incentives in developing countries. From a
methodological point of view, this involves an up-to-date review of
various protection concepts and a discussion of the pros and cons of
these concepts for measuring overall agricultural incentives. Empirically,
the study follows a dual approach that combines new cross-country and
time series evidence on agricultural protection for two important food
crops, wheat and rice, and one important cash crop, coffee, with ad-
ditional evidence on agricultural protection in three developing countries,
Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe. In each case, the overall level of agri-
cultural protection is measured and decomposed in order to quantify the
relative importance of macroeconomic and agricultural policies.
This study is an outcome of a research project entitled "Discrimi-
nation against Agriculture in Developing Countries? Magnitude, Struc-
ture and the Role of General Economic Policy", which was financed by
the Volkswagen-Stiftung. Its financial support is gratefully acknow-
ledged. The study is a joint effort of the Kiel Institute of World
Economics (Manfred Wiebelt, Rainer Thiele) and the Institute of Agri-
cultural Policy and Market Research at the University of GieBen (Roland
Herrmann, Patricia Schenck). The study also benefitted from preparatory
work by partners in Malaysia and Zimbabwe.
The partner in Malaysia was Dr. Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahman from the
Faculty of Economics and Management, Agricultural University of Malay-XIV
sia, Serdang. He prepared two highly appreciated analyses on agri-
cultural protection in Malaysia which influenced the chapter on Malaysia
in this study significantly. The partners in Zimbabwe were Dr. Norman
Reynolds, Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER)
and Andrew Rukovo and Tobias Takavarasha, both at the Ministry of
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Harare. The Zimbabwean
component of this study benefitted from their joint investigation of
agricultural protection in Zimbabwe. At the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, Angela Husfeld, Michaela Rank and Christine Schulte assisted
in the computations, Mar lies Thiessen carefully typed successive drafts,
and Bernhard Klein and Susanne Rademacher made many helpful sug-
gestions when preparing the text for publication. Thanks are due to all
of them.
Kiel, February 1992 Horst SiebertA. Background and Objectives of the Study
For more than three decades, it has been a central issue in development
economics which role agriculture plays in economic development and
which role it should play. With regard to the actual incentives for the
sector, it is a stylized fact that many developing countries (less
developed countries, LDCs) discriminate against agriculture, whereas the
industrialized countries (developed countries, DCs) favor their farmers
[World Bank, 1986]. Concerning the desired treatment of agriculture,
there was and still is severe dissension on the appropriate strategy of
development policy. The first view is in line with the economic theory of
distortions and stresses that it is crucial to reverse existing distortions.
Consequently, . the proposal is to change the existing price ratio between
agriculture and nonagriculture in favor of the agricultural sector
[Valdes, 1986; World Bank, 1986]. The second and opposite view is in
the tradition of dualistic development models as presented by Lewis
[1954], Fei and Ranis [1964] and others. According to this view, it is
necessary to foster a transition from agriculture to industry in order to
stimulate the long-run economic growth of a country. Agriculture is
regarded here as the traditional and more static sector of an economy,
whereas industry is seen as the modern and more dynamic sector.
Hence, a taxation of agriculture in the early stages of development is
regarded as necessary for restructuring the economy. A core parameter
within this view is the price elasticity of supply in agriculture. If it is
very low, and proponents of the second view argue along these lines,
taxation of agriculture can be realized with relatively low costs for the
economy as a whole.
Recent economic contributions and policy actions have stimulated the
discussion on the desired as well as the actual role of agriculture in
economic development. In an often cited theoretical contribution, Sah and
Stiglitz [ 1984] have utilized a dual-economy model to derive that govern-
ments can increase economic growth by setting the terms of trade be-
tween agriculture and industry in favor of the industrial sector.
Similarly, Rodrik [ 1986] argues that overvalued exchange rates in LDCs
For a survey of the role of agriculture in dualistic development mod-
els, see Ghatak and Ingersent [1984, Chapter 5].may be a welfare-increasing device by promoting structural change from
agriculture towards the more dynamic manufacturing sector.
Quite differently, Adelman [ 1984, p. 26] concluded from an analysis
of world income distribution and its determinants that "an agriculture-
driven, open-development strategy, is preferable to an industrial export-
driven strategy" for most LDCs. This is valid, according to Adelman,
under redistribution and growth aspects. Moreover, quantitative studies
on the agricultural supply elasticity have challenged the view that agri-
culture is a relatively static sector. Peterson [ 1979] came up with the
finding that the long-run supply elasticity and the social costs of low
agricultural prices are much higher than previously expected. Similarly,
but with a different methodology, Mundlak et al. [ 1989] showed that
agriculture clearly does respond to price changes when agricultural
supply is properly modelled and that a positive climate for investment in
agriculture leads to more investment in the nonagricultural sector, too.
This may explain the empirical observation that countries with a relative-
ly high growth rate in agriculture have a relatively prosperous general
economy, too [Hwa, 1988]. Actual incentive policies as contained in the
development strategies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank stress the important role of agriculture for development.
Crucial elements of structural adjustment programs are to reduce food
subsidies, to increase agricultural output prices and to rely upon out-
ward orientation, i. e. , by reducing disincentives against agricultural and
nonagricultural exports [Commander, 1989].
New evidence has also appeared in recent years on the actual in-
centives for agriculture in LDCs. Quantitative studies indicate that many
LDCs discriminate against agriculture compared with the nonagricultural
sector [e.g., Bale, Lutz, 1981; Scandizzo, Bruce, 1980; Bale, 1985].
They suggest further that agricultural producer prices in LDCs are
much lower than in DCs [Peterson, 1979]. However, there seem to be
major differences within agriculture as a deeper analysis on the
structure of incentives shows. From an analysis of gross-domestic-
product-based and agricultural output-based purchasing power parity
estimates for the years 1975 and 1980, Prasada Rao et al. [ 1990]
conclude that agricultural output prices have not been held as low in
LDCs as has been commonly believed but that distinct trends indicate a
faster rate of growth of nonagricultural prices relative to agriculturalprices. From a regional perspective, agricultural price levels are
relatively higher in Asia than in Africa. Over the 1975-1980 review
period, agricultural prices declined in Asia but rose marginally in
Africa. In a market study for wheat based on cross-country data, it is
also argued by Byerlee and Sain [ 1986] that producer prices in LDCs
are not as low as is often argued. They conclude that there is no
systematic discrimination against food producers, although consumer
prices are clearly subsidized compared with world market conditions.
Recent results of the World Bank's project on the "Political Economy of
Agricultural Pricing Policy" show on the" basis of country studies that
disincentives tend to be much larger for export crops than for food
crops. Additionally, they show that disincentives induced by general
economic and commercial policies are mostly larger than those generated
by direct agricultural policies [Krueger et al. , 1988].
The previous discussion is the background of our study. It is the
objective of our analysis to deepen the knowledge on the magnitude, the
structure and the variability of agricultural protection in LDCs. Based
on this broadened information on agricultural protection, policy im-
plications of the measured levels of protection will be elaborated. Major
questions to be answered in this study are the following:
(1) How do LDCs treat their agricultural sectors?
(2) Do they treat different sub-sectors differently? In particular: are
export crops favored or disfavored compared with food crops?
(3) Do policymakers stabilize agricultural producer prices in the
presence of volatile world market prices?
(4) Do general economic policies, in particular trade restrictions and
macroeconomic policies, matter for the measured degree of protection?
(5) What are the transmission mechanisms by which general economic
policies might affect agricultural incentives?
(6) Does the empirical evidence suggest a reorientation of agricultural
policy as opposed to policies towards the manufacturing sector?
(7) Does the empirical evidence suggest a resetting of agricultural price
ratios, especially between food crops and export crops?
The study is organized as follows. In Chapter B, an up-to-date
survey of the economic literature on measurement concepts and on the
extent of agricultural protection is aimed at. Traditional and non-traditional concepts to measuring agricultural protection will be reviewed,
and their advantages and disadvantages will be investigated. The empiri-
cal literature on the magnitude and structure of agricultural protection
in LDCs will be presented and evaluated. It will be one result of the
review that a comprehensive cross-country information on protection
levels for important food and export crops is lacking, whereas an
impressive number of quantitative country studies on agricultural
protection has become available in recent years. Another result that
follows from the review is that economy-wide policies have usually been
neglected in these country studies.
After having identified the neglected areas in the literature on
agricultural protection, the main focus of Chapter C will be a quan-
titative analysis of the magnitude, structure and instability of protection
for two important food crops, wheat and rice, and one major export
crop, coffee. This quantitative analysis will be rather comprehensive
country- and period-wise. As DCs are important suppliers on the world
markets in wheat and rice, protection levels in LDCs and DCs will be
considered on those markets. In any case, a relatively large number of
LDCs will be covered for each commodity, and the protection levels will
be computed for a rather long period of time: 1969-1985. Important
measurement issues like exchange rate overvaluation and transport costs
will explicitly be taken into account. The measurement concept that is
implementable and most suitable for the problem at hand will be explained
first. Then, the magnitude and the time series behavior of protection
levels for the three important commodities will be investigated in detail.
Finally, conclusions on incentives for food crops as opposed to export
crops in LDCs will be drawn.
Whereas the cross-country studies in Chapter C concentrate on
agricultural protection vis-a-vis foreign competitors, Chapter D focuses
on domestic agricultural protection vis-a-vis the rest of the economy.
Based on the general finding of Chapter C that economy-wide policies
have a tremendous influence on agricultural incentives in LDCs, we will
investigate how and to what extent these policies affect the relative
profitability of agricultural production in three LDCs - Malaysia, Peru
and Zimbabwe. After a short survey of the economic situation and the
policy environment, we will elaborate the link between industrial import
protection and agricultural incentives for the most important exportcrops in the respective countries. In addition, a more comprehensive
analysis of indirect effects, covering trade policy as well as macro-
economic measures, will be conducted for Malaysia's major agricultural
commodities. Finally, we take up again the "food-crop protection versus
cash-crop discrimination" question, but now based on a broader com-
modity basis.
In Chapter E, the major findings of the study are summarized and
policy conclusions are drawn.B. Measurement of Agricultural Protection: A Survey of the Con-
cepts and the Empirical Literature
I. Introduction
This chapter sets the stage for the empirical analysis of agricultural
protection in LDCs that follows in Chapters C and D. In Section B. II,
major concepts for measuring agricultural protection are surveyed and
their strengths and weaknesses are elaborated. It is discussed there
which problems can be treated with the measurement concepts selected
and which issues cannot. After this, empirical results based on the
discussed measurement concepts are presented. An overview of quanti-
tative studies on agricultural protection and their major findings are also
given. The content of Section B. Ill is as follows. Important results
concerning the degree of agricultural protection in LDCs as opposed to
DCs are summarized there. Additionally, findings on the magnitude of
protection of food versus export crops in LDCs are discussed. The
survey will also stress where the empirical literature on agricultural
protection has been insufficient and where the additional benefit of our
quantitative analysis is located.
II. Concepts to Measuring Agricultural Protection
Synoptical Table 1 lists the measurement concepts of agricultural
protection to be discussed in this section. It shows, too, which policies
are typically covered by those concepts and at which economic variables
they are oriented.
There are three traditional measurement concepts arising from inter-
national trade theory and policy which are discussed in all standard
Surveys of the methodology to measure agricultural protection and its
impacts include Scandizzo and Bruce [1980], Scandizzo [1989] and
Tsakok [ 1990, Chapters 3 and 4]. The traditional concepts of
measuring agricultural protection are also surveyed in Strak [1982].
An unconventional approach to measuring protection, or openness, is
presented by Learner [1988]. Openness is derived by comparing actual
trade as modelled on the basis of the Heckscher/Ohlin theory. The
approach is an interesting alternative to the mainstream approach to be
discussed below.Synoptical Table 1 - Measurement Concepts of Agricultural Protection,
Their Orientation and Typical Policy Coverage (a)
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(a) Direct agricultural policies are economic policies which are tar-
geted at the agricultural sector. Indirect agricultural policies are
those economic policies which affect agriculture without being targeted
at the sector.
studies on protection [ Corden, 1971; Balassa et al. , 1971; Michaely,
1977; Krueger, 1984]: nominal protection, effective protection and
domestic resource costs (DRCs). The relationship between these concepts
and important theorems of trade theory is well-elaborated, and all these
standard approaches have been extensively used in quantitative studies
on agricultural protection.
Apart from these standard approaches, additional concepts have
gained importance in the recent past. There are, in particular, three
concepts which either originated from agricultural economics research or
have been primarily applied to the agricultural sector. The first one is
the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) which is now widely used in com-
parative studies on agricultural protection done by international organi-
zations and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) [OECD, a, 1991;b; USDA, 1990]. The basic idea of the PSE concept is to introduce more
governmental agricultural policies than in typical nominal protection
studies and to stress producer earnings rather than producer prices.
The second and the third of the new concepts emphasize the fact that a
comparative analysis of incentives for agriculture in LDCs has to in-
corporate direct and indirect agricultural policies arising from the
general macroeconomic policy. The concept of true protection is built
upon general equilibrium analysis and stresses the importance of
measures in one sector for the relative prices in an economy. Although
not being necessarily related to agriculture, this concept was applied in
many empirical studies to the implicit taxation of agricultural exports in
LDCs arising from nonagricultural import protection [Greenaway, Milner,
1987]. The third new concept may be defined as the measurement of
nominal protection of the price ratio between agriculture and non-
agriculture, ft was created as the common measure of policy impacts on
relative output prices within the World Bank's project on "The Political
Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy" [Krueger et al. , 1988; Schiff,
1989].
We survey all six concepts in the following sections. The basic
theory behind the concepts is presented, the definitions for the
measurement approaches are given, and their past applications in the
measurement of agricultural protection or agricultural protection effects
are indicated. Additionally, we discuss how far they can be utilized for
quantitative inter-country comparisons of agricultural protection.
1. Nominal Protection
In many cases, the policy discussion on protectionism in agriculture has
concentrated on the question how policy affects prices compared with a
free-market situation without policy. The nominal rate of protection
(NRP) measures this aspect. It expresses the absolute difference be-
tween the domestic price (p.) and the world price (p ) as a percentage
of the world price:
[1] NRP = 100 • (Pi - Pw)/PwA NRP of 20 percent indicates, e.g., that domestic prices exceed the
world market price by 20 percent. The r
(NPC) is often used, too, and is defined as
world market price by 20 percent. The nominal protection coefficient
[2] NPC = Pi/pw.
If the NRP is positive or the NPC is above unity, one concludes
that agricultural prices are supported compared with a situation without
national policy interventions. A taxation of agriculture, on the other
hand, is inferred from a negative NRP or a NPC below unity.
NPCs or NRPs are often used in cross-country analyses on agri-
cultural protection showing how differently countries insulate agriculture
from free-trade conditions [FAO, a; Byerlee, Sain, 1986; Taylor, 1989].
It is a major reason for the use of nominal protection measures in cross-
section analyses that information on producer prices and on border
prices is often available on a comparative basis and even over time.
Hence, nominal protection measures are much easier to quantify for a
large country sample than alternative measures of protection such as a
PSE or measures of effective protection.
Although there are weaknesses of the concept of nominal protection,
there is no doubt that nominal protection covers one central issue of
agricultural protection, i. e. , the policy impact on agricultural output
prices. The ingredients of the NRP or the NPC are crucial for more ad-
vanced measures of protection as well as for policy evaluation. First,
domestic and border prices enter into the PSE and the effective pro-
tection, too. Second, the comparison between domestic and world prices
underlies virtually all welfare-economic analyses on agricultural pro-
It has to be considered, however, that the NRP must be distinguished
from the nominal tariff rate. The reason is that the NRP does not only
cover tariff-induced price differences between the domestic and the
world price. Those price differences that are caused by quotas or
other nontariff barriers can also be taken into account. For the
measurement of tariff equivalents of nontariff trade barriers, see
Milner [1985, pp. 131 ff. ] and Deardorff and Stern [1984, pp. 23 ff. ].
How a tariffication of nontariff barriers can occur within agricultural
trade liberalization is discussed in Riethmuller et al. [ 1990, Section
4.1]. Moschini [1991] elaborates, however, that nontariff barriers and
tariffs are nonequivalent in many cases and that the measurement of an
equivalent tariff is then not straightforward.10
tection and all normative approaches to agricultural policy [Just et al. ,
1982; Houck, 1986; Gardner, 1987; Monke, Pearson, 1989].
The computation of solid NRPs is difficult. In particular, it has
been shown that the following aspects have to be taken into account
[Westlake, 1987]:
(1) When price distortions are to be measured via NRPs, it is essential
that those rates are measured at one point of the marketing channel.
(2) The computation of NRPs implies that prices are compared which are
denominated in differential currencies. Shadow exchange rates have
to be utilized for an undistorted comparison.
(3) An additional argument that is frequently put forward refers to the
price volatility observed in international agricultural markets. It is
argued that NRPs should be computed on the basis of "normal"
rather than actual world prices. Actual world prices are seen as
being too unstable for a rational planning of domestic economic and
agricultural policies.
Westlake's first argument means that marketing costs have to be
considered in order to present undistorted levels of protection.
Transport costs must be introduced for the computation of the free-trade
price at a specified point of the marketing chain, whereas it is often
possible to observe the domestic price including transport costs at the
relevant point. In several of the earlier empirical studies, rather crude
protection levels were calculated and transport costs were ignored.
Often, producer prices at the farm level were related to international
prices at the border, because both series were readily available. Inter-
national prices were then measured as fob (free on board) unit values
for exportables and as cif (cost, insurance, freight) unit values for
importables. This procedure is inappropriate, however, since a bias is
introduced in the measurement of distortions. Export parity prices have
to be computed for export goods and import parity prices for import
goods in order to receive "correct" NRPs taking transport costs into
consideration. The export parity price is the free-trade price of an ex-
portable at any point of the marketing channel. Or, put differently: the
export parity price is the price at which the export good would be
available at a certain point of the marketing chain in the hypothetical
situation without policy. It can be defined as the fob export price less
the total marketing and processing cost occurring between the defined11
point of the marketing channel and the border. The NPC of an export-
able X at the farmgate (NPC_) is then computed as
[3] NPcJ=p£/(p$-CFB)
X X
with p p = producer price of the exportable at the farmgate; p _ = fob
export price; Cpj-, = marketing cost between the farmgate and the
border. Analogously, one can calculate the NPC at the border (NPCj,)
by introducing the fob export price for p and by recalculating the
domestic price p. at the border. Marketing cost Cp», have to be added
then to the farmgate price. The NPC of the exportable at the border
(NPC^S) is thus defined as is
[4] NPC* = <pj + CFB)/p£.
Suppose now that nominal protection is to be computed for an im-
portable. The self-sufficiency ratio is not zero, i. e. , the product is
produced domestically, too. An undistorted computation of nominal pro-
tection necessitates introducing import parity price into Equations [1] or
[2] for p . The import parity price is the free-trade price of an im-
portable at any point of the marketing channel. Or, put differently: the
import parity price is the price at which the import good would be
available at a certain point of the marketing chain in the hypothetical
situation without policy. It is equal to the cif import price plus the total
marketing cost between the border and the defined point of the market-
ing channel. The NPC of the importable M at the retail level is then
measured as
[5] NPC^=p^/(p^+CBR)
with Pp = domestic price of the importable at the retail level; pR = cif
import price at the border; CRR = marketing cost between the border
and the retail level.
An undistorted measurement of nominal protection affords that equa-
tions like [3] or [4] replace Equation [2] for agricultural exportables
and that an equation like [5] replaces Equation [2] for an agricultural
importable. Additional care has to be taken if agricultural protection12
affects a country's trade status or if the trade status changes over time.
Then, the use of either the export or import parity price based on the
actual or the usual trade status may give misleading results [Byerlee,
Morris, 1990]. In the past, crude protection levels were often shown
based on a direct comparison of pp and p_ ignoring marketing costs. It
has been convincingly shown in recent studies that transport costs
matter for the measured level of protection, in particular in LDCs.
Westlake [1987], e.g., shows that uncorrected protection coefficients of
the type NPC = Pp/pR indicate that domestic maize prices in Kenya were
clearly below the international level. An improved computation including
transport and marketing costs revealed the reverse at all important
points in the marketing channel. Westlake's results suggest that the
measurement of price distortions on the basis of uncorrected coefficients
of protection are highly misleading for LDCs. Transport facilities are
often underdeveloped, so that uncorrected protection levels underesti-
mate the true level of protection or overestimate the true level of price
discrimination against the producers. Furthermore, Westlake's findings
indicate that protection levels vary strongly between the different points
in the marketing chain. It might be helpful, therefore, to compute and
to compare protection levels at more than one point of the marketing
channel in order to identify price distortions.
Westlake's second argument stresses that a solid computation of
protection levels has to be based on shadow exchange rates. What is the
rationale for this argument? In Equations [1] and [2], nominal protection
has been defined without reference to an exchange rate. In empirical
applications of the equations, however, it is necessary to utilize an
exchange rate in order to express domestic prices and world prices in
one currency. This is so because official statistics exhibit domestic
prices in a country's domestic currency (say A) and world prices in an
international currency (say B), which is most often the US dollar. The
easiest way to solve the problem is to use official exchange rates for the
price comparison. Then, the NPC according to Equation [2] is implement-
ed as a gross nominal protection coefficient (gross NPC). It is defined
[2'] gross NPC = p^/(p
B • e)13
[2"] gross NPC
depending on whether prices are expressed in the domestic or the inter-
national currency, e is the official exchange rate, defined as the price
of one unit of the international currency in domestic currency units. The
argument that the use of a shadow exchange rate or an equilibrium ex-
change rate is superior to the official exchange rate is based on the
following reasoning. Protection measurement aims at a comparison of the
existing situation with protection and the hypothetical free-trade situ-
ation. Under free trade, however, it might well be that the equilibrium
exchange rate would differ from the actual exchange rate. This could be
due to macroeconomic policies like an import substitution strategy for the
manufacturing sector leading to an overvaluation of the domestic cur-
rencies in LDCs. Hence, the measurement of net protection, which takes
overvaluation or undervaluation of exchange rates into account, is
superior to the measurement of gross protection. It pictures the free-
trade situation more completely and provides a more solid concept for
measuring the actual policy incentives or disincentives for producers. In
the practical implementation, the net nominal protection coefficient (net
NPC) would use the equilibrium exchange rate (e*) to express world
market prices in terms of the domestic currency, i. e. ,
[6] net NPC = P^/(p® • e*),
or to express domestic prices in terms of the international currency,
i. e.,
[6'] net NPC = (p*
Obviously, the relationship between the net NPC and the gross NPC is
[7] net NPC = gross NPC • (e/e*).
A gross versus a net approach to measuring the NRP may be distin-
guished, too. When Equation [ 1] is implemented by the use of the official14
exchange rate, the gross nominal rate of protection (gross NRP) can be
measured as
A B p. - p • e





1] gross NRP = (gross NPC - 1) • 100.
When the free-trade situation is modelled properly with the free-
trade exchange rate, e* rather than e has to be introduced. The net




[9] net NRP = (—^-r— ) • 100
p
B • e*
[9'] net NRP - (net NPC - 1) • 100.
The net NRP can also be reformulated as a function of the world price,
the tariff equivalent of the agricultural policy measures related to the
product and the ratio between the official and equilibrium exchange rate.
The actual domestic price, p ., can be defined as
[10] p* = p* • e • (1 + t)
where t stands for the tariff equivalent of tariff and nontariff measures
separating the domestic from the international price. Introducing Equa-
tion [10] into Equation [9] yields
The computation of net protection as well as the possibilities to
estimate the extent of overvaluation within a structural economic model
are presented in Balassa et al. [ 1971, pp. 324 ff. ].15
[11] net NRP - (^ • (1 + t) - 1) • 100.
There is no dissension in the economic literature that the
measurement of net protection is superior to that of gross protection.
There are considerable difficulties, however, in the modelling of
equilibrium exchange rates, and very different approaches to the
problem do exist. Basically, three different approaches have been used
in the measurement of agricultural protection.
The first approach is based on purchasing power theory. According
to that theory, the percentage change of the exchange rate is equal to
the differential in the rates of inflation [Officer, 1976]. Inflation
differentials have been used in the agricultural economics literature, too,
in order to compute exchange-rate-adjusted NRPs [Byerlee, Sain, 1986].
There are some important objections against the modelling of equilibrium
exchange rates via the purchasing power parity theory. In particular, it
is argued that equilibrium exchange rates are not only determined by
sales of goods and services, on which the purchasing power parity
theory rests, but also by other transactions on the capital market. The
second and the third approach implicitly or explicitly cover such ad-
ditional transactions.
The second approach utilizes the widespread existence of parallel
markets for foreign exchange in LDCs for the modelling of equilibrium
exchange rates. It is argued that official exchange rates are strongly
affected by restrictions on exports, imports and foreign exchange in
many LDCs, thus leading to an overvalued exchange rate. Hence, black
market exchange rates rather than offical exchange rates are seen as a
reliable indicator of the equilibrium exchange rates. Black market ex-
change rates are determined by actual transactions on the parallel and
unregulated market for foreign exchange. In the agricultural economics
literature, this approach has been used in the cross-country analysis of
agricultural protection by Taylor [1989], and it will also be used in this
study. There are counterarguments against this procedure, too. The
Surveys on the theory of exchange rate determination are available in
Krueger [1983], Jacque [1978] and Edwards [1989]. Measures of real
exchange rate misalignments and the linkage between those misalign-
ments and economic performance in 11 African countries are investi-
gated in Schafer [1989].16
economics of parallel markets have shown that a black market exchange
rate coincides with the free-trade exchange rate only in a special case.
The unification of official and parallel markets for foreign exchange will
often lead to an equilibrium exchange rate that lies somewhere between
the official and the parallel rate. Although this argument is valid,
empirical observations have shown that black market exchange rates are
often in the same order as equilibrium rates modelled with a structural
economic model [Taylor, 1989, p. 40]. If this argument is valid, black
market rates have the strong advantage that they are readily available
for a rather large country sample as time series.
The third approach is to model equilibrium exchange rates within a
2
structural model of the foreign exchange market. This approach has
often been adopted by the World Bank in detailed country studies. The
method can be related directly to the protective measures of an indi-
vidual country, more so than the purchasing power parity or the black
market approach can. It may be used to model the changes in import
demand and export supply resulting from a removal of trade barriers.
Thus, the shifts in the demand and supply schedules for foreign
exchange due to trade policy can be specified. Consequently, it is
possible with this method to model the equilibrium exchange rate for the
situation without trade barriers. This procedure has been extensively
used within the 18 country studies of the World Bank's project on "The
Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy". Equilibrium exchange
rates in the absence of trade and exchange rate policies are derived
there along these lines [Krueger et al., 1988].
Westlake's third argument is that the measurement of agricultural
price protection should employ longer term world prices instead of actual
world prices. The rationale for this argument is that actual world prices
of agricultural products fluctuate heavily and cannot serve as a reliable
benchmark for policy decisions in LDCs. Consequently, the basic
Equations [4] and [2] for the NRP should be altered to
This point is made in Roemer [1986]. For a further discussion of im-
portant issues concerning parallel markets in LDCs, see Jones and
Roemer [ 1989] and other contributions in the same issue of "World
Development".
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Examples for such a structural analysis of the equilibrium exchange
rate include Dornbusch [1982] and Stockman [1987].17
[12] NRP = 100 • (Pi - P*)/P*.
p* measures a normal world price that takes longer term developments
into account. It can be calculated on the basis of trend analysis or a
structural model of the world price. If Equation [12] is supposed to
capture the way a decisionmaker forms his price expectations, one would
2
wish to picture exactly these expectations in modelling p* .
It remains doubtful, however, whether long-term world prices are
generally superior to actual world prices in measuring agricultural
protection. It crucially depends on the objectives of the analysis. When
the measurement of actual price protection or actual welfare effects due
to protection in individual years is aimed at, p has to be used rather
than p* . If the goal is to show how price expectations are affected by
policy measures, Westlake's argument is well taken, and normal instead
of actual prices should be utilized. One might extend the argument,
however, and introduce normal domestic prices (p*), too. In many LDCs,
especially in those with hyperinflation and without a full indexation of
agricultural prices, income support policies are also not easy to predict.
Discretionary agricultural policies may lead to a rather high volatility of
domestic prices. With normal domestic prices. Equation [12] for the NRP
can be substituted by
[13] NRP = 100 • (p* - P*)/p*.
When the measurement of protection serves descriptive purposes, it could
also be argued that Equation [13] is superior to Equation [1]. This is a
valid argument if an unbiased model of normal prices can be developed
The study of Byerlee and Sain [ 1986] models normal world prices with
a trend model and it is shown in Herrmann et al. [1991] how the way
normal prices are modelled does affect the quantitative and qualitative
results.
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This point is made in Herrmann and Kirschke [ 1987 ], where it is
argued that the modelling of price uncertainty depends on the in-
dividual market participant's point of view on the determinants of price
formation.
On domestic agricultural policies under high rates of inflation, see
Goldin and de Rezende [1990, Chapter HI] and Dias [1991].18
and if the description focuses on one or very few years. Within a de-
scription of the longer run time series pattern of agricultural protection,
the argument is not valid. A possibility will exist in that case to
elaborate representative means of protection levels on the basis of
Equations [1] and [2]. Special features of protection in individual years
will tend to balance out over time.
Even when NRPs are computed in an undistorted fashion, limitations
of the concept certainly remain. One important limitation is that policy-
induced changes in the NRP are only under specific circumstances an
indicator for the resulting changes in producers' income. An introduction
of a nominal protection level of 10 percent in agriculture leads to an
increase of agricultural income by 10 percent only if
- the input share is zero and
- production does not respond to price changes, i. e. , is absolutely
price-inelastic.
2
This argument can be shown easily. Under the specific assumptions
indicated, it follows that agricultural income and earnings are identical
(Y=E), and income can be decomposed into its price and quantity com-
ponents :
[14] Y = p • q
Equation [ 14] can be rewritten in relative changes as
[15] dY/Y = dp/p + dq/q
or, if the price elasticity of supply is supposed to be zero, as
[16] dY/Y = dp/p.
A similar argument is put forward by the EC Commission in saying that
the use of PSEs on the basis of actual world prices cannot serve as an
acceptable guideline for trade liberalization. The reason is that
exogenous changes in world prices or exchange rates might affect the
protection level without a change in agricultural policy measures. This
leads to the EC's aggregate measurement of support which is presented
in Section B. II. 7. See Christen [1990, Chapter VI] for details.
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The derivation of Equation [16'] follows Koester [1980].19
Regarding the introduction of an agricultural price policy on an other-
wise liberalized world market, Equation [ 16] can be reformulated to
[16*] dY/Y - <Pl - Pw)/Pw-
Equation [ 16' ] indicates that the change in the sectoral income due to a
change in agricultural price policy is fully determined by the NRP in the
no-input case and a zero price elasticity of supply. Obviously, the two
assumptions are very unrealistic. First, the price elasticity of aggregate
supply in agriculture is certainly not zero, and it is even doubtful
whether it is relatively low [Peterson, 1979; 1988]. Second, the input
share is definitely not zero in agriculture, although it is lower than in
the manufacturing sector. There are two common ways of dealing with
insufficiencies in the concept of nominal protection:
(1) The underlying output price distortions are used within economic
models to derive impacts of price policy on earnings, income, private
and governmental expenditure, or economic welfare.
(2) The measurement of protection concentrates more on value added and
income than on output prices.
We will follow the second path now and introduce measures of pro-
tection that are more closely oriented at agricultural income.
2. Producer Subsidy Equivalents
The concept of PSEs is a measure of protection which came from agri-
cultural economics research. Most other important approaches to measure
protection originate from trade theory and trade policy and were applied
to agricultural protection at a later stage.
The measurement of PSEs dates back to a study by Josling for the
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) [FAO,
b] and was applied again in later studies by the same author [Josling,
1979; 1980]. The PSE concept was revitalized during the last years and
has been used extensively in order to observe and to compare agri-
cultural policies across countries and over time [OECD, a, 1988, 1989,
1990, 1991; b; c; USDA, 1987; 1988a; 1988b; 1990]. Beyond the
measurement of support for agriculture, PSEs have been advocated by20
agricultural economists as a concept at which agricultural trade liber-
alization under the Uruguay Round could be oriented [ Tangermann et
al., 1987; Josling, Tangermann, 1989; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
BML, 1988]. Consequently, a debate was stimulated on the pros and cons
of PSEs as measures of agricultural protection [Peters, 1988; Hertel,
1989a; 1989b; Christen, 1990].
A PSE indicates which part of producers' earnings is induced by
agricultural policy. A PSE of 15 percent indicates that 15 percent of
producers' earnings are caused by the instruments of agricultural policy.
Hence, a positive value of the PSE stands for an income support for
producers, whereas a negative PSE indicates a taxation of producers.
There is a consensus on the verbal definition of PSEs among the
major users of the concept, i. e. , the FAO, the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the USDA. However, various
analytical definitions of the concept do exist. The major difference is
which kinds of policies are considered. The FAO study of Josling
referred to product-specific agricultural policies for which price equi-
valents could be calculated. Those policies are market price support,
deficiency payments and subsidies of inputs, storage, and transport. A
major advantage of recent definitions of the PSE is that additional poli-
cies were taken into account that are not product-specific. The OECD
[b] extended the definition by introducing direct income transfers and
indirect measures of income support like budgetary expenses for agricul-
tural research, extension and structural policy. The USDA [ 1990]
utilizes a similar and broad PSE definition which considers overvalued
exchange rates in LDCs additionally. This reveals the main advantage of
the concept: PSEs are an aggregate measure for the impact of a broad
variety of agricultural policies on earnings in agriculture. They are not
restricted to price policies but cover a whole range of other policies like
factor market policies, trade restrictions, direct income transfers, and
government outlays for total agriculture rather than for individual
agricultural products.
The OECD distinguishes three different analytical versions of the
PSE concept. First, the absolute value of the producer subsidy equiva-
lent (APSE) is defined as21
[17] APSE - q^- (p1 - pw) + D - L + B.
g
q. indicates the quantity supplied, and p. and p are again the domestic
1 l w
producer price and the world price, respectively. The first component
on the right-hand side of Equation [ 17] is also called market price
support. D stands for direct income transfers, L for producer levies and
fees, and B indicates other budget payments to agriculture, either in
direct or in implicit form.
Additionally, the OECD calculates a producer subsidy equivalent per
produced unit (apse):
[18] apse = APSE/q^
as well as in percent of the producers' actual earnings including policy-
induced income transfers (PSE):
[19] PSE = (APSE • 100)/(q? • p. + D - L)
If Equation [19] is contrasted with Equation [1], it can be seen that
PSEs cannot readily be compared with the NRP. Actual earnings of the
producers enter into the denominator of Equation [19], and the hypo-
thetical free-trade price is in the denominator of Equation [1]. In order
to allow for a direct comparison between both concepts, Tangermann et
al. [ 1987] have introduced a further PSE concept. It shows the PSE as a
percentage of domestic production evaluated at world market prices.
Equation [ 19] can then be modified to
[19'] PSE = (APSE • 100)/(q^ • p + D - L).
This modified PSE concept includes the NRP as a special case. Like the
USDA and OECD concepts, it starts from a given level of production.
The quantity supplied under the existing policy and under world market
This is not the case, however, for the early Josling approach pre-
sented in FAO [b]. Josling stressed the impacts of agricultural policies
on producers' earnings and used price elasticities of supply and
demand for computing those impacts.22
s s conditions is assumed to be equal (q. = q ), i.e., the price elasticity of
1 ^v
supply is zero. Starting from this assumption and given that only price
policies exist, the PSE according to Equation [19'] is identical with the
NRP as defined in Equation [1]. It is also equal to the percentage
policy impact on producers' earnings in this special case.
In several respects, the monitoring of PSEs by the OECD and the
USDA has yielded further progress over time. Starting from Equations
[17]-[19] in OECD [b], the difference between net PSEs and gross PSEs
was introduced in OECD [a, 1988, Part III, Annex 1]. This distinction
has nothing to do with exchange rate corrections which cause the
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difference between net and gross nominal protection. Net PSEs and
gross PSEs are computed for livestock products, since incentives are
obviously affected in this sector by output-oriented as well as input-
oriented policies. Gross PSEs, as shown in OECD [b], consider output-
oriented policies alone. Net PSEs are calculated by subtracting the
taxation of certain inputs from the gross PSEs of livestock production.
The amount of input taxation or subsidization is called "farm feed ad-
justment". Net PSEs are computed along these lines for milk, beef and
veal, pigmeat, poultry, sheepmeat, wool, eggs, and total livestock pro-
duction. Analogous to Equations [17]-[19], net total PSEs, net unit PSEs
and net percentage PSEs are exhibited. More recently, the monitoring of
PSEs has included PSEs per farmer and PSEs per cropped area [ OECD,
a, 1989, Annex 2]. A further refinement of PSE calculations was
introduced and explained in OECD [a, 1990, Part IV]. Components of
PSEs and changes in PSEs were elaborated. PSEs were decomposed ac-
cording to whether the assistance is due to transfers from consumers,
transfers from taxpayers or budget revenues. Furthermore, net total
PSEs were broken down into a production volume component and several
unit value components: market price support, direct payments and farm
feed adjustment. Further decompositions are applied to these unit value
components. Additionally, individual researchers have tried to dis-
aggregate the OECD's PSEs into PERTs and PESTs [Rausser, de Gorter,
In the case that only agricultural price policies exist, it holds that
S S
D = L = B = O. A zero price elasticity of supply yields q. = q . Equa-
tion [19'] reduces then to PSE = 100 • (pj - pw>/pw = NRP.
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See Equations [6]-[11] in this chapter.23
1991]. PERTs can be described as productive policies which are designed
to provide public goods and PESTS as predatory policies which are
primarily intended to affect redistribution [Rausser, 1982]. PSE estimates
have also been introduced into the OECD's ministerial trade mandate
model and a Walrasian general equilibrium model in order to compute the
impacts of a removal of agricultural protection in DCs [ Huff, Moreddu,
1990; Lienert, 1990; Burniaux et al. , 1990].
A major change has been introduced by the OECD [a, 1991]. Anal-
ogous to the idea of NPCs, nominal assistance coefficients (NACs) have
been introduced and computed. The purpose is to measure the price
wedge explicitly that various agricultural policies drive between domestic
and border prices. Although this seems like a return to nominal pro-
tection, the NAC concept incorporates as many policy instruments as
does the OECD's PSE approach. Hence, due to a rather comprehensive
policy coverage, the NAC concept can be regarded as an improvement
compared with many traditional applications of nominal protection. The
producer nominal assistance coefficient (PNAC) measures the price wedge
for producers and is defined formally as
[20] PNAC = (p + apse)/p .
If the PSE per unit is positive, i. e. , producers are supported, the
PNAC is above unity. Analogously, the PNAC is below unity if the PSE
per unit is negative.
The analysis of PSEs by the USDA has also developed further, and
the data basis covers now a wide range of countries and their major
commodities in the period 1982-1987 [USDA, 1990]. PSEs are presented in
percent of the value of production, per ton in local currency and in US
dollars. Moreover, the policy transfers to producers are decomposed into
the major agricultural policies of the countries which cause the trans-
fers.
By now, there is a vast empirical evidence on PSEs in DCs [ OECD,
a, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991; b] and also on PSEs in DCs compared with
LDCs [USDA, 1987; 1988a; 1988b; 1990; OECD, a, 1991] for the last
decade. This evidence allows for the 1980s a cross-country comparison of
agricultural income support and of income support for individual agri-24
cultural products. It further allows a cross-commodity comparison within
individual countries and an analysis of agricultural protection over time.
The advantages of the PSE concept have been addressed very
clearly by those who are engaged in the PSE estimation: "First, despite
the data problems, the PSE methodology can be implemented for a wide
range of countries, commodities and policies . . . Second, by aggregating
a wide range of government policies into a single indicator, PSEs improve
our ability to make the extent of government subsidies more transparent
to policymakers and the public. PSEs illustrate the relative importance of
total government assistance in different countries and commodity mar-
kets. PSEs help to show which forms of government assistance are most
important in individual countries or in specific commodity markets. When
examined over time, PSEs indicate changing government involvement in
agricultural sectors" [ Chattin, 1989, pp. 354-355].
Although it is generally appreciated that PSEs go beyond all other
measures of protection in their policy coverage, there is an ongoing
discussion on the pros and cons of the concept. Criticisms of the PSE
refer to remaining insufficiencies of the concept, to some simplifying
assumptions and the conceptual limitations. The first argument is that
there are still insufficiencies left if a comprehensive analysis of all in-
come-relevant policies is aimed at. Several agricultural policies are still
excluded from the computation of PSEs like implicit transfers in the
social security system or the impacts of most instruments of general
economic policy. Hence, PSEs are still limited due to an incomplete
coverage of policies, and the missing policies are designed rather differ-
ently across countries. However, it has to be borne in mind that these
insufficiencies in policy coverage are much more important in most ap-
plications of the other concepts of protection measurement.
The second argument refers to the assumptions of the concept. In
its implemented form, some strong assumptions were introduced which re-
strain the capabilities of the concept to model correctly the income ef-
fects of agricultural policies. Cases in point are that the price elasticity
of supply is assumed to be zero, that cross-country effects in supply
Empirical studies suggest that hidden income transfers towards agri-
culture within the social security system may be significant in indi-
vidual countries. This is shown (e.g., for Germany) in Scheele
[1990].25
and demand are ignored and that the small-country case is posited.
Thus, the computation of PSEs along the lines of the OECD or the USDA
cannot substitute for a detailed and careful modelling of income effects of
agricultural policy within a more realistic framework.
The third argument refers to limitations of the concept as such. It
is argued by several authors that it depends on the objectives of
analysis whether PSEs are a suitable indicator of policy interventions. It
has been proposed, e.g., to use PSEs as a guideline for trade liber-
alization under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The measurement of PSEs is income-oriented and not
oriented at the trade effects of agricultural policies. Therefore, one can
show that there are other indicators which are superior to PSEs in
serving this end. Very different agricultural policies may be equivalent
PSE-wise but may have crucially different trade effects [ de Gorter,
Harvey, 1990]. It is a major argument of DCs relying upon quotas that
they provide income support to their farmers without affecting trade
compared with a free-trade scenario. On the basis of this reasoning,
trade distortion equivalents (TDEs) have been introduced into the dis-
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cussion as a superior measure. A TDE is defined as
T T T
[21] TDE = 100 • (q -
T T
q is the traded quantity under policy-induced distortions, and q is
the hypothetical traded quantity under free-trade conditions.
In a further refinement of the same idea, de Gorter and Harvey
[ibid.] suggest the measurement of nominal and effective rates of distor-
tion. They stress that it is crucial to distinguish between protection,
support and distortion and to concentrate on distortions within the agri-
A detailed analysis on the pros and cons of PSEs is given in Peters
[1988]. Differences between PSEs, NRPs and effective rates of pro-
tection (ERPs) are elaborated in Schwartz and Parker [1988]. Hertel
[ 1989a; 1989b] elaborates limitations of the PSE concept showing that
income changes and changes in trade distortions may differ from PSE
changes within a realistic modelling framework. For a comprehensive
overview of the concept and its potential use, see Cahill and Legg
[1990].
2
On implementation issues of the various concepts within the GATT
negotiations, see Tangermann et al. [1987], McClatchy and Cahill
[1989] and Sarris [1989].26
cultural trade liberalization debate. The measurement of these rates of
distortion is closely linked with the recommendation to introduce pro-
ducer entitlement guarantees (PEGs) into agricultural policy [Blandford
et al., 1989]. According to the proponents, PEGs are supposed to be an
acceptable compromise for a distortion-free or nearly distortion-free
agricultural policy under the GATT negotiations. They would allow
individual countries to support farm income while reducing or eliminating
international trade distortions. Price support would be allowed for a PEG
quantity and would range below the quantity supplied under multilateral
free trade. All other support measures would be eliminated, so that do-
mestic prices would be equal to the world price and, hence, the world
price would guide the domestic production decisions.
Our discussion has focused on producer-oriented policies up to
now. A counterpart measure to the PSE is the consumer subsidy equiv-
alent (CSE). CSEs are computed by the OECD and the USDA in addition
to PSEs [OECD, b, Annex II]. The CSE is defined as the implicit tax on
consumption resulting from given policy measures. The measures included
are market price support and any subsidies to consumption. Analogous to
Equations [17]-[19] for PSEs, CSEs are expressed in three different
analytical versions. First, the absolute value of the consumer subsidy
equivalent (ACSE) is defined as
[22] ACSE = -q^ • (p£ - pj + G.
q. indicates the quantity demanded, and p. and p are the domestic
consumer price and the world price, respectively. G stands for budget
payments to consumers.
Additionally, the OECD calculates a consumer subsidy equivalent
per consumed unit (acse)
[23] acse = ACSE/q°
as well as in percent of the actual consumer expenditures including the
policy-induced income transfers
[24] CSE = (ACSE • 100)/(q° • p^).27
In general, a positive value of the CSE indicates that consumers are
subsidized due to policy measures, and a negative value means that they
are taxed. The calculation of CSEs provides important additional in-
formation for an inter-country comparison of agricultural and food pol-
icies since many countries utilize a two-tier price policy for consumers
and producers. Separate measures are in force for consumers leading to
an ambiguous connection between PSEs and CSEs across countries.
As PSEs were utilized recently in order to calculate NACs, the same
approach was introduced by the OECD [a, 1991] for CSEs. A consumer
nominal assistance coefficient (CNAC) measures the price wedge for
consumers. It relates the difference between the border price and the
CSE per unit to the border price:
[25] CNAC = (p - acse)/p
According to Equation [25], a taxation of consumers and, thus, a nega-
tive CSE per unit drives the CNAC above unity. Analogously, a sub-
sidization of consumers implies a positive CSE per unit, thus leading to a
CNAC below unity.
3. Effective Protection
The NRP and the PSE do not yet provide a sufficient indication of the
policy-induced income protection in a sector when inputs are used in the
production process. The effective protection is then the superior con-
cept. Policy may not only affect output prices but may influence input
prices, too. A typical example in agriculture is livestock production,
where input costs are often raised by a market price support for feed
grains. Whereas the NRP neglects this issue, the ERP takes policy
impacts on input costs into account.
The ERP is defined as the difference between the value added (VA)
of a sector in the situations with and without protection as a percentage
of the value added under free-trade conditions (VA ):
[26] ERP = 100 • (VA.-VA )/VA28
As in the case of nominal protection, it is also common to work with
an effective protection coefficient (EPC):
[27] EPC = VA /VA
The ERP is a widespread instrument of policy analysis mostly used
in detailed country studies that has its origin in studies of Balassa and
Corden [Balassa et al. , 1971; Corden, 1971]. When ERPs are available
for all sectors of an economy, it can be derived whether the agricultural
sector is discriminated against or supported compared with other sectors.
In case that disaggregated ERPs are available for subsectors of agri-
culture, those parts of agriculture can be identified that are favored or
taxed as compared to others. As far as NRPs as well as ERPs are avail-
able for agriculture, one can conclude whether total protection is over-
estimated or underestimated when concentrating the analysis on output
protection.
It is a straightforward exercise to show under which conditions
NRPs and ERPs are equal or unequal. Suppose that one output 0 is pro-
duced with one input I. Quantities are again assumed to be constant,
i.e., unaffected by the move from free trade to protection. This as-
sumption is in line with the common definitions of PSEs, but given
quantities refer here to inputs, too. Let us express now the ERP in
relative rather than percentage terms (tp = ERP/100). It follows then
that
[27'] tE = (VAi - VAw)/VAw.
We posit that a tariff exists on the output (t_) and on the input
(t.). Let the output as well as the input be tradable, so that prices
under world market conditions can be figured out easily. Those world
prices are p for the output and r for the input. The linkage between w w
On the theoretical foundation of the concept of effective protection,
see Balassa et al. [ 1971, Appendix A] and on its applicability, see
ibid. [pp. 21 ff. ]. Besides these classical studies of Balassa and
Corden, there are very comprehensive studies available on effective
protection, e.g., Hiemenz, von Rabenau [1973], Michaely [1977,
Chapter 4] and ten Kate [1987]. See also the survey of Donges
[1975].29
the prices under the influence of policy and those in the hypothetical
situation without policy is then
[28] p± 0 w
on the output side and
[29] r£ = (I+4) • rw
on the input side. Denominating the output quantity with q and the in-
put quantity with x yields
[30'] WAi = Pl • q - r± • x
for the value added in the existing situation with policy or
[30] VA± = (l+t0) • pw • q -
The value added in the hypothetical situation without policies, i. e. ,
under world market conditions, is
[31] VA = p • q - r • x.
Introducing Equations [30] and [31] into Equation [27'] gives the
following expression for the ERP:
[32]
[(1+V • Pw • q - (I+4) • rw • x] - (pw • q - rw • x)
Let us now introduce a new parameter a. This parameter a stands
for the share of input costs in the production value under free-trade
conditions:
[33] a = <rw • x)/(pw • q)
Dividing the right-hand side of Equation [30] by (p • q) leads,
after some reformulations, to30
[32*] t£ = (tQ - tj
Various interesting conclusions can be drawn from Equation [32']:
(1) If the output sector does not use inputs, it follows that a = 0 and
tg = tQ. The effective protection in the output sector is equal to the
nominal protection.
(2) If a uniform tariff is applied to the input and the output (t_ = t.),
the effective protection is again identical with the nominal protection.
This can easily be shown with a numerical example. Let t~ = t. = 0. 2
and a = 0.5, it follows then that t£ =- (0.2 - 0.2 • 0.5)/(I -0.5) =
0.2.
(3) If the tariff on the final product is higher than the respective tar-
iff on the raw product (t_ > t.), the effective protection of the final
product is higher than its nominal protection: tp > tn (or ERP >
NRP).
(4) If the tariff on the final product, however, is smaller than the re-
spective tariff on the raw product (tQ < t.), the effective protection
of the final product is lower than its nominal protection: tp < t_ (or
ERP < NRP).
(5) If t_ < t. • a, the effective protection of the final product is nega-
tive. t_ may be negative even if tn is positive.
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(6) It is possible to interpret the ERP as a goal variable. Suppose,
e.g., that a and t- are constant and known. It is possible then to
compute that tariff on the final product which would lead to an ERP
of zero. This is to compute the compensating tariff on the final
product (tX) which treats the sector equally as under free-trade
conditions in value-added terms. In order to realize tp = 0, it must
hold true that
(tQ -
Such an interpretation dominates in Gans [ 1985].31
or
t* i tj • a.
tJ is the compensating tariff on the final product. Analogously,
NRP* (= t* • 100) is the compensating NRP.
The theory on ERPs has been developed further in various direc-
tions. When more than one input is utilized in production, the algebra
must be modified without changing the bottomline of the argument. Sup-
pose that n inputs I. with i = 1, ..., n enter into the production
process. The effective protection of the output good can then be
measured as
n n
[34] t = (t - 2 a t )/(l - 2 a.).
i=l i=l
a. is the share of input costs for input i in the production value. From
the individual input tariffs, a weighted tariff on all n inputs can be
calculated as
n n











1] t = (t - t • 2 a )/(l - 2 a).
It can be seen from Equation [34'] that the effective protection is
identical with the nominal protection of the output good if the tariff on
the output is equal to the weighted tariff on the inputs (t_ = t.).
Analogously, t£ is higher (lower) than t_ if t» > I. (t_ < I.).
Extensions include, e.g., the application of ERPs on the case of input
substitution [Ethier, 1972].32
When the concept of effective protection is applied to LDCs and a
cross-country comparison of effective protection is aimed at, it is again
important to take exchange rate misalignments into account. All equations
above refer to gross effective protection. It is possible, however, to
introduce the following exchange rate adjustments as it was done in the
case of nominal protection. The net effective protection coefficient (net
EPC) is defined as
[36] net EPC = gross EPC • (e/e*)
and the net effective rate of protection (net ERP) as
[37] net ERP = (net EPC - 1) • 100.
e and e* are 'again the actual and the equilibrium exchange rate, re-
spectively.
It is undoubted that the ERP is superior to the NRP and to the PSE
on theoretical grounds. It has been applied on agricultural protection in
various country studies but less so in comparative analyses across
countries. That the concept is primarily used in country studies rather
than cross-country studies is due to the fact that very detailed in-
formation on input-output coefficients is needed for a solid analysis of
effective protection in agriculture. This information is often not available
for LDCs on a recent basis and, in particular, it is not available in the
form of time series. Hence, effective protection is an important tool of
policy analysis within a country study where an input-output matrix is
available for a certain point of time. It can then fruitfully be used to
evaluate the structure of protection within a country and to draw con-
clusions for a welfare-increasing change of that structure. The use of
ERPs for cross-country comparisons of agricultural protection will, how-
ever, remain limited due to data constraints. Measurement concepts,
The first detailed country studies aiming at a comprehensive analysis
of incentives for agriculture in LDCs were based on the concept of
effective protection. Studies by Gotsch and Brown [ 1980] on Pakistan,
Reca [ 1980] on Argentina, Cuddihy [ 1980] on Egypt, Bertrand [ 1980]
on Thailand, and Bovet and Unnevehr [ 1981] on Togo are cases in
point.33
which are easier to quantify, have to be utilized for that purpose,
especially NRPs or PSEs. Moreover, there is ample evidence for the
agricultural sector in LDCs that nominal protection indicates ap-
2
proximately the same pattern of protection as does effective protection.
4. Domestic Resource Costs
The concept of DRCs is closely linked to a central element of trade
theory, i. e. , the theorem of comparative advantage. More precisely, it is
the objective of the DRCs approach to measure the comparative
advantage or disadvantage a country or region has in the production of
a certain commodity.
Theory suggests that a country has a comparative advantage in the
production and the export of a commodity, if the macroeconomic opportu-
nity costs of producing an additional unit of the commodity are lower
than the country's export price. In an algebraic formulation, this implies
that
[38] f* • e + d <: p* • e
with
f* = costs of foreign inputs per unit of output,
e = exchange rate (price of one unit of foreign exchange in domestic
currency),
d = opportunity costs of domestic inputs per unit of output in domestic
currency,
p* = international price of the commodity in foreign currency.
Equation [ 38] can be reformulated to
A recent study by Con way and Bale [ 1988] indicates that EPCs may be
approximated quite easily by regression techniques using information
on NRPs for outputs and inputs and on macroeconomic data.
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This finding was confirmed recently in the country study by Dorosh
and Valdes [1990] on Pakistan.34
d <: (p* • e - f* • e)
[39] drc = d/(p* - f*) <: e.
drc stands for the domestic resource costs per unit of earned or saved
foreign exchange. Equation [39] is the formulation of DRCs originating
from Bruno [1972]. The bottomline of Equation [39] is the following: a
country has a comparative advantage in the production of an exportable,
if the macroeconomic opportunity costs of earning an additional unit of
foreign exchange are lower than the exchange rate.
Some assumptions must be fulfilled so that DRCs actually express
comparative advantage:
(1) The homogeneity assumption is fulfilled; there are no quality
differentials.
(2) Shadow exchange rates rather than official exchange rates are
utilized.
(3) The markets are undistorted by governmental interventions.
Bruno used Equation [39] in order to study the differences in
comparative advantage across sectors for Israel. In this sense, Bruno's
DRC approach is similar to the concept of effective protection which has
been used primarily for intersectoral comparisons within an economy.
An interesting reformulation of the concept was utilized in agri-
cultural economics. This analysis focused there on international compari-
2
sons of comparative advantage [Pearson, Meyer, 1974; Murphy, 1989].
One can easily rearrange Equation [39] to
[40] */<p;-f»> k i
For the differences between DRCs and effective protection, see Bruno
[1972] and Krueger [1972].
2
Monke and Pearson [ 1989] discuss DRCs as an integral part of policy
analysis for agricultural development.35
[40-] (drc/e) <: 1.
The ratio (drc/e) is then used for investigating the relative efficiency
of individual countries in producing and exporting an exportable. If this
ratio is smaller for country A than for country B, it is argued that
country A has a larger comparative advantage than country B to export
the commodity. Other reformulations of Equation [ 40] are
[40") (d • q)/((p-f) • q) k 1
[40"'] (DRC/DVA) i. 1.
q is the produced quantity of the commodity, p is the price of the com-
modity in domestic currency, and f indicates the costs of foreign inputs
per output unit in domestic currency. DRC stands for total domestic
resource costs of producing output q, and DVA is the domestic value
added in the respective sector. The approach of one of Equations [40]-
[40'"] can be used to show which country has the strongest comparative
advantage in the export of a commodity and which countries would pos-
sibly survive in case of trade liberalization.
Equations [40] and [40'"] were applied by Pearson and Meyer
[ 1974] to African coffee exporters and by Murphy [ 1989] to milk pro-
duction in the European Community (EC). Both studies exhibited clear
differences between countries. In the first study, all four countries -
Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Uganda - had coefficients below
unity indicating a comparative advantage for coffee production. The
second study, however, revealed coefficients below and above unity
saying that some EC countries have a comparative advantage and others
a comparative disadvantage in milk production.
Although the concept of DRCs is well-founded in trade theory, it
cannot be used directly for the problem at hand. First, time series and
cross-country data on the macroeconomic opportunity costs are not avail-
able. Second, the concept aims at the measurement of comparative ad-
vantage in an intervention-free world, whereas this study is targeted at
the impacts of policy on production incentives.36
5. True Protection
The measures of protection discussed up to now have one common fea-
ture: they are usually computed in order to picture the degree of inter-
vention or the impacts of intervention in one sector. Often, they addi-
tionally aim at providing guidelines for policy changes within this sector.
Consequently, NRPs, PSEs and ERPs have been used extensively to show
agricultural price intervention effects.
Thus, agricultural economics research has nearly exclusively dealt
with the impact of direct agricultural policy on agricultural incentives.
When the incentives or disincentives for agriculture which face agri-
culture as a consequence of the total set of government policies are to
be worked out, this approach remains unsatisfactory. This is especially
true for LDCs where agriculture is an important sector of the economy
and where the influence of general economic policies on agriculture has
been stressed for many years. Various recent studies emphasize that
trade and exchange rate policies in LDCs affect agriculture heavily, in
several cases more than direct agricultural policies. One important reason
for this phenomenon is that many LDCs protect their manufacturing sec-
tors against foreign competition within a strategy of import substitution.
This raises factor costs for agriculture, since wages increase as well as
prices of imported inputs like fertilizer. Moreover, the value of the
domestic currency improves, and this will implicitly tax agricultural
exports. Agricultural exports, however, make up a large proportion of
total value added in many LDCs, and this implicit taxation may place a
heavy burden on the overall economy. In general, it holds true that the
described policy discriminates against agriculture and against exportables
within agriculture, whereas the manufacturing sector is favored.
As these arguments on relative incentives capture the basic idea of
2 3
true protection, we will show them in more detail within a few graphs.
This argument is, of course, not valid for studies which dealt with
exchange rate misalignments and where net nominal protection, net
effective protection or PSEs on the basis of equilibrium exchange rates
were computed.
2
The concept rests upon the seminal work of Dornbusch [ 1974] and
Sjaastad [ 1980]. See also the survey article of Greenaway and Milner
[ 1987] and the extension of the concept in Greenaway and Milner
[1988a].
The following presentation draws heavily upon Herrmann [ 1990a].37
Figure 1 - Primary Effects of Import Protection in the Nonagricultural
Sector
Suppose that any LDC taxes manufacturing imports in order to protect
the domestic industry. The country follows a strategy of import sub-
stitution. Figure 1 shows how the tariff affects the market of the
protected manufactured product.
The import demand function of the importing country is ID, and the
country imports are q_ at the given world price in the benchmark situ-
ation without protection. The introduction of the import tariff shifts the
import demand curve to the left, from ID to ID'. This leads to a de-
crease of imports, from q_ to q... The domestic price of the manufac-
tured good rises to p., and it lies now by the import tariff t above the
world price. Hence, the incentive increases to produce the imported good
domestically.
Lower imports of the manufactured good imply a decreasing demand
for foreign exchange. The country's expenditure for the imports of the
manufactured good decline from (p • qn) to (p • q1). When import
protection covers all manufacturing imports or a large share thereof, this
effect will matter in quantitative terms, and the declining demand for
foreign exchange will affect the exchange rate. Figure 2 shows the
impact on the market for foreign exchange.
The basic equilibrium on the free market for foreign exchange is
given at the exchange rate e_ where the supply function for foreign
exchange (S) intersects the demand function for foreign exchange (D).
Decreasing imports in the manufacturing sector lower the demand for
foreign exchange from D to D', and the exchange rate falls to e.. We38






define the exchange rate as the price of one foreign currency unit in
domestic currency units, and, therefore, a falling exchange rate implies
an appreciation of the domestic currency. This currency appreciation
induces important consequential effects on agriculture, i.e., the agricul-
tural import as well as the agricultural export sector. Figure 3
illustrates first how the appreciation of the domestic currency affects the
agricultural import sector which is often represented in LDCs by food
crops.
On the left-hand side of Figure 3, the domestic market is shown
with the domestic supply function (S) and the domestic demand function
(D). This yields the surplus or import demand function ID in the right-
D S
hand diagram. In the basic situation, q „ is consumed, q_ is produced,
and qn is imported at the price p _. p 0 indicates the equilibrium market
price denominated in the domestic currency, and it arises from the inter-
$
national price denominated in US dollars (p ), multiplied by the base-
period nominal exchange rate (e ). Suppose now that the policy-induced
appreciation of the domestic currency follows. The price of the agricul-
tural importable in domestic currency falls to p., since the exchange
rate lowers to e... Thus, it becomes more attractive to import foods. Im-
ports rise to qn , consumption increases also to q.. , and production ID lowers to q1 . Obviously, the importing countries are getting more
dependent upon agricultural imports due to the import substitution
strategy in the manufacturing sector.39
Figure 3 - Effects of Nonagricultural Import Protection on the Agri-
cultural Import Sector (Food Crops)
Domestic Market International Market
Figure 4 captures impacts of the currency appreciation on agricul-
tural exports. The export supply curve of the country is ES and it ex-
ES D
ports q_ at the market equilibrium price p_. The appreciation of the
domestic currency reduces the price which a coffee producer, e.g., re-
ceives in domestic currency: from p to p1 . If producers plan in the
o ES
domestic currency, export supply lowers to q1 . It follows that export
D ES D ES
earnings fall, too, from (p_ • q_ ) to (p.. • q1 ). An implicit taxation
of the agricultural export sector occurs.
The impacts shown above can be summarized as a rise of the price
ratio between manufactured and agricultural products, i. e. , the relative
price between urban and rural goods. Thus, rural-urban migration is
favored, and consequential effects on markets for nontradables like
services, construction and housing are induced. The major impacts on
the market for nontradables are presented in Figure 5. In the basic
equilibrium, demand for nontradables (D«) is equal to the supply of non-
tradables (SQ) at the price p-.. The quantity of nontradables supplied
and demanded is q_. Rural-urban migration due to the changed rural-
urban price ratio increases demand for nontradables to D-. We can think
of increased demand for housing, construction and services in the urban
areas. Nontradable sectors have to compete with the manufacturing
sector which is booming due to import protection. Hence, factor prices in
the nontradable sector are raised, and the supply curve for nontradables
shifts to the left: from S- to S-. This increases prices for nontradables
from p0 to p,. It can be concluded that import-substitution policy in the40
Figure 4 - Impacts of Nonagricultural Import Protection on the Agricul-
tural Export Sector
Figure 5 - Impacts of Nonagricultural Import Protection on the Nontrad-
able Sector
manufacturing sector will cause prices to rise not only in the protected
but also in the unprotected nontradable sector.
Some important findings can be derived from the simple graphical
analysis shown above:
(1) If the nonagricultural sector in a LDC is insulated from the world
market and domestic production is protected by tariffs, the produc-
tion of agricultural tradables is implicitly taxed.
(2) Food imports are stimulated as a consequence of an import substitu-
tion strategy in the manufacturing sector. Domestic production of
food crops is hindered by the industrialization policy and the macro-41
economic framework. Import substitution in the nonagricultural sector
thus leads to an increasing import dependence in agriculture.
(3) Agricultural exports suffer from an import substitution policy in the
nonagricultural sector. The price of agricultural exportables drops in
domestic currency. In relative terms, it falls compared with prices of
the protected manufacturing products and of nontradables.
The concept of true protection is suitable to analyze the intersec-
toral linkages presented above. It captures implications of trade policy
measures in one sector on relative prices between sectors of the econo-
my. With this approach, true protection is clearly different from nominal
or effective protection. Whereas NRPs or ERPs are applied to individual
markets or sectors, often within partial equilibrium approaches, the
concept of true protection is by definition a concept of general
equilibrium analysis.
In the theoretical foundation of the true protection concept [Dorn-
busch, 1974; Sjaastad, 1980], an importable, an exportable and a non-
tradable are produced and consumed. True protection is related to the
question how policy changes the price of exportables relative to those of
importables and nontradables. Or, put differently: true protection
measures how the burden of import protection is shifted on to export-
2
ables and nontradables. Dornbusch has shown that an import tariff
raises the price ratios between the importable and the nontradable and
also between the nontradable and the exportable. Hence, import tariffs
imply that nontradables are taxed compared with importables. Additional-
ly, it is discriminated against exportables relative to both importables
and nontradables. It depends on the substitutive relationship between
This is not to say that NRPs and ERPs cannot be used in general
equilibrium analyses. They certainly can, but they were mostly used
within partial equilibrium analyses, and the definition of NRPs and
ERPs are related to one sector. On the differences between true and
effective protection, see Greenaway and Milner [ 1987].
2
It is also possible to study the effects of trade liberalization or finan-
cial market liberalization within general equilibrium models of the true
protection type. For such analyses, see Sell [ 1988; 1990].
The analysis is based on the assumption that the cross price elastici-
ties of surplus demand for nontradables with regard to the prices of
the tradables are positive, whereas the corresponding cross price
elasticities between the tradables are zero. See Dornbusch [ 1974, pp.
179 and 181].42
the products in supply and demand how strong these impacts actually
are.
Standard measures of true protection are the true tariff rate (t*)
and the true subsidy (s*). The definitions rely upon the assumption that
import tariffs and export subsidies exist as trade-regulating devices.
The true tariff rate measures the change of the price ratio between the
import sector (M) and the nontradable or home goods sector (H):
[41] t* = A (PM/PH) = (l+t)/(l+d) - 1 = (t-d)/(l+d)
t stands for the tariff on the aggregate import good, and d indicates the
price increase for the nontradable good. Thus, t* describes how strong-
ly the import sector is actually protected through an import tariff
relative to the nontradable sector. The true subsidy is defined as a
change of the. price ratio between the exportable (X) and the nontrad-
able sector:
[42] s* = A (PX/PH) = (s-d)/(l+d)
s is the nominal subsidy rate, and the true subsidy shows how strongly
the export sector is actually taxed compared with the nontradable sector.
Empirical studies utilizing the concept of true protection often work
with Sjaastads incidence parameter a [Sjaastad, 1980]. This parameter
expresses the percentage change of the -price ratio between nontradables
and exportables due to a one percent change of the price ratio between
importables and exportables:
Empirical studies with the concept of true protection are available for
Cameroon [Milner, 1990], Colombia [Garcia, 1981], Ivory Coast
[Greenaway, 1989], Ghana [Miethbauer, 1990], Mauritius [Greenaway,
Milner, 1986], Nigeria [Oyejide, 1986; Zachaus, 1990], Pakistan
[Dorosh, Valdes, 1990], the Philippines [Bautista, 1987], Zimbabwe
[Mlambo, 1989; Wiebelt, 1992], Zaire [Tshibaka, 1986], and in a com-
parative analysis for Peru and Malaysia [Herrmann et al. , 1990].43
u ranges between 0 and 1. The magnitude of <o provides information to
which extent the burden of import protection is transmitted to the export
sector. This is all the more the case, the more <o approaches unity.
o=l implies that the prices of importables and home goods rise by the
same rate, whereas prices in the exportable sector remain unchanged.
There is a tendency of o to approach unity when importables and non-
tradables are close substitutes and when nontradables and exportables
are not substitutes or the substitutional relationship is very weak.
Alternatively, o will converge towards zero when nontradables and ex-
portables are close substitutes, whereas importables and nontradables are
not. Then, p.. is not closely following the changes in p.,.
The following interpretation of empirical estimates of the incidence
parameter u is possible:
- In case of o = o, the burden of import protection is imposed equally on
the nontradable and the export sector.
- If co = 1, the export sector alone is burdened with the consequences of
import protection.
- If co ranges between 0 and 1 and if it is significantly higher than zero,
import protection places a heavier burden on the export sector than on
the nontradable sector.
It must be added that the incidence parameter u has to be combined
with additional information on protection levels when true tariff rates and
true subsidy rates shall be derived. Suppose that the true subsidy rate
for total agricultural exports is searched for. From Equation [42], the
true subsidy rate is the result of
- direct subsidies for agricultural exports (s) and
- indirect taxes resulting from the appreciating effect (d) of both export
subsidies and import taxes on manufactures.
The latter effect is given by
[44] d = co • t + (l-co)s
where t and s are the weighted average implicit import taxes on manu-
factures and export subsidies on agricultural exportables, respectively.
By now, the concept of true protection has been successfully
applied in empirical studies to show how import substitution strategies in
favor of the manufacturing sector, overvalued exchange rates or booms44
in other sectors tax agriculture and, in particular, agricultural exports.
The empirical evidence reveals that the estimates of o are relatively
high. They are in nearly all cases above 0.5 and approach unity for
some countries and commodities. This implies that the implicit taxation
of agricultural exports via macroeconomic policies is strong. Starting
from individual inter-country comparisons, the evidence suggests that an
inter-country comparison of incidence parameters is insufficient when
differential incentives for production in various countries are to be
elaborated. It seems that the NRPs in the agricultural sector and in the
manufacturing sector vary widely across countries, whereas this is not
the case for the incidence parameter o [ Herrmann et al. , 1990].
6. Nominal Protection of the Price Ratio between Agriculture and Non-
agriculture
This concept has been developed as a major element of 18 country stud-
ies within the World Bank's project on "The Political Economy of Agri-
cultural Pricing Policy" [Krueger et al. , 1984; 1988; Krueger, 1989;
2
Schiff, 1989]. The computation of net NRPs is combined with a general
equilibrium approach. Policy impacts on agricultural incentives in a coun-
try are measured by the NRF of the price ratio between agriculture and
nonagriculture. Consequential policy impacts like those on production,
trade and economic welfare are based upon this measurement of pro-
tection.
For a critical discussion of the magnitude of o and some other features
of the concept, see Singh [1988], Smeets [1989] and Greenaway and
Milner [1988b; 1990].
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Published country studies include Avillez et al. [ 1988] on Portugal,
Jansen [ 1988] on Zambia, Dethier [ 1989] on Egypt, Garcia and Llamas
[1989] on Colombia, Greene and Roe [1989] on the Dominican Republic,
Jenkins and Lai [1989] on Malaysia, Moon and Kang [1989] on South
Korea, Siamwalla and Setboonsarng [ 1989] on Thailand, Tuluy and
Salinger [ 1989] on Morocco, Intal and Power [ 1990] on the Philippines,
Stryker [ 1990] on Ghana, Valdes et al. [ 1990] on Chile, Sturzenegger
and Otrera [ 1990] on Argentina, and Hamid and Nabi [ 1990] on
Pakistan. Forthcoming are the studies on Brazil (Carvalho, Brandao),
Ivory Coast (Atsain et al. ), Sri Lanka (Bhalla), and Turkey (Olgun,
Kasnakoglu). Preliminary results of the Turkey study are included in
Olgun [1989].45
A distinctive feature of the approach is that the measure of total
agricultural protection (NRP_) can be decomposed into one component
that indicates protection due to direct agricultural policies (NRP—) and
another component that captures protection due to indirect agricultural
policies (NRPJ:
[45] NRP = NRP + NRP





























NRP is in each case defined for an agricultural/nonagricultural price
ratio, p. is the domestic producer price of a tradable agricultural
product i, and p.' is the border price of this product evaluated at the
official nominal exchange rate (p.* = p. • e ). p* marks the border price
of the product evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate (p? = p.






with a tradable share a and a nontradable share (1-a) and the respective






cult-ural price index where
the price index of the tradable part is evaluated at the equilibrium
exchange rate and in the absence of trade policy measures affecting
nonagricultural tradables (indicated by a tariff t^.). Let the equilibrium






ual to the world market price of nonagricultural trad-




together with the official exchange rate and the
existing trade policy, the actual price index for nonagricultural tradables
as follows:




Introducing Equations [51] and [52] into Equation [50] yields the follow-










Four aspects make the approach of the World Bank's project
especially attractive:
(1) The total magnitude of agricultural protection originating from direct
and indirect agricultural policies can be analyzed with the approach.
Direct agricultural policies cover those policies that are directed
towards agriculture, like market price policies, export taxes or input
subsidies within the sector. Indirect agricultural policies are those47
instruments of general economic policy which have consequential
effects on agriculture, like trade or exchange rate policy.
(2) The contributions of direct and indirect agricultural policies on total
agricultural protection can be determined precisely on the basis of
the algebra shown above.
(3) The analysis of price protection is the basis for detailed studies of
the impacts on production, consumption, trade, the budget, and
economic welfare.
(4) The World Bank's approach goes beyond the true protection analysis
with regard to the policies covered. General macroeconomic policies,
e.g., fiscal policies, can be captured in addition to trade, exchange
rate and price .policies.
Given the broad country and commodity coverage of the World
Bank's project, innovative new results were produced on the magnitude,
structure and causes of agricultural protection in LDCs.
Although being attractive conceptually, the approach is much more
suitable for detailed country analyses than for combined cross-country
and time series analyses of agricultural protection. Data requirements
are usually too demanding for realizing detailed country studies for a
sufficiently long time period on a broad country basis.
7. Other Measures of Agricultural Protection or Protection Effects
The preceding analysis provided an overview of some commonly used
measures of agricultural protection or of agricultural protection effects.
Other measures have been emphasized in the literature and were used in
quantitative studies. They will be reviewed here only briefly.
Another measure used by Balassa et al. [ 1971, pp. 331 ff. ] con-
siders the fact that production for domestic markets in LDCs may be
treated differently by policy than production for exports. This measure
is called the bias against exports (BAE) and is defined as follows:
An interesting extension of the World Bank's concept is provided by
Schmitz [ 1989] who distinguishes three components of the total NRP:
the internal direct effect, the internal indirect effect and the external
effect. The first two effects are those considered in Equation [ 45].
The external effect arises from agricultural policies in DCs.48
[53] BAE - 100 • (VAD - VAX)/VAX
It captures the percentage excess of value added obtainable from pro-
ducing for domestic markets (VAD) over that obtainable in exporting
(VAX). Value added is in both cases defined for the existing situation
with protection. As far as BAE is positive, there is a policy-induced
BAE and an incentive to produce for the domestic market. If BAE is
negative, the reverse holds true.
There is an additional measurement concept which did not receive
general acceptance but was used in an important empirical study of
agricultural protection by Peterson [1979], whose results will be dis-
cussed later. Peterson addressed the issue whether the pattern of agri-
cultural protection differs crucially between DCs and LDCs. Within a
cross-section approach, he measured for each country a relative price
(p ) between an aggregate output price for the agricultural sector (p)
p













where p . is the domestic price of the commodity i, p . the world market
1 W
 1
export price in US dollars of the commodity i, Pwrr the world market export price for wheat in US dollars, and w. the share of the commodity
i in total output of each country in wheat equivalent units, p can be
interpreted as the overall wheat equivalent price for a country. Based
on Equations [54] and [55], Peterson compared the relative incentives
for agricultural production across countries.
Individual measures of protection have gained importance in the
discussion around the liberalization of international agricultural trade.
This holds especially true for the support measurement unit (SMU)
introduced by the EC Commission [ Riethmuller et al. , 1990]. It was49
proposed as an instrument at which agricultural reform should be
orientated. The concept of the SMU is similar to that of the PSE; it is
supposed to be an aggregate measurement of support which would cover
the protective impact of various agricultural policy instruments. The
SMU would be computed as the price difference per unit of output.
Although the concept has never been defined precisely by the EC, there
are differences to the PSE concept which are stressed by the EC Com-
mission. In particular, the SMU shall be based on the world price in a
fixed period rather than on the actual price as a reference price. The
reason for this is that fluctuations in markets and exchange rates shall
be kept outside of the measure. The EC argues that those fluctuations
have nothing to do with protection and, hence, should not be treated as
an element of protection in the measurement concept.
Finally, when impacts of agricultural protection are derived within
modelling approaches, many important economic variables are covered
which have not been discussed up to now. Depending on the objective of
the analysis, policy impacts on output, on trade, on government revenue
or expenditures, on the welfare of economic groups within an economy,
2
and on aggregate welfare are analyzed.
III. Review of Empirical Studies on Agricultural Protection
There is a famous traditional hypothesis saying that price policy in LDCs
discriminates against agriculture. Most agricultural economists, e.g.,
Schultz , profess to this view and stress the negative economic con-
sequences of the discrimination. They argue that policy-induced distor-
tions cause insufficient investments in agriculture of LDCs, a low adap-
A more precise interpretation of the concept is given in Christen
[ 1990, pp. 113 ff. ].
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For a detailed analysis of agricultural policy or welfare economics, see
Boadway and Bruce [1984], Gardner [1987], Houck [1986], Just et al.
[1982], and Tsakok [1990, pp. 131 ff. ].
See Schultz [ 1978, pp. 5 ff. ]. There are similar arguments in Brown
[1978] and Hayami and Ruttan [1985, pp. 383 ff. ]. A comprehensive
qualitative analysis of the urban bias, or anti-rural bias, in LDCs'
policies is given in Lip ton [1977]. A very detailed analysis of
incentives for agriculture and price distortions in world agriculture is
provided in World Bank [1986].50
tion of technical change and an increasing dependence on imported food.
Wrong price signals on output and input markets and economic welfare
losses due to this policy are emphasized as well as their unintended side
effects on rural-urban migration and on urban poverty.
Up to the early 1980s, the traditional hypothesis was investigated
empirically only for some countries. Since then, however, quite a few
cross-country studies on agricultural price incentives or distortions in
LDCs have appeared. In the following, we will give a brief summary of
the recent empirical literature on agricultural protection in LDCs. The
current knowledge on the issue will be elaborated first. Then, it will be
worked out where deficiencies of the available studies exist and what our
own quantitative analysis, which follows in the next chapter, adds to the
available literature.
1. The Empirical Evidence
The results of recent empirical analyses on agricultural protection and
food policy in LDCs give rise to the following stylized facts:
(1) The degree of agricultural support is much higher in DCs than in
LDCs.
(2) Within the agricultural sector in LDCs, it is discriminated against
export crops as opposed to food crops.
(3) In many cases, direct agricultural policies in LDCs are less important
than indirect agricultural policies for agricultural incentives.
(4) Food consumption in LDCs tends to be heavily subsidized by food
policy.
(5) There is no clear-cut evidence whether direct agricultural policies in
LDCs discriminate against food crops.
(6) Direct agricultural policies in LDCs tend to insulate domestic
producer prices from world prices and often stabilize prices.
See Bale and Lutz [1981], where the traditional hypothesis is
confirmed for Argentina, Egypt, Thailand, and Pakistan for the year
1976. The same result occurred for Kenya which is additionally covered
in Lutz and Scandizzo [ 1980]. The conventional hypothesis of a
taxation of agriculture is elaborated in further country studies, too,
e.g., in Reca [1980] for Argentina. A somewhat more mixed result is
presented for Pakistan in Gotsch and Brown [ 1980].51
a. Agricultural Support in LDCs as Opposed to DCs
By now, there is a wide empirical evidence available showing that DCs
protect their agricultural sectors. Table Al gives an overview of the
pattern of protection in this country group. Recent PSE estimates for
the OECD countries are summarized there by country and by product
[OECD, a, 1990]. Percentage PSEs for total agriculture were positive in
all periods between 1979 and 1989. The percentage PSE according to
Equation [ 19] amounted to 37 percent in the period 1979-1986 and to 44
percent in 1990, on average, for the OECD countries. Additionally, the
average PSE across OECD countries for individual products were in all
cases positive. Within this general pattern, there are remarkable
structural differences, however. The inter-country comparison shows
that the agricultural protection of Switzerland and Norway ranked
highest in all years. Besides this, it can be summarized that percentage
PSEs for total agriculture were in each period in Japan higher than in
the EC, in the EC higher than in the USA and in the USA higher than
in Australia and New Zealand. The latter two countries have the lowest
level of agricultural protection among the OECD countries. Scandinavian
countries, in particular Norway and Finland, rank very high in the scale
of agricultural protection. Percentage PSEs are not far from those of
Japan, i. e. , clearly above average. When average PSEs in the OECD are
compared across agricultural products, it is striking that percentage
PSEs fluctuate strongly from year to year. This is primarily due to
variations in the world price, in particular in crop production. Among
the crops, rice and sugar were the most heavily protected products in
all years. In livestock production, net percentage PSEs are in all years
highest for either milk production or sheepmeat, followed by beef and
veal. When PSEs for crops are compared with those for livestock pro-
ducts, no consistent pattern is visible over the years. The results
reveal that PSEs for crops vary stronger over time, mostly due to
fluctuating world market prices. Consequently, PSEs for crops were
higher than those for livestock production in the period 1986-1989, but
slightly lower before.
In any case, Table Al shows clearly how strongly agriculture is
supported in the most important DCs. Additionally, there are some52
cross-country studies available dealing with the comparison of agri-
cultural incentives in DCs versus LDCs.
A direct comparison of real agricultural prices across countries was
provided for 1968-1970 in a study by Peterson [1979]. Based on real
producer prices as defined in Equation [54], Peterson computed the pro-
tection levels shown in Table 1. The major finding is that real prices
received by farmers in DCs were clearly higher than those in LDCs.
Although there are a few exceptions like South Korea or Pakistan, this
major result is very pronounced. The highest level of protection, in
Japan, was more than seven times higher than the lowest level of pro-
tection, in Niger. And: "Prices received in the top ten countries
averaged 3.7 times larger than prices in the lowest ten" [ibid., p. 14].
A further important element of the Peterson study is that he used
the real prices received by farmers for estimating an international
agricultural supply function. A main result of this analysis is that the
estimated price elasticities of agricultural supply ranged between 1.25
and 1.66. Thus, they were way beyond traditional estimates of the price
elasticity of agricultural supply. Peterson argues first that the cross-
sectional analysis rather yields the long-run supply elasticity, whereas
traditional time series approaches capture the short-run elasticity, and
second that the high magnitude of the supply elasticity indicates that a
discriminatory price policy in LDCs places a much higher burden on the
overall economy than previously expected.
Although the price data and the conclusions of the Peterson study
2
were criticized, especially in their relevance for Africa, other recent
studies seem to support the major findings of Peterson. Various empirical
studies reveal that the degree of agricultural protection rises with eco-
nomic development [Balisacan, Roumasset, 1987; de Haen, Schafer, 1988;
Skully, 1990] or with other variables that are correlated with economic
Kislev [ 1981, p. 280] adds the argument that Peterson's relative prices
can be viewed as effective exchange rates and that his supply equation
"can be interpreted more generally as a response function to effective
exchange rate distortions".
2
See Mclntire [1983] and the response of Peterson [1983].
It is also shown in commodity-related studies for wheat and rice that
protection increases with economic development [ Herrmann, 1989;
Thiele, 1990; Schenck, 1991]. Some empirical evidence is also given53




























(a) Real prices are





















































































Source: Peterson [1979, p. 14].
development [Honma, Hayami, 1986]. There is ample evidence, too, that
the price elasticity of agricultural supply is positive and relatively high
in the medium and long run [Cavallo, 1989; Mundlak et al. , 1989]. This
and explained in political economy terms by Anderson and Tyers
[1989].
Price elasticities of agricultural supply derived within a comparative
static framework are usually smaller. See, e.g., Binswanger et al.
[1987] or Bond [1983]. Surveys of these traditional estimates of supply
elasticities are given in Askari and Cummings [1976], Ghatak and
Ingersent [1984, Chapter 7] and Rao [1989]. A discussion of the
importance of price versus nonprice factors in determining agricultural
supply response can be found in Krishna [ 1982] and Beynon [ 1989] for
Sub-Saharan Africa.54
implies that the distortion of price incentives for agriculture as opposed
to nonagriculture places a heavy burden on the overall economy [Valdes,
1986]. By utilizing a sectoral growth model, Cavallo [1989] and Mundlak
et al. [ 1989] show in the context of Argentina that a freer trade regime
combined with monetary and fiscal discipline would have produced sub-
stantially better economic performance. The price ratio would have
changed strongly in favor of agriculture, and agricultural output would
have increased significantly.
It has to be borne in mind, however, that the stronger policy-
induced support of agriculture in DCs than in LDCs does not imply that
agricultural prices relative to nonagricultural prices are also higher in
DCs. Quite the opposite is true. Prasada Rao et al. [1990, p. 221]
elaborate in a cross-country study for 1975 and 1980 that "agricultural
prices relative to nonagricultural prices are lower in high-income devel-
oped economies relative to low-income developing economies". This
finding is based on a comparison between agricultural output-based and
gross-domestic-product-based purchasing power parities. It can be ex-
plained by the fact that agricultural prices tend to deteriorate more with
economic development. This is a consequence of relatively high rates of
technical change in agriculture, relatively small changes in food demand
due to a low income elasticity and rather low price elasticities of supply
and demand thus favoring relative strong price changes.
b. The Structure of Agricultural Support in LDCs: Export Crops versus
Food Crops
A further empirical result which is rather safe in the light of empirical
analyses is that many LDCs discriminate against their export crops as
opposed to their food crops. The most important recent findings on this
issue come from the World Bank's project on "The Political Economy of
Agricultural Pricing Policy" [ Krueger et al. , 1988; Schiff, 1989]. As was
argued in Section B. II. 6, the measurement approach of this project in-
corporates the incentives and disincentives from direct as well as
indirect agricultural policies and disaggregates total protection of
agriculture accordingly.55
Table 2 summarizes major results on direct, indirect and total NRPs
for representative exportables and importables within agriculture for 18
LDCs. The protection rates refer to 1975-1984. Table 2 allows the
following major conclusions regarding the differential protection of export
and food crops:
(1) Columns (4) and (8) of Table 2 illustrate that the total NRP, as
defined in Equation [46], is on average -38 percent for export
crops. Compared with the average value of -6 percent for food
crops, this suggests that agricultural policies in LDCs discriminate
against export crops as compared to food crops.
(2) The results for the individual countries are such that the NRPs for
the representative export crops are lower than for the representative
import products. The differential is in 8 countries higher than 20
percentage points. There are only two exceptions, namely Pakistan
and Zambia, where the representative importables were taxed even
more than the representative export crops.
c. The Relative Importance of Direct and Indirect Agricultural Policies
for Agriculture in LDCs
Traditionally, the policy discussion around agricultural incentives in
LDCs has emphasized the effects of such policies as agricultural price
and credit policies, fertilizer subsidies or food price policies. This means
that direct agricultural policies were in the foreground of the political
discussion. Although the importance of macroeconomic policies for agri-
cultural incentives has been stressed for a rather long time [ Lipton,
1977], rigorous quantitative analyses of those indirect agricultural
policies were unavailable until the recent past.
Again, the World Bank's project on "The Political Economy of Agri-
cultural Pricing Policy" provides important empirical findings on the
relative importance of direct and indirect agricultural policies for total
protection. Table 2 allows this disaggregation in Columns (2)-(4) for
representative export crops of LDCs and in Columns (6)-(8) for re-
presentative import crops. Some challenging results can be summarized:
(1) Of the 18 LDCs considered, 17 tax their agricultural sectors via in-




























































































































































































(a) Direct, indirect and total NRPs are computed according to Equations [45]-[48] in Section B.II.6. -
(b) South Korea and Morocco's main agricultural products are all imported. - (c) Argentina and Thailand's
main agricultural products are all exported.
Source: Schiff [1989, p. 11].57
trade and macroeconomic policies on the real exchange rate and on
the extent of protection granted to nonagricultural products. The
only exception is Chile, where indirect agricultural policies slightly
favor agricultural protection. The average indirect NRP with -27
percent is rather remarkable.
(2) For the agricultural exportables, disincentives via indirect agri-
cultural policies strengthen the disincentives due to direct agri-
cultural policies which exist in all but three cases. On average, a
stronger taxation of agriculture stems from indirect rather than
direct agricultural policies. The average direct NRP is -11 percent
and, combined with the average indirect NRP of -27 percent, adds
up to a total NRP of -38 percent.
(3) For the agricultural importables, the picture is somewhat different.
In 12 out of 16 countries, the direct NRP is positive. On average,
the NRP is 21 percent. Concentrating on direct agricultural policies
alone would yield the result that agricultural importables, i. e. , food
crops, experience policy-induced subsidies. When the impacts of
indirect agricultural policies are also taken into account, however,
this subsidization is overcompensated, and an average total nominal
protection of -6 percent can be observed. Total NRPs are negative
in 10 out of 16 countries.
We can summarize that indirect agricultural policies are in most
countries more important than direct agricultural policies for overall in-
centives in agriculture. They tend to increase taxation of agricultural
exportables in LDCs and tend to reverse subsidization due to direct
agricultural policy for importables into a net taxation.
d. The Widespread Existence of Food Subsidization in LDCs
A stylized fact in the agricultural protection literature is that LDCs tend
to subsidize food consumption [Byerlee, 1987]. This stylized fact is con-
firmed by cross-country analyses in which consumer prices of food are
compared with "world prices". One of these studies is of Byerlee and
The importance of economy-wide measures is also visible in a study on
government intervention in agriculture of the six largest Latin
American economies by Roberts and Trapido [ 1991 ].58
Sain [ 1986], and some of its results are presented in Table 3. For 1980-
1982, the authors argue that bread prices in wheat-importing countries
should have amounted to about US$0.75/kg, an estimate confirmed by-
consumer prices in Singapore and Panama where wheat was traded free-
ly. The computed NRP suggest that a widespread policy of subsidizing
bread consumption existed. The magnitude of subsidization was fairly
important. Byerlee and Sain demonstrated that the average price was 22
percent below the world price, or 27 percent if exchange rate over-
valuation is considered.
e. Does Agricultural Policy in LDCs Tax or Subsidize Food Production?"
It has been shown that many LDCs favor food crops rather than export
crops in their agricultural policies. Empirical evidence has proven, too,
that important export crops are taxed in many LDCs compared with free-
trade price levels. It is much less clear, however, whether agricultural
policy subsidizes or taxes the production of food crops compared with
world prices.
It is a stylized fact in the traditional literature on agricultural
policies in LDCs that food production is taxed due to economic and agri-
cultural policies [Brown, 1978; Lutz, Scandizzo, 1980; Schultz, 1978;
Lutz, Saadat, 1988]. The urban population has been believed to be
favored at the direct expense of the rural population. Again, Byerlee
and Sain [ 1986] contributed to this issue by a cross-country analysis of
wheat producer prices in 1980-1982. Based on the results contained in
Column (1) of Table 4, Byerlee and Sain came up with the challenging
result that producer prices for wheat in LDCs approached long-run
trend prices in the world wheat market during 1980-1982 and showed no
consistent evidence of price disincentives to wheat producers. Un-
expectedly, this basic result remains valid when exchange rate overvalu-
ation is taken into account. Column (3) in Table 4 shows this with ad-
The cross-country study of Mergos [ 1987] indicates a similar result for
wheat, rice and maize in 1972 and 1978, but is one of the studies that
relates directly farmgate and border prices without correcting for
transport costs and exchange rate distortions.59


















































































Countries are ranked ac-
cording to the unadjusted NPC. Adjusted NPCs take exchange rate mis-
alignments into account. - na = not available
Source: Byerlee, Sain [ 1986, Appendix].
justed NRPs. The findings of the Byerlee/Sain study are rather re-
markable, since the authors' approach goes beyond several earlier
quantitative studies in three respects:
(1) NPCs are calculated at one point of the marketing chain. Transport
costs are taken into account.
(2) NPCs are not only computed with official exchange rates but also
with corrected exchange rates that are supposed to incorporate
exchange rate overvaluation in many LDCs.
(3) NPCs are based on "normal" world prices. This is done in order to
avoid a comparison of domestic prices with fluctuating world prices.60
Table 4 - Estimated and Adjusted NPCs (a) for Wheat Producers in 31


































(NPC < 0.85) (percent)
No significant taxation
or subsidization
(0.85 < NPC < 1.15) (percent)
Producers subsidized






























































































































see Section B.II.l. -
(b) Net exporters; the calculation of Byerlee and Sain were not changed for these
two countries as a different method for computing international prices was used
there. - na = not available.
Source: Byerlee, Sain [1986, Table All; own computations.61
The basic economic result of Byerlee and Sain has been challenged
in the literature due to two reasons [Herrmann et al. , 1991; Taylor,
1989]. First, the major result seems to be sensitive to the modelling
approach. Second, the findings seem to be very period- and product-
specific, and a comprehensive and well-founded protection analysis for
food crops should extend the period as well as the product coverage.
Concerning the first point, it can be put forward that the modelling of
the normal world price affects the economic result. Byerlee and Sain
compute their NPC, which we call NPC.., as follows:
[56] HPC1 = Pi/p*
Like in Equation [12] of the methodological survey, p. indicates the
domestic producer price of wheat and p * the normal world wheat price.
The latter price variable is measured by a linear time trend regression
of world prices over the period 1960-1982, and both prices are evaluated
at the consumption point. The rationale for using a normal rather than
the actual world price is that p * is an indicator of expected world
prices, whereas actual world prices include a stochastic component u:
[57] p = p* + u
Hence, the approach of Byerlee and Sain can be interpreted as one
which deals with price uncertainty, whereas the traditional approach
does not. The issue to be raised here is: Does the method which is used
to eliminate the stochastic component affect the economic results? In
order to answer this question, a reduced-form econometric model of the
world wheat market was developed. The estimated world wheat price from
this econometric model (p **) was introduced as a normal price into the
calculation of the NPCs. The resulting NPC, which we call NPC differs
from the Byerlee/Sain approach by the way the normal world price is
calculated:
[58] NPC2 = pD/p**62
The econometric model is based on a stylized representation of
import demand and export supply in the world wheat market. The ex-
port supply function is
[59] Xt «• a + b p + c Y + d PIL + e PR^ + f POP
and the import demand function




X is exports and M is imports of wheat. P stands for the world wheat
price, Pp for the world rice price, PR for production of wheat, and POP
for population. Y is an income variable. The subscript X indicates ex-
porting and the subscript M importing countries, t and t-1 are the two
periods considered. Actual and lagged production are taken into account,
since a time lag between production and exports is realistic for many
exporting countries. The hypotheses on the signs of the coefficients are:
b>0, c<0, d>0, e>0, f<0, h<0, i>0, j>0, k<0, l<0, m>0. In an equilibrium
situation, exports are equal to imports:
[61] Xt = Mt
Introducing Equations [59] and [58] into Equation [61] yields the
reduced form of the world wheat model:
[62] p^ = (g-a)/(b-h) + i/(b-h) • pRt + j/
- c/(b-h) • Yxt + k/(b-h) • ^ ^t_x
- d/(b-h) • PR^ - e/(b-h) • PRxt_1 + m/(b-h) • POPMt
- f/(b-h) • POPxt.
Equation [62] was the starting point of the econometric model. In order
to save degrees of freedom and to avoid multicollinearity problems, how-
ever, the production of the exporting and importing countries was ag-
Detailed and much more disaggregated econometric models of the world
wheat economy are available in the studies of Schiff [ 1985] and
Harwood and Bailey [ 1990].63
gregated. This seems acceptable, since it was not the goal of this
analysis to identify the underlying supply and demand Equations [59]
and [ 60]. It was also experimented with current and lagged income vari-
ables, and the income variables were constructed as weighted variables
for the major countries.
The following regression model performed best in the specification
search:










































The price of American Red Hardwinter 2, cif Rotterdam, in USS/mt was
used as p , .p__ was measured as the price of American long corn
rice, cif Northsea ports in US$/mt. Both series are from the Stati-
stischen Bundesamt [various issues]. Y-, is the weighted gross
domestic product (GDP) of five major wheat-importing countries -
China, India, Japan, UK, and Brazil - in million US dollars. The GDP
is purchasing-power-partiy-corrected and in current prices. As there
were no GDP data available in current prices for China, the real GDP
was taken from Summers and Heston [ 1988] and corrected by the
Chinese national income deflator shown in IMF [1987]. The countries'
shares in wheat imports were used as weights. Yv is the weighted
.A.
GDP of five major wheat-exporting countries - France, Canada, USA,
Argentina, and Australia - in million US dollars. It is again
purchasing-powei—parity-corrected and in current prices. The coun-
tries' shares in wheat exports were used as weights. The data for the
calculation of Y,. and Yv are from Summers and Heston [1988], and M X
the trade shares are calculated from FAO [e]. PR, the world pro-
duction of wheat, is measured with data from FAO [c]. POP,, and
M
POPV are trade-weighted population variables calculated with
population data from IMF [1987].64
The values below the coefficients are t-values and the values in pa-
rentheses are beta coefficients. * indicates the 1 percent level of
_2
statistical significance and ** the 5 percent level. R is the corrected
coefficient of determination, F the F-value and DW the Durbin/Watson
coefficient. Given the common test statistics, the overall performance of
the econometric model is quite good. 96 percent of the variation in the
logarithm of world prices can be explained with the model and major
hypotheses are confirmed. The world wheat price rises with an in-
creasing world rice price, with a growing income in exporting countries,
with a reduced world wheat production in the same year and in the
previous year, and with a rising population in the exporting countries.
The sign of the income variable Y...., indicates also that the world
wheat price is raised by a growing purchasing-power-parity-corrected
GDP in major wheat-importing countries with a one-year time lag. The
coefficient of the production variable can be interpreted as price
flexibility. An increase of world wheat production by 1 percent reduces
the world wheat price by 0.84 percent in the same period and by
another 0.91 percent in the next period.
Moreover, a comparison of simulation errors indicates that the actual
world wheat price can be much better explained with this model than
with a linear trend model as used by Byerlee and Sain. The root mean
square error over the estimation period 1960-1982 is 23.9 US$/mt with
the trend model and 6.9 US$/mt with the econometric model. Theil's in-
equality coefficient (TU) shows with 1.20 that the time trend model
performs worse than a naive simulation on the basis of previous years'
values, whereas the econometric wheat model clearly outperforms the
naive simulation (TU = 0.34). The antilog of In p according to Equation
[63] was now calculated for 1980-1982 and introduced into the denomi-
nator of NPC«. This allows to compare the NPCs of Byerlee and Sain
with those on the basis of an econometric world wheat model.
Table 4 shows NPC- and NPC_ for the 31 LDCs in Columns (1) and
(2). The results are summarized in the lower part of Table 4 in Columns
(1) and (2) for 1980-1982. It follows that, due to the better explanation
of movements in world wheat prices, the normal price according to the
structural model is closer to the actual world price than the linear trend
price. P™ is 197.4 US$/mt as opposed to p^ with 182.11 US$/mt. This65
means that NPC_ is by 7.7 percent lower than NPC. for all countries.
Table 4 shows that this makes a significant difference for the frequency
distribution of the NPCs. Whereas more LDCs subsidized than taxed
wheat production according to Byerlee and Sain, the reverse is true
when world price uncertainty is eliminated with a different method. The
median NPC is now 0.94 compared with 1.02, and it indicates that the
typical LDC taxes wheat producers.
The result becomes even more pronounced when exchange rate mis-
alignments are taken into -account. The coefficients aNPCL and aNPC_ in
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 capture this point by an adjustment of
NPC1 and NPC-, respectively. The comparison of aNPC. and aNPC2
shows that the median falls from 0.92 to 0.84. This means that the
frequency distribution exhibits a clear shift towards countries which tax
producers when price uncertainty is excluded with a structural economic
model - rather than with a trend model. According to our modelling
approach, the typical LDC clearly did tax wheat producers when ex-
change rate overvaluation is taken into account.
We can conclude on the sensitivity of the results of Byerlee and
Sain: the way how normal world prices are modelled matters to the
measured protection level. Put differently: the computed degree of
agricultural protection depends upon the modelling of price uncertainty
when normal rather than actual world prices are used.
Besides the importance of the modelling approach, another criticism
of the Byerlee/Sain findings is that they are too period- and product-
specific. A broader analysis of food price protection was provided by
Taylor [ 1989] who extended the analysis from 1980-1982 to 1980-1986 and
the product coverage by maize and rice. Additionally, the Taylor study
is based on national border prices rather than a uniform unit value of
imports, on actual rather than normal border prices and an exchange
rate correction via black market exchange rates. Table 5 presents her
major findings.
Taylor's results show that farmgate prices for wheat, maize and rice
were clearly below border price equivalents when exchange rate distor-
tions are taken into account. This pattern is valid for all subperiods
distinguished in Table 5. Maize prices, were on average, above and rice66
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see Taylor [1989, Chapter 3
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Source: Taylor [1989, Tables 4.1 and 4.4].
prices below border price equivalents when unadjusted NPCs are
measured. The average NPC for wheat ranged between 1.07 and 1.20.
Given possible data errors, Taylor evaluated this as being neither higher
nor lower than border price equivalents.
Given the still limited period covered and the differential results in
the empirical literature, we must conclude that the evidence on price
incentives for food crops in LDCs is still inconclusive. In particular,
this holds true on a broad cross-country basis using more comprehensive
time series data.67
/. On the Stabilizing Influence of Agricultural Policy in LDCs
The presented empirical evidence has substantiated the view that
economic and agricultural policies in LDCs tend to discriminate against
agriculture. This refers to the influence of policies on the level of
agricultural prices. There is, however, some evidence available
indicating that agricultural policy might have stabilized real producer
prices and, thus, might have created some risk benefits for farmers.
Table 6 presents some empirical results from the World Bank's project on
"The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy" on this issue. It is
revealed that, on average, producer price fluctuations were smaller than
border price fluctuations. This result is valid for representative agri-
cultural exportables as well as agricultural importables. It suggests that
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Source: Krueger et al. [1988, Table 3].68
a price-stabilizing impact of most policies existed in the period 1960-
1984.
Table 6 also indicates, however, that there is a large dispersion in
the stabilization success of domestic agricultural policies. This as well as
the dominating stabilizing impact is confirmed in recent studies by
Knudsen and Nash [1990] and Guillaumont [1991]. Knudsen and Nash
provide empirical results for 15 crops across 37 LDCs, mostly for the
period 1967-1981, and find out that producer prices and producer
earnings were in most cases more stable than under world market
conditions. This pattern, however, is much more distinct for grains than
for beverages and fibers. The percentage of cases with stabilizing
effects were clearly higher for the typical food crops than for the
typical export crops. Guillaumont presents additional evidence on the
degree of stabilization of real producer prices for export crops in the
period 1979-1988. He concludes that there was a slight stabilization
impact, by 7 percent, on average, although destabilizing existed in
several cases.
g. On the Isolating and Stabilizing Influence of Limited Substitution in
Agricultural Markets
All studies on protection discussed so far used world market prices -
however measured - as the relevant reference prices against which to
judge domestic price policy. However, few countries look at the prevail-
ing world prices when setting their domestic prices for agricultural
goods. Instead, farm and consumer prices are administered and restric-
tions are placed on international trade to defend the domestic policies
[Timmer, 1986]. As a result of trade restrictions, the relevant free-
trade reference prices are unknown. Substitutions in both production
and consumption in the face of foreign competition will bring a new
equilibrium in farm output, consumption and trade, which is not easily
predictable on the basis of historical evidence before trade was openly
permitted.
Moreover, a large country's new agricultural policy may have a
significant effect on prices in world markets which have to be recognized
when estimating the protective effects of the former policy. A different69
result is also obtained, if imported and domestically produced agri-
cultural commodities cannot be regarded as close substitutes because of
consumer preferences. If the cross price elasticity of domestically
produced agricultural products with respect to changes in the price of
imported products is relatively low, trade liberalization and the ac-
companying changes in the domestic price of imports will induce quantity
adjustments in the market for the domestic product which are not suf-
ficiently large to induce an equal percentage change in the domestic
price. This also implies that the protective effect [ Hiemenz, von
Rabenau, 1973, p. 83] and, consequently, the welfare effects are over-
estimated if import parity prices are used to evaluate agricultural policy.
There is enough empirical evidence to reject the assumption of
homogeneous agricultural markets found in standard welfare analyses of
agricultural markets. In fact, two-way trade in any sector, which is
ruled out by the "law of one price", can be found in agricultural trade
statistics at the most disaggregated commodity level [e.g., FAO, e;
IRRI, 1988]. Furthermore, empirical evidence from Asia [e.g., ADB,
1988] shows that there exists a wide spectrum of domestic prices indi-
cating limited substitution possibilities between different varieties, even
for such a narrowly defined market as that for rice. Finally, the law of
one price was rejected quite uniformly for various agricultural markets in
a recent study by Ardeni [1989].
In the following, we will first show how limited substitution can be
introduced into a model of an agricultural market and then discuss how
this influences the protection, welfare and stabilizing outcome of gov-
ernment-imposed interventions. We shall discuss these issues more
specifically with reference to rice in Malaysia. Limited substitution
implies that domestic consumers demand a composite commodity, C, which
is a function of imported quantities, M, and domestically produced
quantities, D:
[64] C = C(M, D)
Since total expenditure on the composite commodity must equal ex-
penditure on its imported and domestic components, we have the follow-
ing budget constraint:70
[65] p-C = pM-M + pD-D
where p, pM and p^. stand for the composite commodity price, the import
price and the price for the domestic import substitute, respectively.
Assuming that consumers minimize the cost of purchasing a given
amount of the composite good, the demand for imported and domestic rice
will be functions of both the domestic price and the import price. The
supply, S, of domestic rice will be a function of its own price:
[66] M = M(pM, pD)
D = D(pD, pM)
S = S(pD)
Now consider two varieties of rice that are substitutes in demand.
The supply of imported rice is perfectly elastic under the small-country
assumption, while the supply of domestic rice is upward sloping. As a
result of government-imposed distortions, the domestic prices of both
varieties are above the border price, and the welfare gains of free trade
are to be calculated. The situation is depicted in Figure 6. The demand
curves for imported and domestic rice are each conditional on the other's
price, i.e., M(p_) and D(p-,). The demands are also conditional on in-
come, but this income is assumed to be constant with respect to the
policy change considered.




Now let the price for M decrease from p.. to p.. as a result of
0 1
liberalization. Initially, consumers attempt to increase M from M to M ,
but because of substitution in demand the lower price for M causes a
decrease in consumers' demand for D. This shift in demand for D from
D(pM) to D(pw) causes a change in pD from p~ to p.- which, in turn,
leads to a shift in demand for M from M(p_) to M(p_). The new equilib-
1 2
rium finally occurs at price p., and quantity M .
Thus, the demand relationship M*, which takes account of adjust-
ments in the market for domestic rice, is obtained and this relationship
is less elastic than the movement along M(p_).
The total welfare gain generated by liberalization is the shaded
triangle under M*. As shown by Just et al. [1982, pp. 188-192], that
triangle measures consumer gains in the import market net of the loss of
government revenues as well as the gains to consumers and losses to
producers in the market for the domestic substitute.
What, then, determines the price adjustment in the domestic market?
Assuming a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function for Equa-
tion [62], de Melo and Robinson [1985] derive an expression which
relates percentage changes in the domestic price (p_) to percentage
changes in the domestic price for imports (pj:
where a is the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestically
produced substitutes, 6 the price elasticity of demand for the composite
commodity, 9 the import share, and e the price elasticity of domestic
supply.
As can be seen from Equation [67], the price adjustment in the
market for domestic rice depends crucially on the elasticity of sub-
stitution. Thus, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the larger the
price adjustment of domestic supply.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Equation [ 67] that for any elasti-
city of substitution the responsiveness of the domestic price depends on
the import share. Thus, even if imported and domestic rice are close
substitutes in demand, the response of the domestic price to a change in
the import price will be small if the import share is low.72
Finally, the derived nature of demand for domestic rice is shown by
the presence of the supply elasticity in Equation [67]. Thus, the higher
the elasticity of supply, the smaller the adjustment in the domestic price
necessary to bring equilibrium back to the market. The same can be said
of the role of the price elasticity of demand for the composite good.
These theoretical considerations are reflected in Table 7 which
summarizes the results from a sensitivity analysis on Malaysian rice
policy. The methodology involved the systematic elimination of distortions
from existing price levels to obtain a picture on prices, supply and
demand under a nonintervention scenario. In order to do this, the
theoretical model above was calibrated for prices and quantities on the
rice market for the period 1982-1986 given in Tamin and Meyanathan
[ 1988] and solved for the no-intervention prices and quantities. The
supply, demand and substitution elasticities, as reported in Tamin and
Meyanathan [ibid.] and Ahluwalia and Lysy [1983], were used as a
central estimate. However, because elasticity estimates differ widely from
researcher to researcher and because we wished to demonstrate the
sensitivity of the results to changes in elasticities, the supply, demand
and substitution elasticities actually used are the central estimate ± 0.5
times the point elasticities given by the sources. Thus, the results are
providing orders of magnitude rather than exact measures. The detailed
results for 1982-1986 are presented in Herrmann et al. [1991]. Table 7
shows averages over 1982-1986. The effects of rice market interventions
are evaluated in terms of nominal protection afforded, net social ef-
ficiency loss, the welfare trade-off between producers and consumers,
and changes in government revenue and expenditures.
If imported and domestically produced rice are perfect substitutes,
the welfare trade-off depends on the price elasticities of supply and
demand and the difference between the intervention prices and the
border price. Between 1982 and 1986, the domestic consumer and pro-
ducer prices in Malaysia have always been above the border price with
nominal protection being slightly higher for producers than for con-
sumers. With perfect substitutability apparent protection equals actual
protection, because arbitrage quickly equates goods prices internationally
under free trade. Assuming low supply and demand elasticities, producer
gains from intervention are estimated to average MS508. 5 million and gov-
ernment expenditures are MS145.5 million. However, consumers sufferedTable 7 - Sensitivity Analysis on the Price and Welfare Effects of Rice Market Interventions in Malaysia,
Average 1982-1986 (a)
Reference solution
Elasticity of supply (£)
Elasticity of demand (<S)
Elasticity of substitution (a)
Border price (p°) (M$ mil.)
Consumer price (p_) (M$ mil.)
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Source: Herrmann et al. [1991]. j
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an average loss of MS383. 2 million due to government intervention. Thus,
the average net social welfare loss (i.e., the deadweight efficiency loss)
amounted to M$20.2 million. Comparing these results with those of the
high elasticity case shows that the losses depend linearly on the assumed
supply and demand elasticities.
If imported and domestically produced rice is not perfectly sub-
stitutable in consumption, the no-intervention outcomes change drasti-
cally. As a result of product differentiation in demand, the fall in
domestic prices will be smaller than in the case of perfect substitutability
and will never equal border prices. As can be seen from Table 7,
domestic consumer and producer prices in the free-trade situation are
always above the border price with consumer prices being a consump-
tion-share-weighted average of the border and producer prices. Actual
protection coefficients relating the initial domestic prices to the free-
trade domestic prices are less than the apparent protection coefficients
relating domestic prices to border prices. As a result, the welfare
effects are much lower than in the case of perfect substitutability.
This is best illustrated by comparing the previous results with
those calculated under the assumption of weak substitutability and high
supply and demand elasticities. In this case, producers realize an aver-
age welfare gain of only MS123.8 million, which is only one-fourth of
producers' surplus estimated under the assumption of perfect substitu-
tability. This result is intuitively clear, because domestic producers
would benefit from some kind of "natural protection" with weak sub-
stitutability, even in a free-trade situation. Furthermore, consumers
suffer an average loss of MS168.6 million which is below 50 percent of
the previous case. These consumer losses are mainly attributable to the
implicit tax on imports. As a result, government expenditure for pro-
ducer subsidies are less, on average, than revenues from implicit taxes
on imports leaving net government revenues of M$37.3 million as
compared to net expenditures of MS145.5 million with perfect substi-
tutability. Thus, the average deadweight losses amount to only M$7.5
million.
Our results indicate that limited substitution possibilities can play
an important role in determining the final welfare effects of government
intervention in the Malaysian rice market. Assuming stronger substitut-
ability (a = 4.5) changes only the quantitative results leaving the75
qualitative conclusions from the comparison of the two extreme cases
unaffected. In any case, limited substitution drives a wedge between
domestic prices and border prices, the extent of which depends on the
degree of substitutability on the consumer side, the share of imports in
total domestic supply and the supply and demand conditions in the
domestic market.
Some other observations which can be made are summarized in Table
8. There, the mean and the coefficient of variation (CV) of selected
variables over 1982-1986 in the free-trade situation and for various
elasticity assumptions are confronted -with those in the distorted
situation. The results can be summarized as follows:
(1) In terms of magnitude, the supply mean is raised (though not sub-
stantially) with intervention, while demand is reduced compared to
intervention. Imports, on the other hand, were in fact reduced over
the period.
(2) The changes in quantities increase with increasing substitutability
and increasing supply and demand elasticities. The same holds true
for producer and consumer prices. Thus, limited substitutability
diminishes the need to support producer prices in order to increase
producer income.
(3) Limited substitution in connection with high supply and demand
elasticities has a stabilizing effect on both producer and consumer
prices. This result also suggests that there is less need for inter-
vention if substitution possibilities are limited.
Although the above welfare calculations are not based on an econo-
metric estimation of the substitution elasticity for rice in Malaysia, they
provide nevertheless useful insights into the impact of agricultural
pricing policies. Perhaps the most important result that emerges from our
findings is the importance of the import share in determining domestic
price changes. Standard trade theory would predict that, even for a
large market such as the rice market in Asian countries, price liberal-
ization would exert strong pressure on domestic prices. On the contrary,
the Armington specification implies that a large market with a low import
share has substantial price autonomy. From the government point of
view, another interesting result is the fact that expenditures to support
the guaranteed minimum price (GMP) would need to be much lower than
is predicted under traditional assumptions.76
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The question remains whether the assumption of product differen-
tation at the micro level is reasonable. There may be disagreement on
the correct specification of the substitution elasticity, but one certainly
does not observe the degree of substitutability found in standard trade
theory.77
2. Deficiencies in the Empirical Literature and the Additional Benefit of
the Following Quantitative Analysis
The survey has shown that our knowledge on the international pattern of
agricultural protection has significantly developed further during the
1980s. In particular, many more country studies have become available in
which the extent, the structure and the causes of agricultural protection
have been measured and analyzed in detail. Important findings of coun-
try studies include that macroeconomic and trade policies are often more
important than direct agricultural policies for agricultural incentives in
LDCs. The results of country studies indicate in most cases that overall
incentives work against agriculture and that policy discriminates against
agriculture. Despite these important findings, the quantitative literature
on agricultural incentives in LDCs is in some important aspects in-
sufficient:
(1) The information on agricultural protection at the commodity level is
much more limited than at the country level. Country studies refer
to those commodities that are relevant from the individual countries'
points of view. Comprehensive cross-country comparisons of price
protection for important export and food crops are much more rare.
The study of Byerlee and Sain [ 1986] is limited to the period
1980-1982 and the wheat sector, and the results of Taylor [ 1989]
refer to 1980-1986 and wheat, maize and rice. Similar cross-country
results for important export crops are not available at all.
(2) Within the given literature on agricultural protection, the discussion
has focused on the level of agricultural protection. There exists no
analysis of the longer run time series pattern of agricultural pro-
tection, i. e., of trends and instabilities in agricultural protection.
(3) Most country studies on agricultural protection still focus on pro-
tection vis-a-vis foreign competitors neglecting policy-induced
distortions in the domestic terms of trade between individual
agricultural commodities and nonagriculture. This holds also true for
protection analyses on Peru and Zimbabwe. For Malaysia, Jenkins
and Lai [ 1989] investigate the relative protection afforded to
producers of rubber, palm oil and rice, but neglect another
promising cash crop, i. e. , cocoa. Moreover, the analysis does not78
include the periods of structural adjustment (1985-1986) and re-
covery (1987-1988).
(4) Existing analyses of indirect agricultural protection do not dif-
ferentiate between^ indirect protection which is attributable to trade
policies on nonagricultural tradables and indirect protection resulting
from macroeconomic policies. Such a differentiation, however, is
necessary when it comes to policy recommendations. The recommen-
dations for policy reform may be quite different depending on the
source of agricultural discrimination.
The empirical analysis in the following parts will deal with these
significant shortcomings of the quantitative literature on agricultural
protection. To begin with, a rather comprehensive data basis on com-
modity-specific protection levels will be presented for wheat, rice and
coffee. Comprehensiveness will be attempted in terms of the countries
covered and the period of analysis: 1969-1985. In computing the pro-
tection levels, transport costs will explicitly be considered as well as
exchange rate distortions. The magnitude, the development and the in-
stability of protection levels will be measured, and the components of the
instability of protection rates will be elaborated for the three major food
and export crops of LDCs. This information will then be used to draw
conclusions on various policy-relevant issues like the relative importance
of direct and indirect agricultural policies for agricultural incentives, its
developments over time, relative incentives for coffee compared with
wheat and rice, or the policy impacts on price stability.
Next, we analyze the effects of trade restrictions and macroeconomic
policies on the agricultural sector in Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe. In a
first step, true protection resulting from agricultural pricing policies and
nonagricultural pricing policies are measured and contrasted with nominal
protection. This analysis covers the most important export crops in the
three countries. Following is an in-depth analysis of indirect protection
in Malaysia. Here, the focus is on different sources of indirect pro-
tection. Finally, the results on indirect protection are compared with
those on other countries and the question whether food crops are subsi-
dized and cash crops are taxed is discussed on a broad commodity basis.79
C. Magnitude and Structure of Protection
I. Introduction
The literature survey in the previous chapter revealed that a number of
country studies on protective measures in the agricultural sector are
available, whereas comprehensive cross-country analyses for specific
goods are still lacking. In this part of the present study, it is the ob-
jective to provide a contribution to fill this gap by establishing a broad
data set on an individual commodity basis.' We examine the extent of pro-
tection, the change in protection over time and its variation across a
wide range of countries for three important agricultural commodities,
namely wheat, rice and coffee.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section C. II introduces the
measurement concept applied in our analysis and describes the data base
used in the calculations. After this, the quantitative results for all three
crops will be presented and interpreted. In the cases of wheat (see
Section C. III. 1) and rice (see Section C. III. 2), the samples comprise
DCs as well as LDCs. This enables us to investigate in how far the con-
clusion drawn in Section B. Ill that DCs generally protect their agri-
cultural sectors as opposed to LDCs is also valid for specific agricultural
commodities. Furthermore, we make a distinction between net importers
and net exporters, because one would expect government authorities to
behave differently in either case, emphasizing self-sufficiency goals in
the first and tax revenues or the maintenance of world market shares in
the second situation. With respect to coffee (see Section C. III. 3), how-
ever, the sample does only consist of LDCs for which coffee is a major
cash crop. In Section C. IV, the instability of protection and its possible
causes, domestic or border price fluctuations, are examined. The main
goal of this analysis is to elaborate whether producer prices are
successfully stabilized in the presence of volatile world market prices.
Finally, Section C. V contains a comparison of the results obtained for
the individual commodities. We address the question there whether gov-
ernment authorities treat food crops (in this case wheat and rice) more
favorably than export crops (in this case coffee), as is often suggested
in the literature [e.g., Krueger et al., 1988] but which has not yet80
been demonstrated for specific commodities by broad cross-country
analyses.
II. Data and Procedures
In the following, the NPC serves as a measure of agricultural price
policies with two alternatives to be considered.
First, the gross NPC" is calculated as the ratio between domestic
prices and border prices, the latter being regarded as the opportunity
costs facing domestic producers (see Section B. II. 1). Data for producer
prices of various agricultural commodities are available from FAO sta-
tistics on prices that farmers received [FAO, d]. They were converted
into US dollars at the prevailing official exchange rate. For the calcu-
lation of border prices, we distinguish between net-exporting and net-
importing countries. The appropriate price for the former is measured
fob at the local port. In the latter case, cif prices are used. The
respective data are obtained as unit values from FAO [e]. For two wheat
importers (South Africa, Poland) the reported data were fob for both
imports and exports. In these cases the import values were converted
into cif using a standard conversion factor of 112 percent [ibid.]. With
respect to rice and coffee, produced and traded quantities are not di-
rectly comparable. Since rice production is reported in paddy units and
rice trade in milled rice units, the former was transformed into milled
rice units by applying the standard conversion factor 0.65 (1 paddy unit
= 0.65 rice units). Border prices for coffee refer to green or roasted
coffee and coffee substitutes containing coffee, whereas prices received
by farmers relate to green coffee. As coffee is mainly exported in the
form of green coffee, border prices as reported by the FAO are deter-
mined to a high degree by green coffee exports. Therefore, the bias
between the two reference quantities is rather small and can be
neglected.
The term "green coffee" is a synonym for "raw coffee" and is
commonly used by coffee traders for beans which are only prepared
for storage and transport. In 1980/81, about 90 percent of all coffee
exports were unprocessed. In earlier years, this share was even
larger [ International Coffee Organization, various issues ].81
Since producer prices and border prices should be brought to a
single marketing point in order to be comparable (see Section B. II. 1),
we, first, carried out an adjustment for internal transportation costs
between the farm gate and the local port to obtain export and import
parity prices, respectively. The transport margins are taken for some
countries from Taylor [1989]. For all other countries of our sample, in-
formation about major production regions for the respective commodities
is taken from the World Atlas Agricultural Committee [1973], and internal
transportation costs are computed along the lines suggested by Taylor
[1989].
Second, a factor correcting for exchange rate distortions was in-
cluded to account for indirect effects resulting from general economic
policies like commercial, exchange rate, monetary, and financial policies.
Currency overvaluations are widespread in LDCs, because governments
have often failed to adjust exchange rates when expansionary monetary
policies have produced higher inflation at home than abroad. Such a
policy implicitly results in import subsidization of food or taxation of
agricultural export commodities, i. e., agriculture is discriminated
against. Hence, using the official exchange rate to convert domestic
producer prices into US dollars may lead to severe overes timations of the
protection level. More realistic NPCs adjusted for exchange rate
distortions (net NPCs) were calculated by multiplying the unadjusted
protection coefficient by the ratio of the published black market rate
[Cowitt, 1986; Pick, 1978] to the official exchange rate [IMF, 1990],
2
both expressed in US dollars per home currency. We posit that the
black market exchange rate is an acceptable estimate of the unobservable
free-market price for foreign exchange, although black market rates
certainly include a risk premium given the illegality of transactions on
those markets.
In order to assess the variability of NPCs and to quantify in how
far this variability was due to instabilities in domestic and world market
prices, respectively, we finally conducted a variance decomposition of
Taylor [ 1989, p. 32] provides a detailed description of the calculation
of internal transportation costs.
2
This method of considering exchange rate distortions is discussed in
Section B. II. 1.82
the protection coefficient for each single country. In a second step, we
also decomposed the variance of the domestic prices in US dollars into
price and exchange rate components to answer the question whether gov-
ernment authorities achieved the goal of stabilizing agricultural producer
prices in home currency.
The variance decomposition procedure can formally be derived as
follows: since the NPC is defined as the domestic price (P. ) divided by
1 $
the border price (P ), log NPC equals the difference between log P.
^V 1
and log P . For the variance of this difference holds the following
equation [e.g., Mood et al. , 1974, p. 179]:
[68] Var(log NPC) = Var(log P? - log P ) = Var(log P?)
+ Var(log P ) - 2 • Cov(log P?, log P )
According to Equation [ 68], instabilities in the protection levels either
reflect movements in domestic dollar prices or in world market prices.
Moreover, the joint effect of both components as measured by the co-
variance term does affect the variance of the protection coefficient. A
positive covariance indicates that both prices move in the same direction
and - since we analyze a quotient - offset each other, thereby lowering
the variability of the NPC compared to a situation in which domestic and
world market prices would vary independently.
Alternatively, the equation may also be formulated for variations of
the variables around log linear trends. In order to decide which of both
versions is appropriate in a special application, one has to test initially
whether the trend function of the variables in use is significant. In al-
most all cases, at least two out of three time series showed significant
trend functions. We then calculated standard deviations from a log linear
trend. In particular, this holds true for prices and exchange rates.
There were only a few exceptions in which standard deviations from the
mean had to be calculated.
This method was previously used, e.g., for isolating the contributions
of price and quantity effects to revenue instabilities in the agricultural
sector [Murray, 1978/79; Herrmann, Schmitz, 1984].83
From Equation [68], the percentage contributions of instabilities in
domestic and world market prices to variations in NPCs can easily be
derived as
[69] CP^ = 100 • Var(log P?)/Var(log NPC),
[70] CP = 100 • Var(log P )/Var(log NPC)
and
[71] CP?P = 100 • 2 • Cov(log P?, log P )/Var(log NPC).
$ CP. denotes the contribution of domestic price movements to protection
instabilities, CP the respective contribution of world price fluctuations
$
 W
and CP. P the joint effect of both prices.
The variance decomposition of the domestic price follows the same $ principle. Since the dollar price (P. ) equals the price in home currency
(P.) multiplied by the exchange rate in US dollars per domestic currency
unit (E), it follows that
[72] Var(log p|) = Var(log Pi + log E) =
Var(log P.) + Var(log E) + 2 • Cov(log P., log E).
Hence, exchange rate fluctuations or price changes in home cur-
rency may be the reason for dollar price variations. The covariance
term, which now refers to a product, has to be interpreted differently
from Equation [68]: a positive (negative) sign indicates that price and
exchange rate movements intensify (neutralize) each other in their effect











[75] CP.E = 100 • 2 • Cov(log P., log E)/Var(log P?)84
where CP. is the contribution of price changes in home currency to
dollar price instabilities, CE the contribution of the exchange rate
component and CP.E the joint effect of both exchange rates and home
prices.
The instability analysis enables us to assess in how far producer
prices for wheat, rice and coffee are successfully stabilized by
comparing the variations of world market prices and domestic prices in
home currency. A successful stabilization requires that
[76] Var(log Pi) < Var(log P )
The greater the difference between VarOog P ) and Var(log P.), the
more producer prices in home currency are stabilized.
III. Estimates of the Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection
1. Survey of Protection Levels for Wheat
Wheat is the major traded food grain in the world. The world wheat
market is dominated by four exporters: Australia, Canada, France, and
the USA. Argentina is the only other country which has a considerable,
regular wheat export trade. On the other hand, China and the former
USSR have been the world's largest producers and importers of wheat,
apart from the old established importers Japan and the UK. Furthermore,
LDCs have become importers on a steadily increasing scale, particularly
in Asian market economies, North Africa and the Middle East [Josling,
1980, p. 15; Harwood, Bailey, 1990, p. 11]. Wheat has become the most
important agricultural product concerning world food security. The
ability of the world to feed its growing population rests heavily on the
production and the international trade flows of wheat. Hence, conditions
in the wheat market are the most significant single determinant of world
food security [Josling, 1980, p. 15]. Having this importance of wheat as
foodgrain in mind, one would expect that domestic policies at least in
Byerlee [1987, pp. 307-328], investigated the political economy of in-
creasing wheat imports by LDCs.85
import-dependent countries tend to favor wheat producers rather than to
discriminate against them in order to improve self-sufficiency.
The structure of protection in the world wheat sector is now
analyzed by means of NPCs which are calculated for the period 1969-
1985. The sample of wheat-producing countries is divided into net im-
porters and net exporters, since it can be expected that price policies
are different depending upon the self-sufficiency ratio in each country
(see Section C. I). With these countries, 57 percent of the world wheat
production is captured, on average, during the period considered. The
sample covers 20 net importers (including 6 typical poorer LDCs, 10
richer LDCs and 4 DCs) and 12 net exporters (including 5 richer LDCs
and 7 DCs). The classification of countries resulted from the dominating
trade status in the years under consideration. The NPCs for individual
years, however, were calculated according to the trade situation in the
respective year. A detailed list of NPCs for all countries is presented in
Tables A2 and A3.
Table 9 gives an overall impression of the distribution of alternative
NPCs for wheat producers across countries and over time. In Column
(1), traditionally measured coefficients are shown. Over the whole period
and across the total sample of wheat-producing countries, gross NPCs
are clearly above unity, thus indicating that wheat producers do not
face direct price discrimination in the long run. Hence, the wheat sector
is protected by direct agricultural price policies worldwide, which may
be explained by the particular role of this product as a staple food.
In individual years, however, protection coefficients diverge from the
average values depending upon the movement of border prices and the
degree of price transmission in each country. Particularly, this became
obvious during the world food crisis in 1974/75, when world market
prices for cereals more than doubled because of a worldwide supply
shortage and a boom in world demand. In these two years, NPCs
differed significantly from those in other years and were below unity in
most country groups except in importing DCs. This suggests a wide-
spread strategy of insulating domestic markets from world market
conditions.
Moreover, the difference between the average coefficients for the
total period as opposed to the two years of the food crisis are a rough
indicator of how world prices are transmitted into domestic markets. The86
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greater the reduction of NPCs due to extremely high world market
prices, the lower the price transmission is, and the higher the degree of87
insulating domestic markets is. Regarding the various country groups,
there is a remarkable distinction. While the difference between both
periods is only 0.35 percentage points in LDCs, DCs show a much
greater deviation from the average in 1974/75, notably a difference of
0.41 percentage points. Hence, in LDCs the degree of insulating
domestic wheat production is greater than in DCs. This implies that not
only the level of wheat subsidization is higher in DCs than in LDCs but
also the degree of protecting domestic producer prices from world price
variability.
Net-importing and net-exporting countries differ in the level of
support. On average, net importers show higher protection coefficients
than net exporters. This indicates that self-sufficiency might be a major
objective of wheat pricing policies in net-importing countries. While high
income exporting countries also clearly protect wheat producers, export-
ing LDCs even tend to discriminate against them. This suggests that
wheat exports in these countries are often taxed in order to raise gov-
ernmental revenues. Another important finding which can be derived
from Column (1) is the fact that protection levels rise with economic
development in importing as well as in exporting countries. While gross
NPCs in DCs are clearly above the average levels of the two samples,
importing and exporting LDCs exhibit lower values. That is, LDCs do
not favor wheat production as much as DCs do.
One country stands out from the whole sample with an average un-
adjusted NPC of 3.40: Japan. This extremely high protection coefficient
rests on the fact that agricultural imports into Japan are more restricted
quantitatively and by means of import tariffs than in any other OECD
country. With relatively poor endowments of arable land, Japan heavily
relies on imports of foodstuffs. The self-sufficiency rate for wheat was
only 10-12 percent in the early 1980s. Therefore, domestic farmers are
highly protected from import competition in order to stimulate domestic
food production [OECD, b, p. 18; Vincent, 1989, p. 173].
In Column (2) of Table 9, NPCs adjusted for exchange rate distor-
tions are shown. These net NPCs were calculated by multiplying unad-
justed coefficients by the ratio of the black market exchange rate to the
For a detailed analysis of the background of agricultural protection in
Japan, see Hayami [ 1988] and Australian Bureau of Agricultural and
Resource Economics [1988].88
official exchange rate in US dollars per home currency. Assuming that
black market exchange rates represent the true demand price for foreign
currency on free capital markets [Taylor, 1989, p. .39], the indirect
impact of macroeconomic conditions on agriculture can be captured with
this exchange rate adjustment.
Table A8 presents average exchange rate factors which measure
exchange rate distortions. Most countries show factors lower than 1,
implying that black market exchange rates are lower than official rates,
thus indicating widespread policies of exchange rate overvaluation. In^ 16
out of 32 countries, factors range below 0.9 and in 8 countries, factors
are even lower than 0.75. The 11 DCs of the sample present no distinct
exchange rate distortions. Hence, overvalued exchange rates are typical
for LDCs. Table 9 shows that the overall protection level decreases in
importing as well as in exporting countries due to exchange rate
distortions. In comparing country groups, one can recognize that the
degree of exchange rate distortion varies considerably. While in all DCs
the differences between gross and net NPCs are negligible, the pro-
tection level decreases from above to below unity in importing LDCs.
Among the net exporters, LDCs show a significant reduction of the
protection coefficient, too. It becomes clear that the wheat sector is
heavily discriminated against in low-income countries when exchange rate
overvaluation is taken into account. Hence, indirect macroeconomic
policies affect agriculture seriously and often reduce production in-
centives for farmers. This is one reason why self-sufficiency particularly
in African countries could not be improved substantially, although it is a
major goal of producer price policy as it is indicated by the results of
Column (I).
1
Summing up, the main results of Table 9 are the following. On the
one hand, producer prices for wheat are by and large favorable not
only in DCs but also in LDCs. The only exception is constituted by the
net-exporting LDCs that tend to discriminate against wheat production
directly. On the other hand, macroeconomic policies like overvalued ex-
For a detailed description of the influence of macroeconomic policies on
agriculture in general and of currency overvaluation on the perform-
ance of African agriculture in particular, see Valdes [ 1986, pp. 161-
183] and Lofchie [1987, pp. 95-97]. An analysis of the political
economy of rapidly increasing wheat imports into LDCs is provided by
Byerlee [1987, pp. 307-328].89
change rates have a major indirect impact on agriculture in LDCs causing
unfavorable production conditions for wheat producers. Hence, these
policies are responsible for a poor performance of the wheat sector in
many low-income countries and for the high import dependence those
countries are facing.
The results of our study confirm the findings of Byerlee and Sain
[ 1986] and Taylor [ 1989] for a much longer period. The two earlier
studies also analyzed gross and net nominal protection for wheat in LDCs
(see Section B. III. l.e). Contrary to the traditional hypothesis that
producers in LDCs are discriminated against by low farm prices for food
crops, they also found out that wheat producers in LDCs, on average,
did not face direct price discrimination in the early 1980s. Indirect
taxation caused by exchange rate distortions, however, appeared to be
widespread in LDCs and to offset direct protection often. One limitation
at least of the Taylor study is the fact that general statements about the
treatment of agriculture should not be based on short-run measurements
of protection, since extreme world market prices in single years
produce protection coefficients which differ significantly from those in
"normal" years. Our analysis presents evidence that direct price pro-
tection and indirect discrimination of wheat production in LDCs did not
only occur in the 1980s but in most of the earlier years from 1969 on,
too.
Moreover, the demonstrated importance of indirect as opposed to
direct agricultural policies for the overall performance of agriculture in
LDCs is in line with the findings of the World Bank's project on "The
Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy" (see Section B. III.l.c).
Finally, our study provides the additional benefit that the pattern of
agricultural protection in the world wheat sector can be analyzed, since
typical LDCs as well as typical DCs are taken into account, and pro-
tection levels can be compared directly across countries and country
groups as well as over time because of the uniform measurement of pro-
tection.
Byerlee and Sain compared producer prices with a so called normal
world market price which represented a long-run trend price calculated
by a linear time trend regression of world prices over the period 1960-
1982 [Byerlee, Sain, 1986] (see Section B. III. 1. e).90
2. Survey of Protection Levels for Rice
Rice is a very important commodity for human nutrition in the developing
world, especially in Asia and West Africa. In some Asian countries
(Bangladesh, Burma, Kampuchea, Laos, Thailand), the rice calory
supply accounts for more than two third of the total calory supply
[IRRI, 1988, p. 112]. Asia contributes about 90 percent to the world
rice production, the most important producers being China (including
Taiwan), India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. Most of the rice is grown
for domestic consumption, while only a small fraction of about 5 percent
is sold in the world market, predominantly by China, Thailand,
Pakistan, and the USA. The direction of trade has changed during the
period under consideration [USDA, 1986]: Asian countries like India,
Indonesia and South Korea, which heavily relied on rice imports during
the 1970s, became more or less self-sufficient in the early 1980s, where-
as the African share in world rice imports increased significantly.
Against this background, price incentives in the rice sector are
examined by means of gross and net NPCs. Protection coefficients for
each individual country are presented in Tables A4 and A5. Table 10
provides a condensed survey of the level of protection across different
country groups covering the time period 1969-1985. The whole sample
2
consists of 29 rice producers including 5 DCs and 24 LDCs. The
average traditional NPC that reflects only direct price policies was
slightly above unity for the total country sample, thus indicating a
moderate overall price support in the world rice market. As one would
expect, DCs were, on average, more protectionist than LDCs.
Significant deviations from the general pattern of protection
occurred in two subperiods. First, between 1970 and 1972 depressed
world market prices corresponded with above average NPCs. Second,
NPCs were comparatively low during the commodity price boom in 1974
and 1975. Both peculiarities indicate that fluctuations in world prices are
not entirely transmitted to the domestic market (see Section C. III. 1).
Childs [ 1990] points out that the low trade flows are, among other
things, a result of very restrictive policies like import bans in Japan
and South Korea.
2
Some socialist countries, which are important rice suppliers (China,
Laos, Kampuchea, South Korea, Vietnam), are excluded from the
sample due to a lack of data.91
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With respect to the degree of price transmission, an interesting asym-
metry between DCs and LDCs becomes evident: while the former showed
larger deviations from the average in the period 1970-1972 than during
the world food crisis, the opposite was true for the latter. That is, the
DCs tended to insulate their domestic markets more effectively against
declining world prices as compared to the LDCs, but let the rice farmers
more likely gain from international price increases.92
The disaggregation of the sample according to the trade status re-
veals that net rice importers as well as net rice exporters were slightly
protected, on average. The different composition of each group, how-
ever, does not allow a direct comparison of the respective NPCs. All 17
net importers are LDCs, whereas the 12 net exporters are divided into 5
DCs and 7 LDCs (see footnotes in Table 10).
Among the net importers, protection levels vary strongly with dif-
ferent stages of economic development. On the one hand, newly industri-
alized economies like Malaysia and South Korea pay heavy subsidies for
their rice farmers. This behavior supports the view that self-sufficiency
goals force governments to protect the domestic food production. On the
other hand, an average protection coefficient around unity for the
poorer rice importers does not confirm the self-sufficiency hypothesis.
Within this group, in turn, there are countries like Nigeria, Senegal and
Ivory Coast, the governments of which followed protective price policies
in most years, and others like Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, and Indonesia,
where policy discriminated systematically against rice farmers (see Table
A4). The latter might be explained by the fact that cheap food prices
guaranteed by public marketing boards are common in many LDCs [ see
Titnmer, 1988] and that the boards would run severe losses if they ad-
ditionally granted high producer prices. As another possible reason for
the observed discriminatory policies, one can mention that rice is of
lower importance for human nutrition in these countries (except
2
Indonesia), whereas it is a food staple in West Africa.
The results for the net exporters reveal how differently agricultural
producers are treated by policymakers in DCs and LDCs. On average,
the rice farmers of the LDCs faced a substantial discrimination. In Egypt
and in the Asian exporting countries (Burma, Nepal, Pakistan,
Thailand), the protection coefficient was below unity throughout the
period under consideration (see Table A4), i.e., rice exports served as
a source of taxation to raise public revenues. It is remarkable that more
The subsidization of rice farmers is well documented for South Korea
by Anderson [1989] and for Malaysia by Jenkins and Lai [1989].
2
In Indonesia, the government grants high fertilizer subsidies to rice
farmers [Titnmer, 1989]. This may explain that the country became
self-sufficient in the early 1980s, although producer prices were below
their world market equivalents.93
favorable price incentives were given by the Latin American countries
included in the sample, namely Argentina and Colombia. Among the in-
dustrial rice exporters, one has to look separately at Japan because of
its extreme policy of insulating domestic markets from international
competition that is not limited to the rice sector (see Section C. III. 1).
An average gross NPC of 4. 14 illustrates impressively the price distor-
tions in the Japanese rice market. The remaining DCs, however, showed
rather modest rice price protection as compared, for example, to the
newly industrialized Asian economies.
The additional consideration of exchange rate overvaluations result-
ing from trade and macroeconomic policies changes the measured struc-
ture of incentives fundamentally. When direct as well as indirect effects
are included, the world rice economy can be characterized by a domi-
nance of discriminatory agricultural policies. Since overvalued currencies
are a widespread phenomenon in LDCs but very rarely in the developed
world, protection levels for the former are significantly overestimated by
the traditional NPC. Only for the richer net rice importers, the ad-
justed protection coefficients remain above unity. For the low-income net
importers, however, exchange rate distortions were considerable and led
to a net taxation of the rice producers. Furthermore, the exporters in
LDCs were taxed by both direct and indirect policies, which is reflected
in a very low average net NPC of 0.48. In several countries, e.g.,
Nigeria and Sri Lanka, policy inconsistencies became evident: rice
farmers were subsidized by direct agricultural policies, but adverse
macroeconomic conditions counteracted these incentives. From this ob-
servation, one can conclude that agricultural planning should take into
account the effects of general economic policies in order to be effective.
Summing up, the world rice sector can be characterized as being
slightly protected from a cross-country point of view when only direct
agricultural policies „ are considered. Different country groups show
significant deviations from this pattern: while governments in richer net-
importing LDCs and - to a lower extent - in DCs grant generous sub-
sidies to their rice farmers, it is discriminated against rice exports in
LDCs. The additional consideration of indirect effects caused by general
Average exchange rate distortion factors for all countries included in
our study are given in Table A8.94
economic policies leads to an overall taxation of the rice sector. Partic-
ularly in poorer LDCs, overvalued exchange rates contribute substantial-
ly to negative production incentives.
There are only limited possibilities to compare these results to other
studies dealing with price protection in the rice sector. The only cross-
country study that applies the same methodology as we do is provided
by Taylor [1989] (see Section B. III. 1. e). Taylor does, however, only
consider LDCs, and the investigation is limited to the period 1980-1986.
Her general conclusions are similar to ours referring to LDCs: net rice
importers (excluding aid recipients) are protected by direct agricultural
policies and disprotected when exchange rate overvaluations are taken
into account, while net rice exporters are discriminated against by both
direct and indirect effects [ ibid. , pp. 55 ff. ]. The present investigation
shows that this outcome is also valid for the 1970s and that agricultural
price policies in DCs as opposed to LDCs subsidize rice exporters.
3. Survey of Protection Levels for Coffee
Coffee is produced in many LDCs which have a natural production
monopoly because of their climatic conditions, whereas coffee processing
and consumption is mainly located in DCs. Production levels vary strong-
ly from year to year according to weather conditions. A number of coun-
tries in Latin America, Africa and Asia rely heavily on coffee exports in
terms of foreign exchange. It is often argued that coffee co es next to
oil in political and economic importance. The outstanding contributor to
world coffee supply is Brazil. Hence, weather conditions in Brazil are an
important determinant of world prices. Cold weather reported from there
in July will cause a price rise, even when world stocks are sufficiently
on hand. The second largest coffee producer is Colombia. Its influence
in the market has steadily grown since 1970. Coffee is very important to
Colombia, because it is responsible for 50 percent of export income in
many years and sometimes a great deal more [Marshall, 1983, p. 8].
Having the importance of coffee export earnings for many countries
in mind, it is interesting to investigate in more detail domestic policies
which affect coffee production. Analogously to rice and wheat, the
structure of protection in the world coffee sector is analyzed for the95
period 1969-1985. The sample includes 22 coffee-producing nations, not-
ably 8 African, 11 Latin American and 3 Asian countries. During the
period considered, these countries were responsible for 84 percent of the
world coffee production, on average, for 1969-1985. Table 11 surveys
the situation for several country groups and over time. In Column (1),
gross NPCs are shown. The overall result in the first line reveals a
serious direct price discrimination against coffee producers. The
geometric mean of protection levels indicates that domestic coffee prices
only amount to 63 percent of world prices. This result confirms the
stylized fact that cash crop exports are, often controlled by marketing
boards in LDCs and are heavily taxed possibly in order to raise govern-
mental revenues. Another reason might be the fact that it is easier for
politicians to implement taxes on export crops than on food crops
because only the supply side is affected and not urban consumers with
their greater 'political influence [Mellor, Ahmed, 1988]. Finally, many
countries try to support domestic processing of coffee by implementing
higher export taxes on green coffee than on roasted or soluble coffee. It
is remarkable that protection levels do not differ between poorer and
richer LDCs. Independent of a country's stage of development, coffee
producers face relatively low producer prices. With respect to regions,
however, a significant difference can be stated. While African countries
show clearly lower protection coefficients, indicating a much stronger
price discrimination compared with the other regions, farmers in Asia get
higher prices than elsewhere. This finding must be explained by the
long history of the marketing board system in Africa which was origi-
nated during the colonial era. Already the colonial governments viewed
the export sector as a source of tax revenue and foreign exchange.
After becoming independent, marketing boards dealing with export crops
were the principal source of hard currency for financing Africa's new
industries in most countries. Since much of the industrial sector in
Africa is governed by an import substitution strategy, it depends
heavily on foreign exchange to finance the import of the necessary in-
puts. "The operative idea was that the difference between the prices
that marketing boards paid their farmer clientele and the prices they
received on world markets would be used as venture capital for the new
industrial sector" [Lofchie, 1987, p. 99]. Nowadays, agricultural
marketing boards in Africa, which meanwhile exist for almost every crop96















































(a) Aggregated by the unweighted geometric mean. - (b) Adjusted for
exchange rate distortions. - (c) Cameroon Ivory Coast, Kenya,
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Source: Own computations with data from World Bank [ 1982] and Tables
A6 and A7.
of economic significance, seem in most cases to be characterized by
waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption, and, hence, must
be regarded as the major reason for the continent's agricultural decline
[Lofchie, 1987]. One important exception - not only among the African
countries - is Kenya. Contrary to all other nations, coffee growers
receive prices which nearly reach the world price level in most years
(see Table A6). Over the whole period, a gross NPC of 0.99 was
measured. This relatively favorable treatment of coffee production in
Kenya is due to the fact that the state, the exporters, the whole
For additional background information about the agricultural per-
formance in Africa, see also Bates [1981].97
industry preparing and handling the coffee, and in particular the
growers, benefit from the central auctions organized by the Kenya
Coffee Board in Nairobi. Here, buyers from all over the world compete
to buy the coffee assuring themselves of the best possible price on the
day. Moreover, contrary to most other countries, it is the explicit policy
of the Kenyan Marketing Board to maximize returns to growers. Hence,
coffee growers in Kenya are in a position to get a higher proportion of
the international value of coffee than in other countries [Marshall, 1983,
pp. 87-88; UNCTAD, 1983, p. 10]. As in the case of wheat and rice,
protection coefficients diverge significantly from the average values in
individual years because of strong world price variability. In the world
coffee sector, 1977 was a year of extremely high world prices due to
large supply shortages in Brazil in the year before. Only a few hours of
frost in one night had affected some 75 percent of trees to some degree
[Marshall, 1983-, p. 42]. As a result, protection levels in all countries
heavily declined in this year. Moreover, the difference between the
values in this year and in the whole period reveals that the degree of
price transmission of world prices into domestic markets is lower in
poorer than in richer LDCs and greater in Asian and American nations
than in Africa. That is, most African coffee growers do not only face
absolutely low domestic price levels but also do not participate in high
world prices.
In Column (2) of Table 11, average NPCs adjusted for exchange
rate distortions (net NPCs) are presented. The adjustment procedure is
the same as for rice and wheat. Table A8 indicates that exchange rate
overvaluation is widespread in coffee-producing countries, because
values of below unity are given in most countries meaning that official
exchange rates are higher than black market rates. In 15 out of 22
countries, the average exchange rate factor is lower than 0.9, and in 9
countries it is even lower than 0.75.
The comparison with Column (1) of Table 11 reveals that net pro-
tection is clearly lower than gross protection in most coffee-producing
countries. That is due to the fact that currency overvaluation directly
affects agricultural exports, since producer prices of export crops are
determined by the conversion factor between foreign and domestic cur-
rency. Consequently, the greater the overvaluation, the fewer units of
local currency per unit sold are realized by agricultural producers.98
Hence, world coffee production is taxed twofold: on the one hand by
direct price policies and on the other hand by indirect macroeconomic
policies. Regarding the difference between gross and net NPCs, the
degree of currency overvaluation is higher in poorer LDCs than in
richer ones and in African countries again stronger than in other
regions. As a result, many of Africa's export-oriented agricultural
marketing boards experience severe cash constraints, since their income
in local currency is also a function of the exchange rate. It has been
the general tendency of marketing parastatals, however, to pass the
systematic penalty on to the farmers by. making either partial or late
payments for their crops. Moreover, African governments, which are
normally rather interested in the political loyalty of parastatal personnel
than of poor farmers, often provide supplemental budgetary appropria-
tions for parastatal operating deficits. Hence, the final result is that
only the producers really suffer from currency overvaluation, since their
prices remain low [Lofchie, 1987, pp. 95-96].
Summing up, the main message of Table 11 is the worldwide un-
favorable treatment of coffee production, particularly in African coun-
tries. Contrary to wheat and rice, the strong taxation occurs already
due to direct agricultural policies. Although earnings from coffee exports
are very important for many countries, coffee production has not been
protected during the period considered but is heavily taxed in order to
finance governmental expenditures. As in the cases of rice and wheat,
indirect macroeconomic policies like currency overvaluation have a strong
negative impact on the overall protection level and on the poor per-
formance of the agricultural sector in many LDCs.
IV. Instability of Protection Levels
In the following, we analyze how NPCs for rice, wheat and coffee pro-
ducers as well as their components, notably producer and border prices,
vary over time. We investigate by means of variance decomposition what
the contribution of components to the variation of protection coefficients
is (see Section C.I). Moreover, we try to find out whether the instabil-
ity of producer prices in US dollars is due to variations of domestic99
prices or to fluctuations of exchange rates. In this way, we want to dis-
cover the main causes of protection instability.
This analysis shall give a deeper insight into the structure and the
development of protection levels in world agriculture. It is a stylized
fact that many countries insulate domestic markets from world market
conditions in order to stabilize producer prices. In such countries,
domestic price stabilization are typically obtained by a buffer stock
system and government monopoly of the country's foreign trade together
with the enforcement of price targets for producers and consumers.
Moreover, the stability of food prices is a politically sensitive issue in
most LDCs. Hence, one would expect that in DCs as well as in LDCs
domestic price variability is relatively lower than world market price
instability [Bautista, 1990].
1. Measurement of Causes of Protection Instability in the World Wheat
Sector
The instability of protection coefficients for wheat producers as well as
of prices and exchange rates is measured by the percentage standard
deviation from a loglinear trend line. Table 12 presents in Columns (1)-
(3) a summary of results of instability measures for the NPC and its
components, the domestic producer price and the world price, for
various country groups. In Columns (4) and (5), the mean percentage
contributions of the trend-corrected variances of producer and border
prices to the trend-corrected variances of NPCs, i. e. , the aggregated
results of the variance decomposition, are shown. The country-specific
results are given in Tables A9 and A10. Table 13 surveys the instability
of producer prices in US dollars and of its components, producer prices
in domestic currency and exchange rates. Furthermore, it shows the
average contributions of the components to the variation of producer
prices in US dollars for different country groups. Table 13 gives addi-
tional information about the causes of protection instability. Hence, both
tables have to be analyzed simultaneously. Standard deviations of pro-
ducer prices in US dollars differ slightly between both tables, because
transportation costs were not considered in Table 13.100
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Source: Own computations with data from Tables A9 and A10.101
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(a) Producer prices without transportation costs. - (b) Arithmetic
mean. - (c) The method of decomposing variances is defined in Section
g
C.II. Var stands for the trend-corrected variance, PT and P. are pro-
ducer prices for wheat in US$ and local currency, respectively. E in-
dicates the exchange rate between US$ and the local currency. - (d) Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Chile were excluded as outliers because of extreme
inflation rates. The USA were not considered, as P. and PT are the
same. - (e) Italy, Japan, UK, West Germany. - (f) Egypt, Algeria,
Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, India, South Korea, Paki-
stan, Syria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Mexico. - (g) Australia, France,
Greece, Spain, Sweden, Canada. - (h) South Africa, Uruguay, Hungary,
Turkey.
Source: Own computations with data from Table A15.
Regarding the gross NPC in Table 12, the hypothesis is confirmed
that the variability of border prices around the loglinear trend (27.8
percent) is stronger than that of producer prices in US dollars (16.9
percent). This indicates that producer prices in US dollars are stabilized102
in most countries. With 176.6 percent compared with 81.4 percent, the
contribution of world price variations to the instability of gross NPCs is
much greater than that of producer price variations (see Columns (4)
and (5)). The positive covariance term in Column (6) indicates that
world market prices being above the trend often go along with producer
prices which are above their trend values, too, and vice versa. Hence,
both effects neutralize each other, thus reducing the instability of gross
NPCs. Therefore, the mean variation of protection coefficients is smaller
than that of border prices. Table 13 shows that producer prices in US
dollars vary mainly as a result of exchange rate fluctuations (see
Columns (4) and (5)). For all countries, the absolute instability of
producer prices in US dollars is slightly higher than that of producer
prices in domestic currency. It can be concluded that domestic prices for
wheat producers are indeed stabilized, on average, because variations of
border prices (27.8 percent) are much stronger than fluctuations of
producer prices in domestic currency (15.7 percent). The negative co-
variance term in Column (6) of Table 13 indicates that the fluctuations of
producer prices in domestic currency and exchange rates are negatively
correlated. Hence, both effects again neutralize each other resulting in
lower variations of producer prices in US dollars than of the com-
ponents .
In LDCs, protection levels for wheat vary stronger than in DCs
(24.8 percent as against 20.5 percent), although the instability of pro-
ducer prices and border prices is rather similar (see Table 12). This im-
plies that the instability of protection coefficients is not only determined
by the absolute variations of the components but also by the correlation
between both price series. In DCs the covariance term is much higher
than in LDCs (268.2 percent as against 90.7 percent). This suggests
that both price series move more synchronously in DCs than in LDCs.
From this, one might conclude that producer price policies in DCs are
more closely linked to border price fluctuations than in LDCs. By
comparing Tables 12 and 13, however, we obtain the additional result
that prices in domestic currency (12.4 percent) vary much less than
producer prices in US dollars (22.0 percent) and border prices (28.3
percent) in DCs. Hence, wheat farmers in high-income countries actually
enjoy highly stabilized prices. As there is only little covariance between
producer prices in domestic currency and exchange rates in DCs (-7.7103
percent), the instability of producer prices in US dollars is rather
strong. The opposite is true in LDCs. While producer prices in domestic
currency and exchange rates fluctuate more heavily in these countries,
both effects tend to neutralize each other. This is indicated by a high
negative covariance term, thus reducing the instability of producer
prices in US dollars. It can be concluded that the variation of producer
prices in LDCs, denominated in foreign currency, does not only result
from domestic price policies but is determined to a higher degree by
fluctuating exchange rates. That explains why producer prices in US
dollars and border prices develop less synchronously in LDCs compared
with DCs. The overall conclusion can be drawn that policies to stabi-
lizing producer prices are more effective in DCs than in LDCs.
With regard to the comparison between net-importing and net-ex-
porting countries, the overall protection instability presented in Table 12
is rather similar (23.7 percent and 24.6 percent). Border price vari-
ations obviously contribute more to the variations of NPCs than producer
price variations (see Columns (4) and (5)). But again, there are some
remarkable differences between DCs and LDCs. As in the whole sample,
in net-importing countries, the fluctuations of the gross NPC are lower
in DCs (17.0 percent) than in LDCs (25.6 percent). Net-importing DCs
even show the lowest protection instability. This is due to the fact that
producer prices in US dollars and border prices are closely correlated as
indicated by the high positive covariance value. Moreover, Table 13
shows that industrialized net importers experience the lowest instability
of producer prices in domestic currency (11.7 percent). In these coun-
tries, price stabilizing policies seem to be very effective. Furthermore,
the fluctuations of producer prices in domestic currency and exchange
rates are positively correlated (see Column (6)). Hence, both series
reinforce each other concerning their effects on producer prices in US
dollars. Although somewhat weakened, similar statements hold true for
industrialized net exporters. Although the protection instability is nearly
the same in DCs and LDCs (22.5 percent and 22.1 percent), Table 13
shows that domestic prices are more stable in net-exporting DCs than in
net-exporting LDCs (12.9 percent against 20.3 percent). That is, DCs
strongly protect wheat producers from price fluctuations independent of
their trade status in order to stabilize the agricultural income.104
The main distinction between importers and exporters among the
LDCs arises from different producer price variations in US dollars,
whereas the protection instability is nearly the same. While fluctuations
of producer prices in US dollars are rather small in net-importing coun-
tries (14.8 percent), they are the highest in net-exporting nations (21.9
percent). This can be explained by the results in Table 13. Net-im-
porting LDCs not only show smaller fluctuations of producer prices in
domestic currency compared with those of net-exporting LDCs but also
present a lower exchange" rate variability. Moreover, the covariance
values between producer prices in domestic currency and exchange rates
are highly negative in importing LDCs (see Column (6)). Both effects
strongly neutralize each other resulting in a low instability of producer
prices in US dollars. The comparison with the fluctuations of border
prices (27.2 percent) reveals that domestic prices are also strongly
stabilized in these countries.
As mentioned above, producer prices in domestic currency and ex-
change rates fluctuate rather heavily in net-exporting LDCs. The
negative covariance term again indicates that both series are negatively
correlated. Therefore, the instability of producer prices in US dollars
(23.2 percent) is much smaller than the variations of exchange rates
(26.4 percent) but still higher than variations of producer prices in
domestic currency (20.3 percent). It follows that in net-exporting LDCs
domestic producer prices are also stabilized against heavily fluctuating
border prices but to a lower degree than in net-importing LDCs. Hence,
we can conclude that domestic policies of stabilizing prices are most
effective in DCs and more effective in net-importing than in net-ex-
porting LDCs. Protection instabilities mainly result from border price
variations, while instabilities of producer prices in US dollars are
strongly affected by exchange rate fluctuations.
Three countries, notably Argentina, Brazil and Chile, were ex-
cluded from the sample because of extremely high inflation rates in many
years which increase the instability of price series (see Table A15) and
produce a bias in the aggregated values of domestic price and exchange
rate series. The mean results for these three countries which are
presented in the last line of Table 13 show that instabilities differ
significantly from the values in other countries.105
Table A9 gives some additional information on the movement of pro-
tection levels for wheat producers over time. The indices +, - indicate
whether the series follow a significant positive or negative loglinear
trend. It is interesting that NPCs move in only 15 out of 32 countries
significantly upwards or downwards. In 6 countries, protection levels
rise over time, while 9 countries show declining coefficients. In the
group of the DCs, an upward-moving coefficient occurs only for Japan,
while protection levels in Italy, Canada, France, and the USA decline
significantly during the period considered. In LDCs, the structure is
ambiguous. From the results shown in Table A9, the conclusion can be
drawn that protection levels for wheat producers do not follow a homo-
genous pattern across LDCs, whereas DCs tend to reduce direct wheat
price protection.
Regarding the net NPC in Table 12, the conclusion can be drawn
that protection coefficients, which were adjusted for exchange rate dis-
tortions, vary rather similarly to unadjusted NPCs. While currency over-
valuation does not affect border prices at least in the small-country
case, it has a strong impact on producer prices in US dollars or ex-
change rates, respectively. As exchange rate factors vary strongly over
time, the instability of producer prices in US dollars and of exchange
rates is higher than in the case of official exchange rates. Therefore,
percentage standard deviations of producer prices in US dollars are
higher in case of net NPCs than of gross NPCs. Prices in domestic
currency, however, remain unchanged.
Furthermore, Columns (4) and (5) of Table 12 show that the contri-
bution of producer price fluctuations to the instability of net NPCs
across all countries has increased compared to the results of gross
NPCs. A comparison of DCs and LDCs, however, reveals that the dif-
ferences between the alternative measures of protection only arise from
changes in LDCs. That is due to the fact that exchange rate overvalu-
ation is widespread in low-income countries alone (see Section C. III).
Moreover, the impact of the adjustment procedure is stronger for net-
importing LDCs than for net exporters, since the instability of producer
prices in US dollars has increased more in these countries. This sug-
gests that exchange rate overvaluation is more frequent and stronger in
net-importing countries compared with net exporters. That might be due
to the fact that the group of developing net importers includes even106
poorer countries than the sample of developing net exporters, since ex-
change rate overvaluation is particularly typical for low-income coun-
tries.
Furthermore, Columns (4) and (5) of Table 12 show that the contri-
bution of border price fluctuations to instabilities of net NPCs are still
higher than the contribution of producer price variations. The positive
covariance terms in Column (6) indicate that both price series often move
together and therefore more or less neutralize each other.
Table A10 presents the country-specific results. Compared with
Table A9, some changes can be recognized within the group of LDCs.
While in the case of gross NPCs 10 LDCs showed significantly upward-
or downward-moving protection coefficients, now the number amounts to
13 countries. 6 nations, Algeria, Nigeria, Poland, Tanzania, Hungary,
and Uruguay, join this group, whereas the trends in protection coeffi-
cients become insignificant for 3 nations, Egypt, Syria and Argentina. 9
LDCs show significantly declining net protection coefficients, 4 LDCs
show increasing ones. When all countries are taken into account, net
protection levels moved downwards in 13 out of 32 countries, while only
5 nations showed upward-moving coefficients. Hence, the broad country
sample shows that the degree of net protection for wheat tends to
decline rather than to increase over time.
Summing up, it can be stated that protection coefficients for wheat
producers vary over time mainly as a result of border price fluctuations.
Hence, policies of stabilizing producer prices are widespread. This
finding gets even more distinct when the variation of producer prices in
US dollars is decomposed, because in most cases the instability of pro-
ducer prices in domestic currency is indeed much lower than the price
instability in US dollars. Moreover, the efficiency of stabilization policies
increases with a rising stage of development and is higher in net-import-
ing than in net-exporting countries. Exchange rate overvaluation, which
almost exclusively occurs in LDCs, causes increasing variations of pro-
ducer prices in US dollars, while producer prices in domestic currency
remain unchanged. Nevertheless, net protection in LDCs varies more
heavily over time than gross protection. The contribution of the in-
stability of border prices to fluctuating NPCs, however, is still stronger
than the variations of producer prices.107
Our results confirm basically the findings of Krueger et al. [ 1988]
(see Section B. III. 1). For a smaller sample of countries and for their
main commodities, they also found out that domestic producer prices for
agricultural products in many LDCs have been more stable than their
border prices based on calculated standard deviations. Moreover, they
also discovered that the domestic price variability is significantly larger
for exported than for imported products. That might be explained by the
theory of collective action. With respect to imported food crops like
wheat, there is a pressure for price stability not only from producers
(as in the case of exports) but also from politically more influential
urban consumers because of the impact of food price variability on real
wages [ibid.]. As a result, politicians in LDCs rather provide stabi-
lization policies for staple crops than for export crops.
2. Measurement of Causes of Protection Instability in the World Rice
Sector
As in the case of wheat, variations of protection coefficients, prices and
exchange rates were quantified for each single rice-producing nation of
our sample. The results of the variance decomposition of NPCs into pro-
ducer and border price components are documented in detail in Tables
All and A12. The instabilities of dollar prices and its possible causes,
i.e., variations of domestic prices in home currency and exchange rate
fluctuations, are shown in Table A16. Tables 14 and 15 provide a sum-
mary of the aggregated results for different country groups.
Table 14 shows in Columns (2) and (3) that producer prices for
rice fluctuated to a lesser extent (21.8 percent standard deviation) than
its world market equivalents (31.1 percent), on average, thus indicating
a trend towards granting rice farmers stable prices in US dollars. As a
consequence, volatile border prices contributed more to instabilities of
the gross NPC than varying producer prices (see Columns (4) and
(5)). The positive covariance between producer and border prices (see
This result is confirmed by various studies examining the determinants
of nominal rice price protection [David, 1990; Timmer, 1990; Thiele,
1990]. In all these studies, world price fluctuations were identified as
an important source of variations in NPCs, thus indicating that pro-
ducer prices were insulated from world market price movements.108
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Column (6)) expresses that both prices tended to move parallel during
the period considered. Put differently: producer price changes partly
offset variations in world market prices and, thus, the variability of
protection coefficients was below that of border prices.
Until now, we have only investigated whether producer prices in US
dollars were stabilized, on average. For a strategy which intends to
stabilize the revenues of farmers, however, the producer price in home
currency is the relevant goal variable. Therefore, in a second step, the
decomposition of the dollar price into its home price and exchange rate
components is necessary. The results of this variance decomposition are
reported in Table 15. Table 15 shows that producer prices in domestic
currency were indeed stabilized, because their standard deviation (16.9
percent) was lower than that of the dollar price (24 percent) which in
turn appeared to be less variable than the border price (see Table 14).
Home price and exchange rate variations contributed equally to insta-
bilities of the dollar price. Dollar price instabilities, in turn, were
higher than the fluctuations of its components, although the negative
covariance term signals that home price and exchange rate fluctuations
should tend to offset each other. The covariance term, however, was
comparatively low, i. e. , producer prices in home currency and exchange
rates moved rather independently.
Differences between LDCs and DCs are most striking with regard to
the variability of NPCs which was substantially lower in the latter group
as a consequence of a strong correlation between producer and border
prices. Price stabilization seems to prevail independent of the stage of
economic development: in developed as well as developing economies,
producer prices in US dollars varied to a lesser extent than border
prices and dollar prices, in turn, were less stable than prices in home
currency. The rather high variation of the dollar prices as compared to
exchange rates and prices in home currency is again due to the fact that
the components, although being negatively correlated in most countries,
moved more or less independently, particularly in DCs where the average
covariance was near zero.
As was already pointed out in Section III. 2, the results for net-im-
porting and net-exporting countries are not directly comparable. Never-
theless, it can be stated that both subgroups followed the general pat-
tern, i. e. , border price variations lay above those of dollar prices and110
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those above variations of prices in home currency. Among the net im-
porters, the richer LDCs showed higher average variability in NPCs,
dollar prices and exchange rates than the poorer LDCs. The opposite
was true for the producer price in home currency, mainly because of the
very low instability of Malaysian and South Korean producer prices (see
Table A16).Ill
Within the group of net-exporting countries, NPCs varied to a
lesser extent in DCs than in LDCs. The opposite was true for producer
prices in US dollars due to two reasons (see Table 15). First, average
exchange rate fluctuations were higher in DCs. This may be explained
by a tendency in some LDCs like Egypt to fix their currencies to the US
dollar, while the currencies of the DCs included in the sample have been
floating towards the US dollar since 1973. Second, home price and ex-
change rate variations in the LDCs were negatively correlated, i. e. , off-
setting each other, thus reducing the instability of producer prices in
US dollars. The producer prices in home currency, in turn, were effec-
tively stabilized in net-exporting DCs as well as in net-exporting LDCs.
Although one would expect government authorities to tax exports with
frequently changing rates, the developing net exporters showed more
stability, on average, than the group of net importers with regard to
both dollar prices and prices in domestic currency.
Two highly inflationary economies, namely Argentina and Mexico,
were considered separately in the variance decomposition because of
extreme fluctuations in domestic prices and exchange rates (see Table
15). Since producer prices in home currency and exchange rates moved
strongly parallel in these countries, dollar prices did not show con-
siderable deviations from the average. The high variability of home
prices in the inflationary countries may be explained by the fact that
future movements of macroeconomic variables like exchange rates and
inflation can hardly be forecasted, and government authorities thus
adjust producer prices in a very discretionary way.
The additional consideration of exchange rate overvaluations, which
were considerable in a number of LDCs (see Table A8), changes parts of
the results obtained until now. While border prices and producer prices
in domestic currency per definition remained unaffected by distorted
exchange rates, the NPCs and the producer prices in US dollars became
more volatile. The instability of producer prices, however, was still
below that of border prices, i.e., the price stabilization hypothesis is
again confirmed. Since overvaluations are generally limited to LDCs,
differences in the variability of NPCs between DCs and LDCs become
more pronounced when the net NPCs are regarded (see Table 14). More-
over, adjusted dollar prices varied stronger in LDCs than in DCs in112
contrast to unadjusted dollar prices which had roughly the same stand-
ard deviation in both groups.
From the detailed country specific results reported in Tables All
and A12, one obtains the additional information that in a number of the
countries considered the level of protection did not follow a significant
trend over time. Only in 13 (15) out of 29 cases the gross NPC (net
NPC) carried a trend. 5 (6) countries showed increasing values and 8
(9) countries decreasing values of the gross NPC (the net NPC) between
1969-1985. That is, no common trend of price protection among the rice
producers could be ascertained for that -period. Remarkably, all DCs
included in the sample, except for Japan, exhibited decreasing protection
levels, particularly the USA and Australia.
Altogether, the previous analysis revealed within a broad cross-
country comparison that volatile border prices contributed more to pro-
tection instabilities than varying producer prices. Producer prices in US
dollars, in turn, varied stronger than producer prices in home cur-
rency. Hence, it can be concluded that a general tendency towards price
stabilization in favor of domestic rice farmers does exist in the world
rice economy. This policy is observable independent of the stage of
economic development. Only some highly inflationary economies (Mexico,
Argentina) showed no successful stabilization. In these countries,
producer prices in home currency were more volatile than world market
prices.
3. Measurement of Causes of Protection Instability in the World Coffee
Sector
After having investigated the instability of protection coefficients for two
important food crops, now one typical export crop shall be analyzed:
coffee. According to earlier considerations (see Section C. IV. 1), it can
be expected that domestic coffee prices are less stabilized by policy than
prices for food crops. The reason is that urban consumers are hardly
affected by coffee price policies and, hence, will not stand up for price
stabilization measures in this case. It follows that political pressure for
price stability must solely be generated by influential coffee growers who
are often not sufficiently influential in the decision-making process.Bibliof hek
113
Again, the instability of protection coefficients, prices and exchange
rates is measured by the percentage standard deviation from a log linear
trend function. Moreover, the contribution of the trend-corrected var-
iances of producer and border prices to the trend-corrected variance of
NPCs is measured by means of variance decomposition. The summarized
results are presented in Table 16. Additionally, we analyze whether
variations of producer prices in US dollars are due to fluctuations of
prices in domestic currency or to exchange rate instability. Table 17
surveys these results. The" country-specific results are given in Tables
A13, A14 and A17.
Columns (l)-(3) in Table 16 show again that the instability of the
gross NPC for all countries mainly results from border price rather than
producer price variations. But there is only a slight difference between
the fluctuations of producer prices in US dollars and border prices (31. 5
percent as against 33.3 percent). Furthermore, the extremely high co-
variance terms in Column (6) indicate that variations of producer and
border prices are positively correlated in many cases. It follows that
both effects neutralize each other, thus reducing the instability of gross
NPCs. Therefore, fluctuations of protection coefficients are significantly
smaller than the variations of the components. Table 17 shows that
prices in domestic currency vary strongly in the total sample and even
contribute more to the instability of producer prices in US dollars (67. 1
percent) than exchange rate movements (42.5 percent). Hence, coffee
producers have to face highly unstable prices, on average, across coun-
tries. But it can be recognized, too, that producer prices in domestic
currency fluctuate less than in US dollars and even fluctuate less than
border prices. This suggests that the instability of world market prices
was not as much transmitted into domestic markets as producer price
fluctuations in US dollars imply. That is, in the world coffee sector
domestic producer prices are also stabilized to some degree. The rather
small covariance terms in Column (6) of Table 17 indicate that variations
of producer prices in domestic currency and exchange rates are hardly
correlated.
Dividing coffee producers into richer and poorer LDCs provides
some differences in the case of gross NPCs. In richer LDCs, the in-
stability of protection coefficients is slightly higher than in poorer
LDCs, although border price fluctuations are lower. Moreover, the vari-114
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ance decomposition of producer prices in US dollars shows that prices in
domestic currency and exchange rates vary less in poorer LDCs than in
richer LDCs (see Table 17). The comparison of producer prices in do-
mestic currency and border prices reveals that producer price stabi-
lization is more frequent in poorer LDCs, whereas richer LDCs show
more or less the same fluctuations of both price series.
When the data basis is disaggregated into regions, it can be seen
from Table 16 that fluctuations of protection coefficients vary strongly
across different regions of the world. The greatest instability of the116
gross NPC occurs in African countries, although producer prices in US
dollars fluctuate the least there, whereas the lowest variations of protec-
tion coefficients occur in Asia, where producer prices in US dollars vary
the most. This shows again that the joint effects of both price series
must be examined in order to explain the movement of protection levels.
In Latin American and Asian countries, the degree of variations of
producer and border prices is rather similar. Furthermore, the high
covariance values indicate that the course of both series is positively
correlated and, hence, fluctuations of the gross NPC are dampened. In
Africa, however, border prices vary much stronger than producer prices
in US dollars and even very much stronger than producer prices in do-
mestic currency (see Table 17). This suggests that in contrast to other
country groups, producer prices for coffee in Africa are clearly
stabilized, thus intensifying the instability of the gross NPC. Moreover,
Table 17 shows that prices in domestic currency fluctuate much stronger
in Asian and American countries than in Africa. Therefore, the con-
clusion can be drawn from Tables 17 and 11 that coffee producers in
Africa face rather stable but low prices, while producers in Latin
American and Asian countries more or less face world market conditions.
Four countries, notably Uganda, Zaire, Peru, and Brazil, were excluded
from the sample, because they had extremely high inflation rates in many
years which raise the variances of the price series. It follows that mean
values would be biased if these countries remained in the sample. Tables
16 and 17 show that the mean variations of protection levels, prices and
exchange rates are significantly stronger in these four countries than in
the rest of the sample.
Table A13 shows that 10 out of 22 countries have significantly de-
clining protection coefficients. It is noteworthy that no country showed
rising NPCs. This indicates increasingly unfavorable conditions for coffee
producers worldwide. Moreover, it can be recognized that the percentage
contributions of the components and the covariance terms vary strongly
across countries. This suggests that there is no uniform pattern of
producer price policies in the world coffee sector.
As in the case of wheat, net NPCs vary stronger than gross NPCs
(see Table 16). As border prices remain unaffected by exchange rate117
policies, this must be due to the fact that corrected rather than un-
corrected exchange rates produce a greater instability of producer prices
in US dollars. Columns (4) and (5) show that the contribution of pro-
ducer price fluctuations in US dollars to the instability of the net NPC is
now even greater than the contribution of border price variations. Since
exchange rate factors vary over time, too, producer prices in US dollars
are not only affected by fluctuations of prices in domestic currency and
exchange rates but also by changing degrees of overvaluation in the
case of the net NPC. Hence, the instability of producer prices in US
dollars increases when exchange rate distortions are taken into account
and thus leads to stronger fluctuations of the net NPC. This general
result is also valid for the different country groups. Again, the ex-
cluded countries show significantly stronger variations of the net NPC
and components than the other groups.
Table A14 presents the country-specific results for the net NPC;
11 out of 22 countries show significantly declining protection coefficients
and the others follow no significant loglinear trend. Hence, the adjust-
ment for exchange rate distortions does not affect the general state-
ments.
Altogether, the conclusion can be drawn that highly unstable bor-
der prices are often transmitted into domestic markets resulting in
strong variations of producer prices. As both price series are positively
correlated to a high degree, the instability of NPCs is smaller than the
variations of the components. Moreover, the variance decomposition of
producer prices in US dollars had shown that prices in domestic cur-
rency vary rather strongly but compared with border price fluctuations
appeared to be stabilized to some degree. Differences between poorer
and richer LDCs are rather small, whereas differences between country
groups are considerable. Africa showed the lowest instability of prices in
domestic currency, while fluctuations in Latin America and Asia are
nearly twice as much and are of the same order as border price fluctua-
tions. Hence, Latin American and Asian coffee producers are exposed to
world market conditions, while African farmers get more or less stabi-
lized but low prices.118
V. Comparison of the Results for Wheat, Rice and Coffee
In this chapter, we have investigated the extent and instability of
nominal protection in the world wheat, rice and coffee economy across a
number of countries for the period 1969-1985. Major results of the
analysis are summarized in Tables 18 and 19. As can be seen from Table
18, wheat producers and, to a lesser extent, rice producers were, from
a cross-country point of view, protected by output price policies, while
coffee was heavily discriminated against. At first glance, this confirms
the hypothesis of a food crop subsidization and cash crop taxation (see
Section B. Ill.l.b). Does this conclusion, however, remain valid when the
samples are disaggregated? In the case of coffee, the decomposition into
richer and poorer LDCs reveals that producers were taxed independently
of the stage of economic development. This result appears to be very
stable, as only one out of 22 countries analyzed, namely Kenya, showed
average gross NPCs approaching unity (Table A6). With respect to wheat
and rice, the samples are much more heterogenous, containing DCs and
LDCs as well as net importers and net exporters. As one would expect
(see Section B. Ill.l.a), rice and wheat farmers in DCs generally re-
ceived prices exceeding world market equivalents. LDCs were, on aver-
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Table 19 - Comparison of the Instability of Gross NPCs and Producer and























































(a) Some highly inflationary countries are excluded (see notes in
Tables 12-15).
Source: Tables 12-17.
age, slightly protected in the wheat sector and treated neutrally in the
rice sector. Moreover, the trade status matters in LDCs: net wheat and
rice exporters were discriminated against, the latter more heavily than
the former, while average NPCs for net rice and wheat importers were
above unity (see Sections C. III. 1 and C. III. 2). Thus, one can put for-
ward the following statement: import-competing wheat and rice farmers in
LDCs tend to be protected by direct agricultural policies as opposed to
exporters of the two food crops and of coffee, the typical cash crop.
The inclusion of indirect effects resulting from general economic
policies changes the results fundamentally. The net NPCs indicate that
LDCs, which are net importers in the rice and wheat market, move from
The average nominal protection for rice importers in LDCs, however,
is rather low (12 percent), reflecting that there are also countries in
this group in which rice farmers are taxed. Moreover, the results ob-
tained here should be generalized with caution, because we analyze
only two food crops and one export crop.120
protection to disprotection, with a few exceptions like South Korea. Ex-
porters, in turn, are taxed by both direct and indirect policies. This
outcome, although obtained by application of another methodology, is
very much in line with the results reported in Krueger et al. [1988].
The most interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the in-
stability analysis is that price stabilization seems to be a very wide-
spread phenomenon. Table 19 shows the average variability of world
market prices as measured by the standard deviation from a loglinear
trend exceeded the variability of producer prices in domestic currency in
all three agricultural markets considered and in DCs as well as in LDCs.
However, some qualifications of this general statement have to be made:
first, prices granted to coffee producers were substantially less stable
than the respective prices for wheat and rice farmers. This observation
fits well into the view that government authorities treat food crops more
favorably than export crops and provides an extension of the findings in
Krueger et al. [ibid. ], who did obtain only very weak evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that price stabilization policies depend on the trade
status. Second, in some highly inflationary countries, which are
excluded from the figures in Table 19, price stabilization was not suc-
cessful, i. e., the variation of producer prices exceeded that of border
prices. Third, producer prices for wheat and rice were slightly more
effectively stabilized in DCs than in LDCs.
Summing up, import-competing producers in LDCs receive higher
and more stable prices than exporters. DCs, in turn, grant the highest
and most stable prices to farmers.
The effects of trade and macroeconomic policies on agriculture will be
discussed more thoroughly in Chapter D.121
D. The Impact of Sector-Specific and Economy-Wide Policies
on Agriculture: The Cases of Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe
I. Introduction
So far the question whether the agricultural sector is actually taxed or
subsidized has been analyzed in a partial equilibrium setting, con-
centrating on the distortionary impact of agricultural policy and ex-
change rate policy on individual agricultural tradables. However, the
size of agriculture in LDCs implies that any policy directed towards this
sector inevitably affects other parts of the economy profoundly. Con-
versely, measures to promote and protect other sectors can severely
hamper agricultural development. In this context, the domestic terms of
trade between agriculture and the rest of the economy, which result
from agricultural and macroeconomic policies, emerge as a key issue. By
changing the relative prices of importables, exportables and home goods,
trade and exchange rate policies alter the structure of incentives
throughout the economy, thereby affecting the sectoral allocation of in-
vestment, the level and composition of agricultural output and trade and
the migration of labor from farms to urban areas. These issues are
particularly important for LDCs, where governments in the 1970s and
1980s have failed to adjust their exchange rates despite acute foreign
exchange shortages and have relied instead on increasing import
restrictions.
This chapter discusses the extent to which agricultural policies -
such as trade duties, subsidies, administered prices etc. - and macro-
economic policies - such as overall trade policy and exchange rate policy
- affect the level and structure of incentives of agriculture vis-a-vis
other sectors and, within agriculture, the structure of incentives of cash
crops relative to food crops in three LDCs: Malaysia, Peru and
Zimbabwe.
The importance of agriculture to the three economies and the policy
environment is discussed first, in Section D. II. Then, we analyze the
The terms macroeconomic policies and economy-wide policies are used
interchangeable in this study. They are defined to encompass all those
policies which have a significant influence on resource allocation
without being intentionally directed towards agriculture.122
extent to which the foreign trade regime has affected the relationship
between tradable and home goods prices in the three countries, based on
a general equilibrium model of exportables, importables and home goods
(see Section D. III). The empirical analysis further distinguishes between
different categories of export goods in the determination of the relative
price effects vis-a-vis home goods. Following the framework of Krueger
et al. [ 1988] in its approach to analyzing the effects of agricultural
price policies (direct effects) and trade and exchange rate policies
(indirect effects) on agriculture, Section D. IV examines the level of
overall protection in Malaysia. This analysis extends earlier work of
Jenkins and Lai [ 1989] in several areas, as will be shown below. Finally,
Section D. V compares the results obtained here with those of other
studies which applied the same methodology. The question whether food
crops are treated more favorably than export crops, which was already
raised in the cross-section analysis of Chapter C, is discussed again,
now covering a much broader set of agricultural commodities on an
individual country basis.
II. Agriculture in the Three Economies
1. Agricultural and Macroeconomic Performance
a. Recent Economic Trends
The three countries analyzed in our study have shown fundamentally
different economic performances during the last two decades. On the one
hand, Malaysia's economy appeared to be quite dynamic. Real GDP grew
steadily - apart from a short recession in 1985-1986 - at fairly low in-
flation rates. On the other hand, Peru and Zimbabwe are characterized
by a sequence of ups and downs rather than stable economic develop-
ment.
Malaysia, as an open and resource-rich economy, gained from the
price boom for petroleum and other primary commodities in the 1970s,
As a result, palm oil production, for example, increased from 400,000
tons in 1970 to more than 2.5 million tons in 1980 [Rahman, 1990b].123
which is reflected in high growth of real GDP at an average rate of
about 8 percent between 1970 and 1980 (see Table 20). The development
in the 1980s can be divided into three subperiods: the economic ex-
pansion of 1981-1984, the adjustment period 1985-1986 and the recovery
beginning in 1987. At the turn of the decade, the Malaysian economy
faced a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade because of a
simultaneous reduction in prices for important export goods like
petroleum, palm oil, rubber, sawlogs, tin, and cocoa [World Bank,
1988]. The subsequent decline in private investment was compensated by
an ambitious heavy industrialization program launched by the govern-
ment. Although protecting the economy from the global recession of
1981-1982, the costs of this policy were severe budget and current ac-
count deficits (see Table 21) which were mainly financed by foreign
borrowing, and thus caused the Ringgit (Malaysian dollar, MS) to
appreciate.
To remove the imbalances, the government initiated a process of
structural adjustment which started to bear fruits in 1985. Despite a
further decline in the terms of trade, the current account improved due
to a sharp reduction in imports of investment and intermediate goods
which overcompensated the downturn in commodity and manufactured
exports. Furthermore, a program of external debt refinancing was
instituted. Internal developments, however, were considerably less
favorable. Real GDP stagnated for two years, the worst performance
since independence in 1957. Main factors that contributed to the re-
cession were significant public expenditure cuts, the adverse terms of
trade and the loss of international competitiveness as a result of an
overvalued currency and real wage increases exceeding productivity
growth [ibid.]. A significant real depreciation of the Malaysian dollar
against the currencies of the major trading partners in 1986 and an
improvement of the terms of trade were main causes for an export-led
economic recovery in 1987. The upswing continued in 1988 and 1989 with
growth rates of 8.7 and 8.5 percent, respectively, now being mainly
investment-driven [UNIDO, 1991].
Peru's economic performance in the 1970s was determined by the
strictly inward-looking development strategy of the military government.
After a short period of fairly satisfactory growth, a combination of
stagnant exports, a decline in export prices, heavy dependence on food124


































































(a) Average annual growth rates. - (b) 1980=100.
Source: IMF [1990].
imports and industrial intermediate goods, and a rapid increase in the
burden of foreign debt caused a balance-of-payments crisis in 1975 and a
subsequent recession from 1976-1978 [Thiele, 1991b]. By mid-1978, the
government embarked on a stabilization program supported by the IMF
and the World Bank which led to a slight economic recovery and a rapid
improvement of the balance of payments.
President Belaunde, who was elected in 1980, continued the import
liberalization program of his predecessor. On the other hand, public
investment was increased, especially for infrastructural projects [ Mann,
Pastor, 1989]. In 1980 and 1981, the Peruvian GDP grew by 4.7 and 5.5
percent, respectively. Declining terms of trade, the worldwide recession,
an overvalued exchange rate and limited access to external funds as a
result of the Peruvian debt overhang led to an economic stagnation in
1982. In the following year, the situation was further aggravated by the
"El Nino" stream that caused floods in the North and droughts in the125
Table 21 - Balance of Payments of Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe, 1980-

























































(b) Minus sign indicates increase.
Source: IMF [1990].
South of Peru [ World Bank, 1989]. Consequently, GDP declined by 12.3
percent in 1983. In addition, inflation rose steadily. The government
reacted with a reversal of the import liberalization efforts and took
measures to stabilize the economy, particularly a currency depreciation
and a reduction of public expenditures. It achieved a recovery of the
current account via a sharp decrease of imports (see Table 21) but could
not overcome inflationary pressures and had to accept low economic
growth.
In 1985, the new Garcia government adopted a heterodox policy mix
to stabilize the economy [Corsepius, 1989; Foders, 1987]. To break
inflationary expectations, the exchange rate was devalued and then
fixed and prices were frozen. Real wages and - later on - agricultural
incomes were raised and public work programs initiated in order to
achieve demand-led growth. Additionally, a wide range of imports were
banned to encourage the use of slack capacities in local industry.
Foders [ 1987] contrasts this heterodox policy with the orthodox policy
option and concludes that the latter would be superior in the Peruvian
context.126
Finally, Garcia announced a limit for debt service payments amounting to
10 percent of export revenues. At the beginning, the heterodox package
seemed to be very successful. Real GDP grew by 10 percent in 1986 and
7. 8 percent in 1987, and the inflation rate was reduced from 158 percent
in 1985 to 63 percent in 1986. However, the fiscal deficit could not be
controlled, which forced the inflation rate to increase again in 1987.
Moreover, the exchange rate freeze led to a real appreciation of the Inti.
The trade balance and the current account deteriorated, and inter-
national reserves became scarce as a result of very low fresh capital
inflows which could not offset the current account deficit (see Table 21).
The economy fell back into a deep recession - GDP declined by 8. 5 per-
cent and 12 percent in 1988 and 1989, respectively - accompanied by
accelerated inflation.
The Zimbabwean economy experienced a period of moderate growth
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1970 and then
- being subject to international sanctions since 1975 - fell into a
recession that continued from 1976 to 1979 [Robinson, 1990]. When the
country achieved independence in April 1980, the new government in-
herited an economy which was - as a result of the sanctions - diversified
and industrialized and had a rather well-developed physical and ad-
ministrative infrastructure, not only by African standards [ Rukovo et
al. , 1991]. On the other hand, economic policymakers faced a number of
difficulties like a very skewed distribution of income and a high degree
of regulation. The "growth-with-equity" program introduced at inde-
pendence achieved important early successes in terms of double-digit
growth rates in 1980 and 1981 which were caused by expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, the lifting of sanctions, increasing world
market prices for Zimbabwe's major agricultural and mining exports, and
the inflow of foreign assistance [ ibid. ]. In 1982, real GDP growth slowed
dramatically as a result of several factors: the global recession reduced
the demand for Zimbabwe's exports and thus caused the balance-of-
payments deficit to increase; measures to improve social services and to
remove income inequalities as well as heavy subsidies to parastatals
widened the budget deficit without generating growth; and finally, a
severe drought cut into the country's ability to export agricultural
commodities and necessitated food imports [World Bank, 1985]. Moreover,
increased wages, rapid expansion of government spending and increased127
domestic credit fueled inflation. In the following years, the economic
performance was mixed. Low or negative growth rates in 1983, 1984 and
1987 again coincided with droughts and, the other way round, short
booms in 1985 and 1988 profited from favorable weather conditions. This
illustrates the close relationship between economic growth and agri-
cultural performance and the heavy dependence of the latter on the
climate. Obviously, policymakers were not able to overcome this
dependence despite the relatively large and diversified manufacturing
sector the country possesses.
b. Structure and Performance of Agriculture
Agriculture is still an important sector for all three economies, although
its role is declining as in most LDCs. In 1987, about one third of the
Peruvian and Malaysian workforce and even more than two thirds of the
Zimbabwean workforce were employed in the agricultural sector (see
Table 22). In terms of contribution to real GDP, agriculture still has a
prominent position in Malaysia, where it was only recently overtaken by
manufacturing. The share of Peruvian agriculture in real GDP (8 percent
in 1989), by contrast, has rapidly fallen as a result of the strong bias
against the sector caused by import substitution policies (see Sections
D. II. 2 and D. III). The priority given to industrialization also becomes
apparent from the fact that most Peruvians (70 percent in 1989) live in
urban areas, particularly in Lima. In the Zimbabwean economy, the
agricultural share in GDP is rather low, but agricultural exports are still
a main source of foreign exchange earnings and thus largely determine
the country's ability to carry out essential imports like capital goods.
Malaysia's agricultural sector is predominantly export-oriented.
Presently, about three quarters of agricultural output are attributable to
the perennial export crops rubber, palm oil and cocoa [Rahman, 1990b].
Malaysia is the world's largest producer of natural rubber and the third
largest producer of palm oil and cocoa. Whereas its world market share
Exact production figures for major Malaysian, Peruvian and Zimbabwean
agricultural commodities for the period 1970-1987 are presented in
Table A18. A comprehensive analysis of the cocoa industry is provided
by Rahman [ 1990a].128
Table 22 - Main Indicators of Agricultural Development, 1965-1989
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Source: FAO [c; e]; World Bank [1990; 1991]; own computations.
in rubber has declined from 50 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1987,
world market shares in palm oil and cocoa have risen sharply in the same129
period from 43 to 63 percent and from 1 to 9 percent, respectively. Rice
is Malaysia's single most important food crop, the production of which
has been subject to heavy public support since the First Malaysia Plan
1966-1970 in order to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency. However,
increasing costs of paddy production in the early 1980s, especially in
marginal areas, led the government to concentrate paddy production in
selected granary areas. As a consequence, output decreased in recent
years and the self-sufficiency ratio was scaled down to about 60 percent
[Rahman, 1990b].
From an aggregate viewpoint, the performance of Malaysia's agri-
cultural sector can be regarded as rather satisfactory. In the period
1965-1987, overall output grew by 3. 1 percent, on average, and the
growth of food production exceeded population growth, thus indicating
an increase in per capita domestic food supply (see Table 22). The
improved nutritional standard of the country is also reflected in a higher
daily calory supply per capita. The external position of the agricultural
sector is characterized by an increasing surplus in the trade balance, as
exports have grown far more rapidly than imports.
The agricultural indicators for Peru sharply contrast with those for
Malaysia. Production expanded slowly during the period considered; in
particular, food production could not keep pace with population growth.
Output figures for all major Peruvian foodstuffs - potatoes, rice, maize,
and wheat - almost stagnated between 1970 and 1987 (see Table A18).
Even heavy food imports did not raise the food supply: in 1988, the
daily per capita supply of calories was below its 1965 level and signif-
icantly below the average of all middle-income LDCs. Moreover, the
increasing dependence on food imports has turned the agricultural trade
balance into deficit. Opposite to what one would expect in an in-
dustrializing economy, the share of agricultural imports in total imports
rose between 1965/67 and 1986/88. The agricultural trade situation was
further exacerbated by a sluggish export performance. Sugar and
cotton, Peru's most important export crops of the 1960s, experienced a
dramatic decline during the last two decades. In 1983, Peru became a net
importer of sugar. Since then, sugar exports were only made in order to
take advantage of the premium prices offered within the US sugar quota
[Boiling, 1989]. The world market share of cotton decreased from 4 per-
cent in 1963 to 1.5 percent in 1986. Only coffee, which emerged as a130
new export crop in the 1960s, somewhat increased its world market share
from 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent [Herrmann et al. , 1990].
Zimbabwe's agricultural performance has been mixed since 1965. On
the one hand, total agricultural as well as food production growth fell
short of the (very high) population growth, which may partly be ex-
plained by repeated droughts that caused extreme temporary output
reductions for certain commodities, particularly maize (see Table A18).
On the other hand, Zimbabwe's reliance on food imports is very weak.
The country has achieved self-sufficiency for its main staple, maize, and
does even produce a significant exportable, surplus if weather conditions
are favorable. Wheat is the only major foodstuff that has to be imported
regularly. Zimbabwe's single most important export crop, tobacco,
currently accounts for about 50 percent of total agricultural export
revenues and reached a world market share of 6.5 percent in 1987.
Other major cash crops are cotton, sugar, tea, and coffee. Considerable
agricultural exports together with low food imports are responsible for a
surplus in Zimbabwe's agricultural trade balance.
A common feature of the agricultural sectors in all three economies
is a certain degree of dualism. Such dualistic structures are most
prominent in Zimbabwe as a result of the racial discrimination before
independence. One can clearly distinguish two subsectors in that
country: a modern, technologically advanced sector, comprising about
4,200 large-scale commercial farmers who own about 12.8 million hectares
of land; and the traditional smallholder's sector, comprising over 800,000
farm families who account for about 16. 4 million hectares of land [ Rukovo
et al. , 1991]. Similar differentiations are possible in Peru between
irrigated coastal agriculture and subsistence farming in the Highlands
and, to a lesser extent, in Malaysia between the growing of rubber,
palm oil and cocoa on estates and by smallholders, respectively.
A comparison of the agricultural and the general economic per-
formance in the three countries reveals as an interesting peculiarity that
the ranking is the same in both categories. Malaysia shows the highest
growth rates of agricultural production and real GDP, followed by
Zimbabwe and Peru (see Table 22). This result adds to the evidence that
Only in 1984, Zimbabwe had to import maize as a result of an
extremely bad harvest caused by a drought.131
agriculture is an important sector in economic development and that
industrialization at the expense of agriculture - like in Peru - can
hardly be successful.
2. Agricultural, Trade and Macroeconomic Policies
Against the background of the general economic and agricultural
indicators presented in the previous subsection, we will now provide a
short survey of the policies adopted in the three economies which
directly or indirectly affect the agricultural sector.
a. Agricultural Pricing Policies
Government interventions directed towards agricultural prices are wide-
spread in DCs as well as LDCs and are justified by several reasons like
food security and the securing of sufficient and stable farm incomes (see
Chapter C).
In Malaysia, rubber and palm oil exporters have to pay a pro-
gressive export tax that is collected for revenue purposes and also
2
smoothes out price fluctuations. Moreover, both commodities are subject
to a research cess, and an additional cess is imposed on rubber for
replanting. Since these cesses are earmarked, they are, however, of
indirect benefit to the rubber and palm oil sector. The NRPs reported in
Table 23 thus overestimate the actual discrimination against the two
export crops which appears to be rather modest, especially in the 1980s.
The price of cocoa, Malaysia's third most important agricultural export
commodity, is fully determined by world market conditions. By contrast,
strict price regulations are at work in the rice market. Paddy farmers
receive a GMP that usually lies above the world market equivalent, thus
Hwa [ 1988] shows for a cross section of countries that there exists a
significant linkage between agricultural and industrial development and
that agricultural growth induces productivity increases and thereby
facilitates overall economic growth.
2
Jenkins and Lai [ 1989] provide a detailed description of the pricing
policies towards Malaysia's major agricultural commodities.132

































































Source: Herrmann [1990b]; Rahman [1990b]; Rukovo et al. [1991].
reflecting the country's striving for self-sufficiency with regard to this
staple food crop. In addition, the GMP is a means of poverty eradication
among paddy farmers who are almost all Malays. The price subsidization
of rice production has steeply increased in the 1980s compared to the
1970s (see Table 23). Apart from the GMP, Malaysian paddy farmers also
gain from input subsidies like cheap fertilizer and public drainage and
irrigation projects.
Peru has continuously taxed its major export crops, coffee and
cotton, since the beginning of the import substitution policy in the early
1960s. Although producer prices are generally intervention-free, they
are dropped far below world market prices through high export duties.
Moreover, export prices are closely related to volatile world market
The improvement of the living standard, especially for the indigenous
Malayan population, is a key objective of the new economic policy
(NEP) which was implemented in 1970.133
prices, while food prices are more effectively stabilized [Herrmann,
1990b]. Peru's food price policy has made use of consumer subsidies and
a system of guaranteed producer prices. The price system is ad-
ministered by two public enterprises that have generally granted favor-
able prices to wheat and maize farmers while taxing rice producers.
During the 1980-1985 period, some steps were taken to eliminate price
controls and food subsidies [Boiling, 1988]. In 1985, regulations were
sharpened again. Producer prices for the major food crops were sig-
nificantly raised in order to encourage import substitution in agriculture.
In addition, production costs were kept- low via subsidized credits and
fertilizer. This policy mix could not be financed any longer in late 1988,
so that prices were freed [see Corsepius, 1989].
The Zimbabwean government has treated the agricultural sector
rather favorable, on average, at least compared to other countries in
Subsaharan Africa. All agricultural prices, for consumers as well as pro-
ducers, are fixed by state-owned marketing boards and do more likely
reflect the bargaining power of the groups involved in the decision
process than efficiency considerations [Jansen, 1982]. Extensive con-
sumer subsidies together with sharply raised producer prices for some
commodities (maize, beef, sorghum) led to severe losses of the marketing
boards in the 1980s which had to be financed by the government and
thus exacerbated the Zimbabwean budget deficit.
b. Trade and Macroeconomic Policies
Nonagricultural import protection as well as macroeconomic instruments
like fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies indirectly affect the
agricultural sector via changes in the real exchange rate, either
measured as the relative price between tradables and nontradables or as
the relation of domestic to foreign inflation. Import tariffs raise the
relative price of nontradables (see Section D. Ill), while expansionary
public expenditure programs fuel domestic inflation. Both policies end up
in a real appreciation and discriminate against agriculture, especially
In 1984/85, for example, subsidies for the marketing boards accounted
for 3.6 percent of the total government budget [Thomson, 1988].134
agricultural exports, if they are not accompanied by sufficient nominal
devaluations.
Malaysia initiated a first phase of import substitution in the mid-
1960s. As a result, the average ERP for manufacturing rose from 25 per-
cent in 1965 to 44 percent in 1970 [Ariff, Semudram, 1990]. After this
early stage of import substitution was almost completed in the mid-1970s,
the system of protection was curtailed stepwise, but it is still in force
and works against exports except in the free trade zones, where pro-
ducers have duty-free access to imported inputs and machinery and ad-
ditionally receive several export incentives [ibid. ].
Recent macroeconomic policies in Malaysia have to be viewed as a
consequence of the resource boom in the 1970s. A large proportion of
the windfall profits was spent on nontradables, e.g., in the construction
sector whose relative price rose in the early 1980s. Moreover, the for-
eign exchange inflow led to a credit expansion that fueled inflation, and
the heavy industrialization program widened the fiscal deficit which was
mainly financed by foreign borrowing. Both effects contributed to a sig-
nificant real appreciation of the Malasian dollar between 1980 and 1984
(see Table 24). At the end of 1984, the Malaysian dollar was estimated to
be overvalued by 20 percent [ ibid. ]. The adjustment package in 1985-
1986 contained a fiscal and monetary restraint as well as a nominal de-
valuation. Consequently, the real exchange rate depreciated. In the
following years, monetary policies were directed at the maintenance of
price stability, the size of the public sector was reduced, and the ex-
change rate was geared to market forces [UNIDO, 1991]. For the agri-
cultural sector, this meant a considerable reduction of indirect taxation
(see Section D. IV).
Peru's economic policies since the 1960s have been dominated by an
inward-looking industrialization strategy based on heavy import pro-
tection. Especially the military regime of General Velasco insulated the
Peruvian economy from world markets. In 1978, the average tariff rate
for imports amounted to 66 percent [World Bank, 1989]. After a short
liberalization phase, that brought about a tariff reduction to 32 percent
in 1981, balance-of-payments problems caused a return to more protec-
tionist policies in 1984. This trend was continued by the Garcia ad-
This rate does, of course, not include nontariff barriers like the
comprehensive import licensing scheme that restricts exports to Peru.135
Table 24 - Real Exchange Rate Movements, 1980-1989
Real exchange rate index






90.6 91.0 96.7 101.3 105.3 100.0 83.9 79.6 72.2 70.9
100.0 83.8 87.1 89.9 86.8 109.7
100.0 85.5 89.2 92.9 89.3 102.6
89.4 72.2
90.5 91.7
100.0 83.7 72.6 71.5 76.0 72.3 67.4 64.3
(a) Real effective exchange rate as calculated by the IMF. An Increase of
the index indicates an appreciation. - (b) Real effective exchange rate as
calculated by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) for exports
and imports, respectively [see Corsepius, 1989]. An increase of the index
indicates a depreciation. - (c) Real exchange rate defined as the relative
price between tradables (approximated by the trade unit value index) and
nontradables (approximated by the building materials price index). An in-
crease of the index indicates a depreciation.
Source: Corsepius [1989] for Peru; IMF [1991] for Malaysia; Masters
[1991] for Zimbabwe.
ministration, so that the average legal tariff rate had risen back to the
1978 level in 1987.
An important instrument of Peru's macroeconomic policy is the ex-
change rate. Between 1978 and 1985, the Sol was gradually devalued
under a crawling peg system. However, a real appreciation of the cur-
rency could not be avoided, because expansionary demand policies fueled
inflation (see Table 24). The Garcia administration devalued the official
exchange rate drastically and held it fixed after that. Moreover, the
government introduced a system of multiple exchange rates which had
the objective to support nontraditional exports and to subsidize priority
imports, including the staples maize and wheat. With respect to agri-
culture, the multiple exchange rates caused a further discrimination
against the traditional export crops and counteracted the endeavors to
reduce the dependence on imported food. In view of a dramatic real ap-
preciation of the Inti (see Table 24), the government returned to a
crawling peg in December 1986 and carried out several discretionary
The Inti substituted the Sol as the Peruvian currency in 1986.136
devaluations but could not offset the accelerated inflation that resulted
from the demand-led growth model.
In the case of Zimbabwe, Masters [ 1991] has shown for the period
1966-1988 that the inflation differential between Zimbabwe and its major
trading partners was almost fully compensated by nominal exchange rate
changes, thus keeping purchasing power parity roughly constant.
During the UDI period, the nominal exchange rate was more or less
constant, while the money supply grew faster than nominal GDP and the
government deficit exploded. The resulting inflationary pressure was
suppressed by strict price controls and the rationing of imports. After
independence, the now open inflation was stopped by fiscal and monetary
restraints. In addition, the Zimbabwean dollar was substantially devalued
in 1982 to regain the country's international competitiveness. However,
the new government also introduced a national minimum wage. The
following steep real wage increase pushed up the relative price of non-
tradables. The nominal devaluation had only a temporary effect and could
not stop this real appreciation (see Table 24) that led to a significant
transfer out of the agricultural sector [ ibid. ].
III. The Incidence of Industrial Import Protection on Agricultural
Exports in Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe
1. The Analytical Framework
The starting point for the empirical investigation of the incidence of
protection is a simple general equilibrium model [Dornbusch, 1974] based
on the following assumptions:
(1) A small open economy with constant factor endowment and real in-
come that produces and consumes three different types of goods -
importables (M), exportables (X) and nontradables (N).
(2) Home goods and both tradables are substitutable in production and
consumption, whereas substitution possibilities between exportables
and importables are ruled out.
This assumption can be relaxed, as is shown by Greenaway and Milner
[1988a], who discuss the case of intra-industry trade, where import-
ables and exportables are substitutable.137
(3) In the initial (free-trade) situation, the trade balance is in
equilibrium, and all prices (Pw. P-y, PKI) are set equal to unity.
(4) Uniform import tariffs (t) and uniform export subsidies (s) are
regarded as possible commercial policy instruments.
(5) The exchange rate is fixed, but the relative prices of both traded
goods in terms of home goods are flexible, i. e., market clearing is
guaranteed.
According to the small country assumption, the prices of the trad-
ables in domestic currency are determined by the world market price,
the exchange rate and the policy interventions applied at home. The
price for nontradables, however, is a function of domestic supply and
demand, but is also affected by commercial policies.
Let us now suppose the introduction of a uniform tariff that
disturbs the initial equilibrium via an increase in the relative prices
pM/pN and pM'/p.,. This change in relative prices causes adjustments on
the supply and demand side. On the one hand, firms in the import-
competing sector get incentives to increase their production and thereby
divert resources from the other sectors. On the other hand, consumers
shift from now more expensive import goods to nontradables and export-
ables. As a consequence of these substitution processes, the home good
sector faces an excess demand and a subsequent price increase. To what
extent must the price for nontradables rise in order to induce a new
2
equilibrium? Since the market for nontradables was initially cleared, a
new general equilibrium requires an equiproportional change of both
demand and supply, i. e.,
["] BN = sN.
Such changes in demand and supply are,. in turn, a function of
(relative) price movements. Thus,
The price and quantity movements in response to the introduction of
an import restriction are shown graphically in Section B. II. 5 for all
individual markets.
2
Dornbusch [ 1974] has shown that equilibrium in the market for non-
tradables coincides with balanced trade. Hence, it is sufficient to





where E and <J are the compensated supply and demand price elasticities
for nontradables with respect to X, N and M, and a hat "*" denotes a
proportionate change. By setting Equation [78] equal to Equation [79],
solving for p.. and making use of the homogeneity constraint
[80] 2 6± - 2 d± = 0,
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one obtains the price increase that is necessary to clear the home good
market as




The ultimate change of p.. thus depends on the substitutability between
home goods and importables in supply and demand. The more (less)
elastic consumers and producers react to relative price changes, the
higher (lower) must be p., to remove the disequilibrium in the market
for nontradables. Apart from the two corner solutions, which are dis-
cussed in Section B. II. 5, the new equilibrium has the following charac-
teristics: the domestic price of importables has increased relative to the
price of exportables by the full amount of the tariff. It has also risen
relative to the price of home goods but by less than the full amount of
the tariff. Finally, the price of exportables has declined relative to both
other prices. In other words: only a part of the tariff turns out to be
of advantage for the import substitution sector, the rest is shifted to
the producers of exportables as an implicit tax. The extent of the shift139
is measured by means of the incidence parameter, o, that ranges
between zero and unity and is the higher the closer the substitution of
relationship between importables and home goods is (see section B. II. 5).
Having estimated the incidence parameter, it is possible to calculate
true tariff and true subsidy rates [Greenaway, Milner, 1987]. The true
tariff is defined as the change in the price of importables relative to
home goods (A(p../pVI)). Hence, it measures the incentives for resource
M IN
reallocations between the import-competing and the nontradable sector
but not the protection against foreign competitors which is analyzed by
the conventional concepts like NPC and EPC.
Since the prices of importables and nontradables have increased to
1+t and 1+d, respectively, where d equals pN> the true tariff (t*) is
given by
where
[84] d - pN - UPM + (l-o) px
= ot + (l-o) s.
Analogously, the true subsidy (s*) measures the relative price change of
exportables in terms of nontradables ((Atp-Vp^)). It is defined as
The true tariff equals the nominal tariff (t) if importables and non-
tradables are not substitutable. In all other cases, it is lower and can
even become zero if home goods and importables are perfect substitutes.
Import protection also leads to true subsidies ranging below nominal sub-
sidies (s) via an increase in the price of nontradables apart from the
According to assumption (3), both prices were initially equal to unity.
This implies, of course, that the relative price Pi//Pvi
 wa
s also unity.140
situation where home goods and importables cannot be substituted. Put
differently: the import substitution policy does, in general, only partly
achieve its objective of creating incentives in the protected industries
and, over and above that, discriminates against exports.
2. Empirical Results
Based on these theoretical considerations, we estimated incidence
parameters and true incentives for Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe by
applying the Equations [81], [83] and [85].
a. The Incidence of Protection
In order to obtain the appropriate regression equation, we rewrite
Equation [81] as
[86] (PN- ;X) =O(;M. ;X).
Since the theoretical model focuses on changes in relative prices,
Equation [86] is further transformed into the double logarithmic form
[87] ln(pN/px)t = constant + u ln(pM/px)t + ufc
where u, is a stochastic disturbance term. Equation [87] shows that the
incidence parameter has to be interpreted as the elasticity of the price
of nontradables relative to exportables with respect to the price of
importables relative to exportables. u could now be estimated from
Equation [83]. One must keep in mind, however, that the regression is
based on time series data and thus the theoretical assumptions of
constant real income and balanced trade appear to be unrealistic.
Consequently, income (Y) - as measured by GDP per capita - and the
balance of trade (BOT) are additionally included into the regression.
That is,
[88] ln(pN/px)t = constant + u ln(pM/px)t + a BOTt + 0 lnYt + ufc141
Moreover, as shown by Garcia [1981], the regression equation may
be disaggregated to account for subsectors among exportables and
importables. Then, the following specification is valid:
[89] ln(PN/PxA)t = constant + ^ inCp^p^ + «2 inCp^/p^
+ a BOT + |3 lnY + u
where py, either denotes the price index for individual agricultural
export commodities or a price index for all agricultural exports, and
F>XNA is a price index for all exportables not included in p^. All
export price indices are weighted by the export shares.
The results for the shift parameters, obtained by estimating
Equations [88] and [89], are presented in Table 25. In each case, the
Cochrane/Or cutt iterative procedure was used, because the ordinary
least square (OLS) estimates suffered from positive autocorrelation. The
coefficient of determination was always satisfactory, and the incidence
parameters appeared to be statistically different from zero at least at the
10 percent significance level.
The high values of the incidence parameters reported in Table 25
indicate that - with the exception of beef in Zimbabwe - a major part of
import tariffs is shifted to the export sector as an implicit tax. This
result holds true for all countries considered and for total exports as
well as individual agricultural exports. It implies that home goods and
importables are, in general, fairly close substitutes in production and
consumption, while the relationship between exportables and home goods
is weak. The imposition of a one percent uniform tariff on Malaysian im-
ports, for example, would raise the pricq ratio between nontradables and
total exports by 0.78 percent, the relative price of home goods in terms
of palm oil even by 0.91 percent, thus creating strong incentives to
divert resources from the export sector. Significant resource movements
between the import substitution and the home good sector are, by con-
The complete results of the regressions, including goodness of fit
statistics and detailed information on the data sources applied, are
provided by Herrmann et al. [ 1990] for Malaysia and Peru and by
Wiebelt [ 1990b] for Zimbabwe. These authors also tested the sensitivity
of the incidence parameter u with respect to different model speci-
fications.142
Table 25 - Estimates of the Incidence Parameter o (a) for Total Exports,
Total Agricultural Exports and Individual Agricultural Exports















(a) The incidence parameter



















a is defined in Section B.II.5, Equation
for Malaysia were run without income and
Source: Herrmann et al. [1990, Tables 2 and 4]; Wiebelt [1990a,
Table 1].
trast, rather unlikely, because the import tariff does only slightly
change the respective relative price.
The results discussed so far are all based on the regression
Equations [88] and [89]. It may be, however, that the estimates for o
depend on the model specification chosen [see Smeets, 1989; Meester,
1986]. We, therefore, tried several alternative specifications: the
balance-of-trade and income variables were omitted, different lag
structures were introduced, the weights for the export price index for
nonagricultural commodities (PVVTA) were changed, and various proxies
were used for the home good price index [see Herrmann et al. , 1990;
Wiebelt, 1990a].
As can be seen from Table 26, which shows the range of o esti-
mates, the incidence parameters are fairly stable across different model
specifications. Except for beef in Zimbabwe, they always rank above 0. 5
and in some models even lie around unity. Hence, the sensitivity analy-143

































Source: Wiebelt [ 1990a, Table 3].
sis confirms our conclusion that total exports and individual agricultural
exports bear a major burden of import protection in Malaysia, Peru and
Zimbabwe.
b. True Incentives
The similarity of the incidence parameters for all three countries does
not imply that agricultural exports are treated similarly. In order to
assess whether, and to what extent, agricultural exports are discrimi-
nated against, we must additionally know the nominal protection for
manufacturing and the agricultural export crops. The estimated shift
parameters can then be combined with nominal tariffs and nominal export
subsidies to calculate true tariffs and true subsidies according to
Equations [83] and [85].
The true protection concept focuses on relative price changes of
importables and exportables caused by trade restrictions, both in terms
of nontradables. Import tariffs as well as export subsidies can raise the
price of nontradables. In our analysis, however, we assume the in-144
troduction of an import tariff at given export subsidies, thus ruling out
repercussions from export subsidies or export taxes on home good
prices. As a consequence, Equation [84] reduces to
[90] d = ot.
The true tariffs and true subsidies calculated in this way reflect
upper bounds - in the presence of nominal export subsidies - or lower
bounds - in the presence of nominal export taxes - for the actual
incentives.
Table 27 contains average true tariff and true subsidy rates for
Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe. Peru exhibits by far the highest industrial
protection level which reflects the country's strong priority given to an
inward-looking development strategy. In Malaysia and Zimbabwe, import
protection appears to be rather moderate in the period considered. With
regard to the true incentives for manufacturing, the difference between
the three countries almost disappears: in each case, import protection is
followed by a price increase for nontradables which is nearly as large as
the price increase for importables. The close substitutability between
home goods and importables thus prevents the intended creation of sig-
nificant incentives for resource reallocations between both sectors, as is
indicated by very low true tariffs. An impressive example for this
phenomenon is given by Peru, where a nominal tariff of 71 percent turns
into a true tariff of 7 percent only.
Government interventions with regard to agricultural exports are
2
extremely different in the three countries considered: Malaysia, tra-
ditionally being export-oriented, taxes its major export crops, rubber
and palm oil, but on a rather low level. Cocoa, the third important
Malaysian agricultural export commodity, is not subject to government
interventions. Zimbabwean policymakers tend to subsidize the agricultural
For a discussion of the conflict arising from simultaneous import
protection and export promotion, see Greenaway and Milner [ 1987] or
Greenaway [1989].
2
The values in Table 27 are unweighted averages and thus do not cover
the variations of export subsidies from year to year. Yearly figures
are provided by Wiebelt [ 1990a] for Zimbabwe and by Herrmann et al.
[ 1990] for Malaysia and Peru.
The policy instruments used are surveyed in Section D. II.145
Table 27 - Estimates of True Tariffs and Subsidies for Malaysia, Peru
and Zimbabwe, 1980-1987 (percent) (a)



























































plicit import tariffs for total manufactures as calculated by Erzan et
al. [1989] and includes all import charges
- (c) The true tariff rate and the true
Equations [83] and [85].True subsidies and
but no nontariff barriers.
subsidy rate
true tariffs
with the incidence parameters reported in Table 25.
are defined in
are calculated
Source: Thiele [1991a, Table 4]; Wiebelt [1990a].
sector. There is, however, an enormous range of protection for individ-
ual goods running from moderate taxation to heavy subsidization. By
contrast, Peru is characterized by a very unfavorable treatment of its
major export crops, coffee and cotton, which must be viewed as a con-
sequence of the country's industrialization strategy.
The true subsidies lie substantially below nominal subsidies, thus
reflecting that import restrictions do not only, for the most part, miss
their original objective of changing relative prices in favor of import-
substituting activities but also impose an implicit tax on agricultural146
exports. The tax on Malaysian palm oil, for example, more than doubles
when indirect effects resulting from import protection are included.
Malaysian cocoa and Zimbabwean cotton, which are neither taxed nor
subsidized by agricultural price policies, receive significant negative
true subsidies. These two examples illustrate that there may occur in-
consistencies between sector-specific and economy-wide policies. Hence,
successful agricultural planning is hardly possible without consideration
of commercial policies, as is indicated by the high incidence of import
protection. Along the same lines, one can argue that an improvement of
the production incentives for agricultural export commodities in Peru, for
example, requires both price adjustments and a trade liberalization.
IV. The Effects of Agricultural and Macroeconomic Policies on Agri-
cultural Incentives in Malaysia
The import substitution bias in Malaysian industrial policy and the
resulting appreciation of the real exchange rate (measured as the rela-
tive price between tradables and home goods) discussed in the previous
sub-section indirectly affected the prices of agricultural commodities
relative to nontradable goods. Moreover, the "export boom" of the 1970s,
reflecting massive increases in foreign exchange inflows from the export
of petroleum, palm oil, electronics, textiles and timber, and the more
traditional commodities (rubber, tin, etc. ), has also caused important
shifts in the expenditure patterns, resource flows, employment, and the
structure of domestic production and imports. Evidence suggests that
the failure of the exchange rate to adjust appropriately has had adverse
effects on agriculture and, with escalating costs in the sector, may have
lowered returns for a major part of traditional agricultural commodity
production. This, in turn, has led to a fall-off in investment in the
sector and to the initiation of specific interventions to offset the biased
structure of macroeconomic incentives. Because the domestic terms of
trade have moved strongly against agriculture as a result of macro level
The export boom of the 1970s is described in World Bank [1984]. The
transmission mechanisms by which the oil boom and trade policy
affected agricultural incentives in Malaysia are investigated by Wiebelt
[ 1991a; 1991b] using a multisectoral, general equilibrium model.147
developments, it is possible that a number of micro level policy inter-
ventions would be redundant, once corrective actions are taken to the
government's overall macro stance.
This question will be investigated more thoroughly in this sub-
section. Following the framework set forth in Krueger et al. [1988],
which is outlined in Section B. II. 6, the effects of agricultural trade and
pricing policies (direct effects) are quantified in terms of NRPs and
ERPs for major agricultural commodities, calculated using historical
nominal exchange rates in determining border prices. The (indirect)
effects of overall trade policy and appreciation of the real exchange rate
are then included in measures of the total effects on prices and value
added by using free-trade equilibrium real exchange rates. The analysis
extends earlier work on Malaysia by Jenkins and Lai [ 1989] in several
areas.
The period of investigation is extended to include the total macro-
economic expansion period 1981-1984 as well as the adjustment period
1985-1986 and the recovery period 1987-1988. The commodity coverage is
also extended to include cocoa as another important cash crop. Moreover,
variable input coefficients from different input-output tables are used to
compute ERPs. And finally, an attempt is made to isolate the indirect
effects resulting from trade policy and those emanating from macro pol-
1. Measures of Intervention
a. Direct Effects on Output Prices: Nominal Rates of Protection
Agricultural trade and price policies (including trade taxes, quotas, ad-
ministered prices, and marketing and processing subsidies) have a direct
effect on output prices. NRPs measure these direct effects on output
prices by comparing actual domestic prices with free-trade prices that
would prevail in the absence of government intervention, i. e. ,
[91] e [1] NRPi = (Pi - P|)/P.[148
where NRP. is the NRP on good i, p. is the domestic producer price of
good i, and p.' is the border or world market price of good i adjusted
for transport and other marketing costs. Since the interest in this
section is in incentives at the producers' level, NRPs are calculated
based on prices received by farmers. For the export crops - rubber,
palm oil and cocoa - p. is derived by adjusting the fob prices by all
relevant charges between the farm gate and the point where the fob
price is quoted. These include local marketing and transport costs and
export taxes. For paddy, the only food crop included, the producer
price is the GMP. In general, for an exportable good, the border price
measured at the farmgate (export parity price) is defined as the fob
price less the cost of export handling, transport and marketing. For
paddy, the border (import parity) price is obtained by deducting the
estimated miller's overhead costs and profits from the cif price and
converting it to paddy equivalents using the conversion factor of 0.65
for paddy/rice. The cost of milling and drying the paddy and trans-
porting the wet paddy to the drying centre are then deducted.
b. Indirect and Total Effects
NRPs, calculated using the official exchange rate, measure only the
direct effects of agricultural policy. However, trade policies and ex-
change rate policies affect border prices and the opportunity costs of
production and consumption. In order to capture these indirect effects of
misalignment of the exchange rate, the indirect effects of trade on non-
agriculture and of exchange rate policies on farm prices can be measured
as (see Section B. II. 6):







[92] M48] ^--^-x-^,^.,^-!-^ -X
where p.' is the border price of a commodity evaluated at the official
exchange rate and p? at the equilibrium exchange rate. P»JA is the actual
A more detailed description of the price calculations together with the
relevant data sources is provided by Rahman [1990b].149
price index of nonagriculture as defined in Equation 149]. Pxi* *
s *-he
price index of nonagricultural products evaluated at the equilibrium
exchange rate and in the absence of trade policy measures affecting




[93] • [50] p*A = a • (1+w . eo + d-a) • PNAfJ
In Equations [92] and [93], e*/e_ measures the exchange rate adjustment
necessary to eliminate any prevailing current account imbalances and any
impact on the exchange rate of trade and pricing policies. The
exchange rate adjustment is estimated as follows:
V
\J
where e* and e_ are defined as above.
Q_ = unsustainable deficit in the current account,
I)— = the elasticity of demand for foreign exchange (the elasticity of
demand for imports),
Q_ = the demand for foreign exchange (the level of import demand),
e_ = the elasticity of supply of foreign exchange (the elasticity of
supply of exports),
Q_ = the supply of foreign exchange (the level of exports),
tj, = the average implicit tariff rate,
t., = the average implicit export tax rate.
The above measure of indirect protection (Equation [92]) ignores
changes in the price of agricultural tradables. However, long-term in-
vestments in agriculture are a function of the relative prices of agri-
cultural and nonagricultural goods (the domestic terms of trade of agri-
For the definition of the other variables and parameters of Equation
[93], see Section B.II.6.150
culture). Thus, the ratio of the output price of a commodity to the price
of nonagricultural goods is the appropriate measure of the incentives:
P.-/PNA fi [46] NRPm -. "
A - 1
1 J T it* /it*
This equation measures the combined effect of sectoral and economy-wide
price interventions on agricultural prices and is a measure of the price
incentives used in the empirical analysis; the total effect on output
prices can thus be interpreted as foreign protection adjusted by sectoral
and economy-wide policies. The difference between Equations [95] and






measuring the impact of direct policies as a percentage of the relative
price which would prevail in the absence of all interventions.
Finally, for an in-depth analysis of the impact of economy-wide
policies it may be useful to separate the effects of indirect protection in
Equation [92] into those arising from
- trade policy with respective to nonagricultural goods and from
- those policies which cause the unsustainability of the current account.
Analogously to Equation [92], the indirect effect of exchange rate




captures only those effects on the price index for nonagricultural goods
which result from nonagricultural trade policies, while ignoring the ad-151























which measures that part of indirect protection resulting from non-
agricultural trade policies. From the last expressions of the right-hand
side of Equations [92], [92'] and [92"], it is clear that the indirect
effects are the same for all tradables.
2. Magnitude, Structure and Instability of Agricultural Incentives
a. Output Price Effects
In estimating the direct and total NRPs caused by agricultural, trade,
and exchange rate policies, import parity prices are used as world
market prices for paddy (rice converted into paddy equivalents) and
export parity prices for rubber, palm oil and cocoa. The producer prices
are measured at the farmgate. In the case of paddy, the relevant
producer price is the GMP. For exportables, farmgate prices have been
calculated from the relevant fob prices by subtracting marketing and
transport cost as well as the different export taxes. Details of the
calculations are given in Rahman [1990b].
Table 28 presents the results of
- the effect of agricultural policies on nominal protection: NRP.;
- the direct effect of agricultural policies on nominal protection of
agricultural exportables relative to paddy: NRPp.;
- the direct effect of agricultural policy on the relative protection of
agricultural tradables to nonagriculture: NRPp..;
- the indirect effect of nonagricultural protection on the relative pro-
tection of agricultural tradables to nonagriculture: NRP._;152
Table 28 - Direct, Indirect and Total Nominal Protection to Producers of







































































































































































Source: Own computations based on Rahman [1990b].
- the indirect effect of exchange rate over-/undervaluation on the
relative protection of agricultural tradables to nonagriculture: NRP..-.;
- the total indirect effect: NRP- = NRPJT + JQJ
- the total (direct and indirect) effect of agricultural price, non-
agricultural trade and exchange rate policies on the relative protection
of agricultural tradables to nonagriculture: NRP_. = NRPJJJ
 + NRPj-
From Equations [92], [92'] and [92"], it is clear that the indirect
effects are the same for all tradables. For every year from 1960 to 1988,
the total indirect effects of trade policies (NRP.) have been detrimental
to the domestic relative price of the agricultural tradables (Table 28).153
Figure 7 - Ratio of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate to the Nominal Ex-




Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [ 1990b].
This has arisen for two reasons. First, the impact of the exchange rate
overvaluation in Malaysia has a greater impact on the agricultural
sector, which is entirely traded, than it has on the nonagricultural
sector which is only partially traded. This indirect effect (NRP.Q) was
most pronounced in 1981-1984, when an expansive fiscal policy created
severe fiscal and external imbalances that were financed mainly by heavy
foreign borrowing, thereby leading to a drastic appreciation of the
Malaysian dollar (Table 28, Figure 7). Second, trade restrictions in the
nonagricultural sector have served to make investment in nonagriculture
relatively more attractive than it would have been otherwise. The
indirect effects of trade restrictions (NRP™) on nonagricultural imports
were more important during the import substitution phase 1960-1975
(Table 28). More recently, these indirect effects on the real exchange
rate decreased substantially as a result of the marked depreciation of the
Malaysian dollar and additional measures to curb inflation.
Summing up, the indirect effect of exchange rate policy and trade
policy was negative for all agricultural tradables over the period 1960-154
1988. Whether individual agricultural tradables are ultimately taxed or
subsidized then depends on the direct effects of agricultural policies.
These direct effects together with the total effects will now be in-
vestigated for the most important agricultural commodities.
Paddy
The direct effect of agricultural price policy (NRP.) on paddy was small
in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s which comprises also the
1973-1975 period of the world food crises when world rice prices were
abnormally high (Table 28, Figure 8). On average, domestic producer
prices exceeded import parity prices by 10 percent in 1960-1969 and 1
percent in 1970-1975 when evaluated at the official exchange rate. If
evaluated with respect to nonagricultural prices, this effect drops to 9
and 1 percent, respectively. Including the indirect effects of the ap-
preciation of the real exchange rate, however, the total effect of gov-
ernment policy on farmgate prices (NRP~.) of paddy averaged zero in
Figure 8 - Producer and Parity Prices, 1960-1988: Paddy
Producer Prio
Import Parity
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Fiscal Year
Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [1990b].155
1960-1969 and even became negative (-9 percent) in the 1970-1975
period.
After the mid-1970s and particularly during the 1980s, the GMP was
kept substantially above import parity prices measured at the official
exchange rate (Figure 8). The direct effect of rice policy is slightly
lower when measured as a percentage of the relative price which would
prevail in the absence of all interventions. Even if the negative indirect
effects of the overvaluation of the real exchange rate are taken into ac-
count, total protection, on average, exceeds 100 percent indicating sub-
stantial assistance through the paddy price support. Although the GMP
was reduced from M$698/mt to M$661/mt after 1983, total subsidization
increased over the 1985-1988 period as a result of decreasing world
prices and diminishing indirect discrimination against tradables.
Except for 1968-1970 and 1974-1975 - when import parity prices
were abnormally high (Figure 8) - the effect of direct pricing policies on
exportables and paddy has been to provide negative relative protection
to producers of exportables (NRPp.). In the 1960s, the relative dis-
protection was in the range of -6 percent for cocoa producers to -20
percent for rubber smallholders. This ratio of disincentives increased
steadily from the mid-1970s to reach a peak of over -65 percent in 1985-
1988.
Rubber
Rubber production has been discriminated against by direct and indirect
policies over the whole period of investigation. The direct impact of the
various export taxes (duty and cess payments) was the largest during
the commodity price boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Table 28,
Figures 9 and 10). The nominal discriminatioin was higher for smallholder
rubber than for estate rubber due to higher marketing and transport
costs and the replanting cess which was collected only from smallholdings
before 1975. The total export taxes paid by estates for 1960-1974 did not
include the replanting cess, because this cess was refunded to the
estates without any proof of replanting being required for refunding.
However, this practice was changed in 1975, and estates like small-
holdings were required to submit proof of replanting to qualify for the
refund. As a result, NRPs differ only slightly after 1975.156
Figure 9 - Producer and Parity Prices, 1960-1988: Estate Rubber
19S0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [1990b].
Figure 10 - Producer and Parity Prices, 1960-1988: Smallholder Rubber
1960 1965 1970 1975
Fiscal Year
1985 1988
Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [1990b].157
The indirect effect of the appreciation of the real exchange rate
augmented the direct effect of trade policy, so that farmgate prices for
estate rubber and smallholder rubber were, on average, only 81 and 77
percent of the equilibrium exchange rate border prices from 1960 to
1988.
Palm Oil
Palm oil received negative nominal protection over the entire period
under study. This was due to the progressive export duty and the sur-
charge that were levied against exports up to 1988. On average, do-
mestic producer prices were 10 percent lower than the export parity
prices when evaluated at the official exchange rate (Table 28, Figure
11). If the indirect effects of the appreciation of the real exchange rate
are taken into account, average total discimination against palm oil
producers is raised to 17 percent. It is interesting to note that in the
1960s the indirect effect caused by overvaluation (-9 percent) dominated
the direct effect caused by export taxation (-8 percent).
Figure 11 - Producer and Parity Prices, 1960-1988: Palm Oil
Producer Price
Export Parity
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Fiscol Year
Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [1990b].158
Cocoa
Cocoa is the only export commodity which is not discriminated against by
direct agricultural policies (Figure 12), yet, the indirect effects of trade
and exchange rate policy resulted in average total negative protection of
-9 percent in 1960-1988 (Table 28).
Figure 12 - Producer and Parity Prices, 1960-1988: Cocoa
1985 1988
Source: Derived from basic data in Rahman [1990b].
b. Effective Rates of Protection
Trade and exchange rate policies do not only affect the relative prices of
final goods but also the prices of tradable inputs and, therefore, value
added in agricultural and nonag r icul tur al activities. The direct effects on
value added per unit of output of commodity i (value of output less
value of nonf actor inputs) relative to free-trade value added are
measured by the ERP (see Section B. II. 3), defined as
[97] ^ [26] ERP± = (VA± - VAI)/VA:159
where VA is the value added. Total effects (including indirect effects of
trade and exchange rate policies) can be measured as
[98] - VA*/VA*A) / (VA*/VA*A)
where Vj.. represents value added in the nonagricultural sector and the
asterisks indicate that the value added is measured using border prices
evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate. One common approach to
measure the impact of government policies on value added is to derive
the value-added ratios for the individual product categories from the
input-output tables and to multiply them by the actual and distortion-
free prices to generate series for value added. In order to calculate the
indirect effects of policies on relative effective protection of agricultural
tradables and nonagricultural goods, free-trade series of value added
need to be calculated similarly to the procedure above.
In order to measure the effective protection of rubber, palm oil and
paddy, Jenkins and Lai [ 1989] have taken the value-added coefficients of
the respective sectors from the 1971 input-output table for Malaysia
[Malaysia, 1973]. These coefficients are kept constant for the entire
1960-1988 period. The adoption of fixed value-added shares appears
rather stringent, especially given the availability of three mutually
consistent tables for 1971, 1978 and 1983. A cursory review of the three
comparable tables reveals that the value-added ratios have changed over
time (see Table 29).
It may be discerned that the value-added shares of estate and
smallholder rubber tended to increase over the 1970s and subsequently
































Source: Malaysia [1973; 1982; 1988].160
stagnated. In the case of palm oil, the value-added coefficient has shown
a gradual, albeit small, decline since 1971. This could have had a damp-
ening impact on the growth of the sector. On the other hand, the pro-
ductivity increase, which has occured in both estate and smallholder
cocoa as a result of intensified research and technology development, has
obviously led to an improved value-added share over time. To a large
extent, this could have been responsible for the strong expansion of this
sector over time. In the case of paddy, there has been a clear deterio-
ration in its value-added ratio since 1971. Indeed, it is widely accepted
that the labor and land productivity of paddy has declined sharply,
especially in recent years, owing to ageing labor force and deteriorating
irrigation facilities, especially outside the granary areas. The above set
of value-added ratios has been applied in the empirical analysis of
effective protection to approximate the value-added coefficients for the
periods 1960-1977, 1978-1982 and 1983-1988.
Table 30 presents results of calculations of the direct, indirect and
total ERPs for paddy, estate rubber, smallholder rubber, palm oil, and
cocoa. The estimates of the direct effects are qualitatively the same as
those for the nominal rates. The trend in effective protection over the
period 1960-1988 is also similar to that of nominal protection. Because
value added of rice at world prices was small in the second half of the
1980s, the ERPs estimated are extremely large. During the whole period,
the indirect effects tended to provide a negative effective protection to
the agricultural sector of approximately 9 percent. In recent years, this
negative protection diminished as a result of the macroeconomic adjust-
ment measures.
The total effective protection viv-a-vis the nonagricultural sector
was negative for rubber, palm oil and cocoa, but positive for local
paddy. Total effective protection for estate rubber varied between -9
and -36 percent and averaged -21 percent. The effective discrimination
against smallholder rubber was slightly larger and the discrimination
against palm oil was somewhat lower.
Evidently, agricultural pricing policies have not produced any
direct effect on the prices of estate and smallholder cocoa relative to
border prices and to nonagricultural goods. This is simply because there
is no export tax imposed on cocoa. Consequently, the total effects of
policy interventions, though negative, have tended to remain fairly low161
Table 30 - Direct, Indirect and Total Effective Protection to Producers of































































































































Source: Own computations based on Rahman [1990b].
over time. It may be inferred that government policies have not intended
to discriminate cocoa since 1960. Nevertheless, these policies have
provided a deliberate support for nonagriculture, thereby discriminating
against cocoa producers. However, though cocoa production may not be
attractive when compared with the production of nonagricultural goods,
it is relatively more lucrative than either rubber or palm oil. This could
have explained the rapid investment in cocoa and, concomitantly, the
significant disinvestment in rubber since the early 1970s.
While the direct and total ERPs were negative for the export com-
modities, they were in turn extremely positive for local paddy. Protec-
tion was negative only during the world food crisis. In more recent
years, the total effective protection reached very high levels, as
reported in Table 30. After 1984, the total ERP averaged about 250 per-
cent, with a rate of 423 percent in 1987, primarily due to the fact that
the price of rice in the world was severely depressed.162
Apart from the objective of influencing investment decisions, one of
the reasons why the Malaysian government intervenes in agricultural
markets is to provide greater year-to-year price stability for both pro-
ducers and consumers. Table 31 presents the coefficients of variation for
real agricultural prices (nominal prices deflated with an index of non-
agricultural prices, p^. or Pxr*)- Agricultural trade and price policies
have resulted in greater stability only for paddy producers, whereas the
coefficients of variation of border prices, which were calculated by use
of equilibrium exchange rates, are approximately the same or lower than
the coefficients of variation of actual domestic prices for all exportables.
It can be concluded that agricultural pricing policies not only dis-
criminated against cash crops relative to paddy but also were ineffective
in stabilizing producer prices of exports.

















V. Comparison with Other Studies
1. The Impact of Agricultural and Economy-Wide Policies
A number of studies have endeavored to estimate shift parameters for
LDCs' exports using the type of methodology described in Section D. III.
A summary of results from these studies is presented in Synoptical Table
2. The time periods covered are usually quite extensive. In the cases of
Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe, we used yearly data, whereas in many
other cases quarterly (e.g., for Cameroon) or monthly data (e.g., for163
Colombia) were taken. Conventions with respect to the construction of
price indices also vary from study to study. In many cases, single
product indices are relied upon, in others, multi-product indices are
deployed. Also, exportables refer in some cases to traditional exports
and nontraditional exports, agricultural exports and industrial exports,
in others to a composite of both. The results encompass a variety of
countries and time periods and rely upon alternative data bases.
As can be seen from Synoptical Table 2, estimates of the proportion
of import protection, which is shifted in the form of an implicit export
tax, vary from 48 percent (in the case of Pakistan lower estimate) to 100
percent (in the cases of Ghana and Zimbabwe upper estimate) with the
unweighted mean being 74 percent. Our results for Malaysia, Peru and
Zimbabwe are not crucially different from these findings. The estimated
(unweighted average) shift parameters for total exports are slightly
higher than the mean in Malaysia (0.80) and Peru (0.82) and equal to
the mean in Zimbabwe (0.74). The studies consistently indicate in fact
that a substantial proportion (at least three quarters) of the protection
conferred on import-substituting activities is shifted in the form of an
implicit export tax.
Generally, the shifting of protection is higher for traditional ex-
ports as well as for total agricultural and individual agricultural ex-
portables than for nontraditional exports, reflecting the lower sub-
stitutability in production between these resource-based activities and
nontradables. By contrast, the estimated ranges of incidence parameters
for total exports (0.66-0.83) are higher than those for total agricultural
exports (0.53-0.70) and individual agricultural exportables (0.36-0.84) in
Zimbabwe [Wiebelt, 1990a]. This implies that a tariff will decrease the
relative price of total exports, but the relative price of agricultural
(nonagricultural) exports will fall marginally less (more) than total ex-
ports. Obviously, technological and demand characteristics are such that
there is less substitutability between nonagricultural exportables and
home goods than between agricultural exportables and home goods. This
pattern of incidence contrasts with empirical evidence for other LDCs in
Synoptical Table 2, where agricultural exportables exhibit a larger
degree of incidence than nonagricultural exportables. It accords well
with a priori theorizing, since production in nonagricultural sectors is164
Synoptical Table 2 - Important Findings on the Incidence of Protection:
Evidence from Country Studies in LDCs































0.73-0.96 (agricultural exports), 0.62-0.81 (indus-
trial exports) for I/1976-I/1984 with quarterly data
0.93-0.97 (total exports), 0.95-0.98 (coffee), 0.96-
1.00 (nontraditional exports) for the period March
1970-October 1979 with monthly data
0.64-1.00 (total exports), 0.68-0.95 (cocoa) for
1969-1980
0.65-0.82 (traditional exports), 0.55-0.69 (non-
traditional exports) for 1960-1984
0.80 (total exports), 0.68-0.86 (rubber), 0.91-1.03
(palm oil), 0.75-1.12 (cocoa) for 1960-1985
0.85 (traditional exports), 0.59 (nontraditional ex-
ports for July 1976-December 1982 and with monthly
data
0.55-0.90 (total exports), 0.82-0.84 (agricultural
exports), 0.83-0.86 (cocoa), 0.61-0.82 (groundnuts),
0.66-0.79 (palm kernels) for 1960-1982; 0.65-0.73
(total exports), 0.56-0.98 (total agricultural ex-
ports), 0.37-0.67 (cocoa), 0.54-0.87 (palm kernels),
0.36-0.44 (groundnuts) for 1960-1988
0.48-0.68 (total exports) for 1972-1987 with
quarterly data
0.72-0.92 (total exports), 0.55-1.07 (coffee), 0.57-
1.01 (fishmeal), 0.64-1.05 (cotton) for 1970-1985
0.85-0.87 (total exports), 0.66 (traditional agri-
cultural exports) for 1950-1980
0.52 (total exports), 0.41 (agricultural exports),
0.72 nonagricultural exports) for 1970-1982
0.79-1.00 (total exports), 0.83 (coffee), 0.88
(beef) 0.97 (maize), 0.90 (cotton), 0.71 (tobacco),
0.66-0.83 (total exports), 0.53-0.70 (agricultural
exports), 0.57-0.76 (maize), 0.66-0.84 (coffee),
0.36-0.68 (cotton), 0.55-0.73 (tobacco) for 1966-
1987
Source: Compiled from the sources given in the synoptical table.165
more import-dependent, and adjustment is hampered by the rigid foreign
exchange allocation system dominating in Zimbabwe.
If for illustrative purposes we take the unweighted average total
import charges as calculated by Erzan et al. [ 1989] for most of the LDCs
contained in Synoptical Table 2 as a proxy for the appropriately
weighted implicit nominal tariff and the unweighted average of the shift
parameters, and neglect interventions on export markets, then the
average true tariffs and subsidies can be calculated from Equations [83],
[85] and [90]. Since the direct and indirect effects of export price
policies on agricultural producer prices and nontradables prices are
suppressed, the true incentive measures indicate only the indirect
effects of industrial import substitution policies. The major results can
be summarized as follows (Table 32):
(1) Import charges on manufactures are high in Cameroon, Colombia,
Mauritius, Pakistan, and Peru. This observation is a qualified one,
however, since nontariff measures are excluded from the analysis
due to data considerations and the actual application of nontariff
measures, and their restrictiveness could vary significantly across
countries.
(2) The average true tariffs on manufactures are substantially below the
nominal tariff rates depending on the size of the incidence para-
meter. The discrepancy is the largest in Colombia, where manufac-
tures are truly protected by only 2.5 percent despite nominal pro-
tection of 88 percent. By contrast, the discrepancy is the lowest in
Mauritius and Pakistan. This observation is also a qualified one,
however, since incentives for exportables were neglected in the
calculation of true tariffs. Where export subsidies (taxes) are
quantitatively important, the true tariffs are overestimated (under-
estimated).
(3) Of course, exportables, whether agricultural or nonagricultural, are
indirectly taxed by import protection. In some cases, these indirect
taxes may be more than offset by direct subsidization. However,
because export subsidies also induce negative indirect effects, these
export subsidies have to be large to compensate for indirect effects.
Peru, one of our case studies and a country with a poorly perform-
ing agricultural export sector, protected its manufacturing sector much
more strongly than most other countries. With an incidence parameter166
Table 32 - Estimates of True Tariffs and Subsidies Resulting from Import












































on categories of exports(d)
-37.2 (agricultural exports),
-33.4 (industrial exports)
-45 (total exportB), -46.0
(coffee), -46.4 (nontraditional
exports)




-12.3 (total exports), -11.9









-36.7 (total exports), -36.5
(coffee), -35.7 (fishmeal),
-37.5 (cotton)
-25.1 (total exports), -20.6
(traditional agricultural ex-
ports)
-15.3 (total exports), -12.3
(agricultural exports), -20.0
(nonagricultural exports)
-17.0 (total exports), -14.9
(coffee), -15.6 (beef), -16.7
(maize), -12.7 (cotton), -14.9
(tobacco)
(a) True tariffs and true subsidies are calculated on the basis of an unweighted average
incidence parameter calculated from the extreme values given in Synoptical Table 2. -
(b) The implicit tariff rate is an unweighted average of the total import charges
on total manufactures as calculated by Erzan et al. [i989] except for Mauritius and
Cameroon, where tariffs are taken from Greenaway and Milner [1987] and Milner [1990],
respectively. - (c) Calculated with Equation [83]. - (d) Calculated with Equation [85]
under the assumption of no nominal subsidies/taxes on exports.
Source: Own computations based on Erzan et al. [1989], Greenaway and
Milner [ 1987] and the results given in Synoptical Table 2.167
above the mean of the total sample, this implies that the indirect dis-
crimination against exports is heavier than the average. As shown in
Section D. Ill, agricultural exportables are also heavily taxed by direct
policies, thereby aggravating the discriminatory effects of trade policy.
The Zimbabwean trade policy also leads to an indirect taxation of agri-
cultural exportables. However, as shown in Section D. Ill, this negative
indirect effect is more than offset by direct subsidies in the case of
maize and beef. Malaysia shows the lowest NRP on manufactures. With an
incidence parameter near the mean of the total sample, this implies that
the indirect discrimination in Malaysia is lower than in all other countries
considered.
This result is reconfirmed if the more comprehensive estimates of
direct and indirect protection undertaken in Section D. IV are compared
with those for a sample of 18 LDCs (including Malaysia) of the World
Bank [ Krueger et al. , 1988]. Table 33 summarizes the results from the
individual country studies and contrasts them with our results for
Malaysia's most important agricultural commodities from Section D. IV. 2.
From Table 33, it can be seen that all agricultural exportables except
cocoa have been taxed directly more heavily than the average of the
total sample in the period 1975-1979. However, since indirect taxation in
Table 33 - Direct, Indirect and Total Nominal Protection to Agricultural
Producers in Malaysia and a Sample of 18 LDCs, 1975-1984
(percent)





























































Source: Krueger et al. [1988]; Rahman [1990b].168
Malaysia was substantially below the average, total taxation of all
Malaysian agricultural exportables was below the average. The picture
somewhat changed in the period 1980-1984. As a result of expansionary
fiscal policy and increasing foreign borrowing, the indirect effect more
than doubled in Malaysia. Although direct taxation was reduced, total
taxation remained nearly constant and was substantially below the
average for the sample of 18 LDCs.
Food policy in Malaysia always favored rice producers. Direct sub-
sidies in both periods were substantially above the average. Moreover,
indirect taxation caused by trade policies for nonagricultural commodities
and macro policies only had a marginal impact if compared to rice policy.
As a result, total nominal protection of rice was substantially above the
average for the most important imported food products in the 18 LDCs.
2. Food-Crop Protection versus Cash-Crop Discrimination?
One of the major results of the cross-country analysis in Chapter C was
that both food producers (of wheat and rice) and exporters (of coffee)
are discriminated against in LDCs if the indirect effects of overvalued
exchange rates are taken into account. To measure the indirect and total
effects of agricultural trade and macro policies for food and cash crops
was also a major objective in the individual country studies of the World
Bank's project on "The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy"
[Krueger et al. , 1988].
Table 34 summarizes the results of these country studies for im-
portant food and cash crops. Several findings are noteworthy. First and
foremost, whereas import-competing food crops were protected by agri-
cultural policies, on average, these direct policies discriminated against
agricultural exports over most of the period investigated. Indeed, the
degree of discrimination against exportables and the protection of import-
substituting crops is remarkable even for the same commodities: contrast
rice exporters who are taxed at the equivalent of 14, 37 and 27 percent
over the three time periods, with rice importers, receiving the equiva-
lent of 8, 24 and 59 percent nominal protection (relative to nonagri-
cultural products). Second, the impact of indirect interventions is even
stronger than the direct ones for both exportables and importables. In169
Table 34 - Direct and Total Nominal Protection of Agricultural Exports
























































































(a) Only those commodities were included which are produced in at least
2 of the 18 co'untries; not recognized are commodities which are pro-
duced in Argentina, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and
Turkey either because the studies are not published yet or because the
country's products appear only once in one of the above categories. -
(b) Calculated as an unweighted average of the protection rates for in-
dividual crops. - (c) The countries included are for the individual
commodities: coffee (Colombia, Dominican Republic), cotton (Colombia,
Egypt, Pakistan, Zambia), rice (Colombia, Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand),
cocoa (Ghana, Malaysia), sugar (Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Thailand), rubber (Malaysia, Thailand). - (d) The countries in-
cluded are for the individual commodities: wheat (Chile, Colombia,
Egypt, Pakistan, Portugal), rice (Dominican Republic, Ghana, South
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal), maize (Egypt, Ghana, Philip-
pines, Portugal, Thailand, Zambia).
Source: Computed from Avillez et al. [1988], Dethier [1989], Garcia and
Llamas [1989], Greene and Roe [1989], Hamid et al. [1990],
Intal and Power [1990], Jansen [1988], Jenkins and Lai [1989],
Moon and Kang [1989], Rahman [1990b], Siamwalla and
Setboonsarng [1989], Stryker [1990], and Valdes et al. [1990].
the case of agricultural exports, the effective taxation by indirect
policies exacerbates the negative direct protection, often resulting in
extremely large total negative protection equivalents. Rice exporters, for
example, are estimated to receive about one third the price they would
have received in a free-trade regime at realistic exchange rates with no
direct intervention in 1971-1979 and about half in 1980-1985.
In the case of imported food crops where the governments' in-
tention, as may be concluded from the direct effects, was to protect170
domestic producers, the impact of indirect policies was sufficiently
strong to overcompensate direct protection. On average, the most im-
portant food crops are effectively discriminated against by government
policy. One remarkable exception is rice, where direct protection is very
high and the impact of indirect policies in net-importing countries like
South Korea and Malaysia is not large by comparison.
Overall, the results from these country studies reconfirm the
findings of Section C. Ill that exportables are directly taxed, whereas
food crops are subsidized in LDCs. They also confirm that individual
crops are directly taxed in net-exporting countries and directly sub-
sidized in net-importing countries. Most importantly, however, they
stress once again the quantitatively important negative effect of trade
and macroeconomic policies on relative incentives for agriculture.
This holds also true for wheat exports in Argentina, the direct NRPs
being -10 (1965-1970), -32 (1971-1979) and -13 (1980-1985).171
E. Summary and Conclusions
I. Summary and Major Findings
It is a central issue in development economics which role agriculture
plays in economic development and which role it should play. There is a
wide consensus that agriculture is a key sector in the early stages of
development with regard to its contribution to income, employment and
foreign exchange. There is a severe dissension, however, on the appro-
priate agricultural development strategy. Beyond this normative issue,
not many quantitative studies on agricultural incentives appeared up to
the very recent past which were either comprehensive as detailed coun-
try studies for total agriculture or as cross-country studies for indi-
vidual important agricultural products.
The main focus of our analysis has been on the positive rather than
normative analysis of agricultural policy in LDCs. This study is sup-
posed to contribute to a sounder and more comprehensive empirical
evidence on agricultural incentives in LDCs, The magnitude, the
structure, the development, and the instability of agricultural protection
in LDCs have been elaborated. In particular, the focus of our study has
been
(1) to provide an up-to-date survey of the different concepts that can
be applied to measure agricultural protection and to discuss the pros
and cons of these concepts;
(2) to review the empirical literature which is available on agricultural
protection in LDCs and to elaborate its strengths and weaknesses;
(3) to contribute to the quantitative literature on agricultural protection
in two respects:
- by quantifying the extent and the variability of agricultural price
protection in the wheat, rice and coffee markets on a broad data basis
covering a wide cross section of producer countries and a rather long
time period;
- by elaborating in case studies for Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe how
and to what extent economy-wide policies influence the agricultural
sector and whether those indirect agricultural policies are more or
less important than direct agricultural policies.172
The survey of the measurement concepts has shown that various
techniques have been developed in order to measure the level of agri-
cultural protection as well as the influence of direct agricultural policies
and macroeconomic policies on agricultural incentives. The review of the
empirical evidence has revealed two key results. First, LDCs seem to
discriminate against export crops compared with food crops. Second,
indirect agricultural policies seem to dominate direct agricultural policies
in their importance for agricultural incentives. These important results
were derived recently in 18 country studies of the World Bank's project
on "The Political Economy of Agricultural" Pricing Policy" [Krueger et
al., 1988]. There is, however, a lack of cross-country studies for im-
portant agricultural products as well as of country studies utilizing other
methodologies which support this evidence.
In our empirical analysis, the main emphasis has been put on the
comparison of policies towards food crops and cash crops and on the dis-
tinction of direct and indirect policies affecting agriculture. The results
may serve as a basis for policy recommendations to reduce the distor-
tions within agriculture and between agriculture and the rest of the
economy.
In the cross-section analysis, we calculated gross and net NPCs for
major wheat, rice and coffee suppliers for the period 1969-1985. Net
NPCs were obtained by adjusting gross NPCs for exchange rate
distortions, and transport costs were explicitly taken into account. Ex-
change rate distortions were measured as the ratio between official and
black market rates and were regarded as a proxy for the effects of ex-
change rate policies. In order to assess whether producer prices were
stabilized in view of volatile world market prices, we first conducted a
variance decomposition of the NPCs into its components, producer and
world price variations, both measured in US dollars. In a second step,
dollar price variations were decomposed into exchange rate fluctuations
and movements of producer prices in home currency. Stabilization efforts
were regarded as successful if producer prices in domestic currency
varied less than world market prices. The results with respect to the
level and instability of nominal protection can be summarized as follows:
(1) On average, producer prices for both food crops and wheat and rice
were above world market equivalents, thus indicating a subsidization173
of the farmers, while producer prices for coffee, a typical cash
crop, were generally below world market prices.
(2) When exchange rate distortions were taken into account, producer
prices for wheat were neither higher nor lower than border prices,
on average, whereas prices granted to rice and coffee farmers were
below world market prices.
(3) In net rice and wheat importing LDCs, producer prices exceeded
world market prices, on average, but were dropped below them as
soon as exchange rate distortions were taken into account.
(4) Net rice and wheat exporters received lower prices, on average,
than they would have reached in the world market. Prices diverged
further when exchange rate overvaluations were considered.
(5) The DCs included in our sample generally subsidized their wheat and
rice farmers independent of the trade status. Furthermore, exchange
rate distortions could almost be neglected in the DCs.
(6) In most cases, the variance of producer prices in home currency lay
below the variance of border prices, thus indicating a widespread
tendency to stabilize producer prices.
(7) Stabilization efforts were, on average, more successful towards the
two food crops than towards coffee. Among the food producers,
those in DCs received the most stable prices.
(8) Only in some highly inflationary countries, producer prices varied
even more than world market equivalents.
In the country studies, we analyzed the effects of import re-
strictions on the agricultural export sector by means of the concept of
true protection. This concept focuses on relative price changes between
tradables and nontradables and thus measures the incentives for
resource reallocations between domestic sectors rather than protection
against foreign competition. Incidence parameters, which quantify the
proportion of an import tariff that is shifted to exportables as an implicit
tax, were calculated for total exports as well as individual agricultural
exports of Malaysia, Peru and Zimbabwe. The incidence parameters were
then combined with nominal import tariffs for manufacturing and nominal
agricultural subsidy rates in order to obtain "true tariffs" and "true
subsidies" which measure the price changes of importables and export-
ables, respectively, both relative to nontradables. Major findings of this
analysis are:174
(1) A large proportion of import tariffs - generally more than 50 percent
and in some cases even about 100 percent - was shifted to export -
ables as an implicit tax due to a close substitutability between im-
port-competing manufactured goods and nontradables.
(2) "True tariffs" were in all three countries significantly below nominal
rates, thus indicating that the intended incentives for resource re-
allocations in favor of the manufacturing sector were only partly
effective.
(3) "True subsidies" were always lower than nominal subsidies reflecting
the discriminatory effects of trade policy on agricultural exports. In
some cases, e.g., Malaysian cocoa, the indirect effects resulting
from import restrictions counteracted the incentives given by agri-
cultural policies.
For Malaysia, we finally adopted a more comprehensive measure of
protection including the contributions of agricultural as well as trade and
macroeconomic policies. Following the methodology of the World Bank's
project on "The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy" [Schiff,
1989], direct, indirect .and total NRPs and ERPs relative to nonagri-
culture were calculated for the major Malaysian agricultural commodities.
Moreover, the indirect effects were split up into one part that is due to
trade policies and another part that reflects macroeconomic policies. In
order to assess the relative incentives between food crops and export
crops, direct NRPs for exports were also calculated relative to paddy.
The analysis led to the following main results:
(1) Paddy farmers have been subsidized so heavily since the mid-1970s
that the negative indirect effects have been overcompensated by far.
(2) The weights of indirect and direct effects in the total NRPs of the
export crops varied over time largely depending on the government's
macroeconomic policy stance but also because of fluctuating export
taxes and cesses, especially for rubber. The overall taxation of
Malaysia's export crops has significantly decreased since 1985 due to
a reduction in both direct and indirect taxation.
(3) The relative prices within agriculture have continuously changed in
favor of paddy.175
II. Implications for Policy Reform
The analysis of this study suggests that agricultural price distortion is
not only a result of agricultural policies but also of economy-wide
policies. Trade, exchange rate and other macroeconomic policies all have
a significant negative influence on the domestic relative price between
agriculture and nonagriculture in most LDCs. However, the costs of
adopting policies that discriminate against agriculture are not borne by
that sector alone. Ironically, it is those countries such as South Korea
and Malaysia, which did not or did only slightly discriminate against
agriculture relative to industry, that experienced very high industrial
growth rates. By contrast, the low-growth syndrome has been ex-
emplified by many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some in Latin
America and South Asia, where taxation of the agricultural sector is a
widespread phenomenon.
Since it has been revealed that economy-wide distortions are pre-
valent in many LDCs, agricultural pricing reforms should first and
foremost begin with macroeconomic policy reforms to correct for the real
overvaluation resulting from inappropriate macro policies. Monetary
policies, public sector policies and exchange rate and trade policies are
indeed a very significant element in many of the reform programs re-
commended by the World Bank and the IMF [IMF, 1986].
A devaluation of the official exchange rate will reduce most of the
discriminatory effects facing LDCs' agricultural producers. By increasing
the price in domestic currency terms of traded goods relative to non-
traded goods (the real exchange rate), a nominal devaluation will induce
a reallocation of resources from nontraded goods producing sectors to
import-substituting and export-oriented activities. Since agricultural
goods are mostly traded, a devaluation will benefit agricultural
producers. The argument for devaluation is particularly appealing in
view of the price and wage rigidities which normally prevail in markets,
limiting the scope for absolute decreases in the nominal price of non-
traded goods. Given these circumstances, the only practical means of
securing a real devaluation is often an upward adjustment of the price
for traded goods. Of course, the ultimate success of the strategy
depends on sufficient monetary restraint to prevent the erosion of the176
devaluation-induced change in relative prices by subsequent increases in
the prices of nontraded goods.
Once the exchange rate reforms were achieved, such that net NPCs
and gross NPCs, discussed in Chapter C, were made equivalent, the
next step would be to reform direct government interventions in agri-
cultural and nonagricultural price determination. The interesting
observation from our cross-country analysis on wheat, rice and coffee is
that once exchange rates are realigned to their true values, NPCs for
the two food crops are above 1.0 in the group of LDCs indicating that
direct price protection policies vis-a-vis- foreign competitors prevail.
Thus, recommendations for increased agricultural prices may not be
necessary if exchange rate reforms are successful. In fact, if the
objective is to achieve efficiency in resource allocation, policymakers may
wish to lessen direct support programs, once exchange rates have been
devalued.
Whereas a devaluation more than offsets overall disprotection in the
cases of wheat and rice, it is insufficient to eliminate overall dis-
crimination against coffee producers. To the extent that demand for a
country's coffee exports is inelastic, the domestic producers may be
successful in shifting the burden of the export duty to the foreign
consumers of coffee. More commonly, however, coffee-exporting countries
are price takers in the international market, and coffee producers must
bear the tax. In such a case, domestic prices for coffee should be raised
from an efficiency point of view.
This highlights that agricultural producer price distortions cannot
be corrected by blanket policy reform. For many countries, the trade
categories differ between agricultural commodities which create in-
consistent distortions and sources of distortion. Moreover, trade policies
in nonagriculture affect the relative prices between traded agricultural
and nonagricultural goods and between traded and nontraded goods. In
general, given undistorted exchange rates and liberalized nonagricultural
markets, wheat and rice would require a lessening of support to achieve
border price equivalents, whereas coffee would require an increase in
domestic prices to achieve border price equivalents.
A final implication of the cross-country analysis on wheat and rice,
which can be generalized [see World Bank, 1986], is that DCs and LDCs
tend to follow exactly opposite policies. DCs protect their agricultural177
sector and produce too much, LDCs discriminate against agriculture and
produce too little from a worldwide efficiency point of view. The patterns
of world agricultural production and exports would change in favor of
LDCs if both groups of countries followed efficient policies. Just as a
country gains by allocating its resources to where they can be most pro-
ductive, the world as a whole would certainly gain if more were pro-
duced in LDCs for both domestic use and exports. This would require
much freer trade and domestic policies not only in LDCs but also in
DCs.
Much of the bias against agriculture in Peru and Zimbabwe arises
from policies to promote industry behind high trade barriers. Inward-
looking industrialization strategies accelerated the shift of resources out
of agriculture by lowering agriculture's profitability vis-a-vis the in-
dustrial sector in both countries. Agricultural exports suffered, as did
food production that competes with imports. This is not just because do-
mestic agricultural prices became lower relative to the prices of protected
industrial products but also because the protectionist policies resulted in
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As a result, traded agri-
cultural goods also became less profitable than nontraded goods. Given
the need to raise export earnings in these countries and agriculture's
potential in this respect, as well as the dependence of the rest of the
economy on the performance of the agricultural sector, it would seem
advisable to continue and reinforce the currently adopted devaluation
policy combined with a reduction of import restrictions.
Since the prices of most agricultural commodities in the two coun-
tries are controlled through marketing and stabilization boards, this
policy must be supported by direct pricing policies. For the agricultural
producer, the relevant real exchange rate is the ratio of the prices for
agricultural goods to the prices of nontraded goods. Therefore, the
producer price of the affected commodity must be raised - in principle,
pari passu with the currency depreciation - in order to facilitate the re-
quired drop in the real exchange rate. Recent experience with adjust-
ment policy in Peru seems to indicate that an important factor in the fai-
lure of the depreciation to increase (agricultural) export supply is the
inability of the authorities to ensure that the real exchange rate falls
significantly and remains at its depreciated rate for a period long enough
to permit adjustment of supply. Invariably, this is due to a failure to178
pass on price increases to exporters and import-substituting activities -
where such prices are regulated - or an incapacity for various social and
political reasons to restrain budgetary deficits and monetary expansion
sufficiently to abate domestic inflation.
In Malaysia, the general thrust of government agricultural policy
has been to encourage self-sufficiency in rice and diversification in ex-
ports. Indirect effects, which, by definition, had the same net impact on
rice and exports, were remarkable low by international comparison.
During the import-substituting phase (1965-1975), indirect discrimination
was largely a result of industrialization policy, whereas indirect dis-
crimination in the 1980s largely stemmed from expansive fiscal policies.
Consistency in output pricing has not yet been adopted as a
principle of policy in agriculture in all three countries, as witnessed in
the variations observed both in levels of protection afforded different
crops in different years and protection for the same crop over time.
Partly, the cause of this variation is the use of inappropriate in-
struments (e.g., administered prices) to provide product incentives, and
partly it is the result of the numerous ad hoc interventions that were
introduced over time without an adequate consideration of the multiple
consequences that would result. Consequently, the task policymakers are
facing is to modify the pricing policy requirements, so that more con-
sistent long-term signals are given to producers, while at the same time
correcting for specific distortions that lower returns to particular crops.
III. Open Questions for Further Research
As argued above, the results of this study suggest that welfare-increas-
ing economic policies should
(1) dismantle the indirect and invisible burden arising from exchange
rate distortions for agricultural incentives and
(2) reverse the distorted price ratio between export and food crops to
the favor of export crops.
Beyond this general conclusions, it was not possible to answer all
related questions, and our study raises some issues for future research.
A first and important point is that this study has not been intended
to provide an optimal agricultural development strategy. Only some im-179
portant policy conclusions have been drawn which can be immediately
derived from our results with the theory of economic distortions. In
order to design optimal strategies, analytical studies for individual
countries remain necessary which might utilize the theory of optimal
taxation as derived in modern public finance. Additional aspects would
have to be covered in such studies, like differential price and income
elasticities for rural and urban goods or the equity efficiency trade-off
in the social welfare functions.
A second area for further research is the importance of nonprice
factors for agricultural incentives. Such nonprice factors are infra-
structure, the functioning of credit markets in rural areas or the
adoption of technology. It has been shown in several studies [Krishna,
1982; Beynon, 1989] that the supply response in agriculture is strongly
dependent of nonprice factors as well as of the price factors which are
often stressed' within the "getting-prices-right" argument [Timmer,
1986]. A comprehensive policy analysis and proposal would have to
identify important nonprice factors limiting a successful agricultural
development strategy in an individual country.
The third point is also a major topic in the context of structural
adjustment [ Panagariya, Schiff, 1990; Imran, Duncan, 1988; Koester et
al., 1990]. It was elaborated above that price incentives within
agriculture in LDCs are distorted against export crops to the favor of
food crops and argued that this price ratio should be changed. A major
argument against a joint liberalization of LDCs' policies towards export
crops is that world prices would be depressed and total earnings would
2
be reduced. A comprehensive analysis of optimal policies in individual
LDCs would have to judge the validity of the price-decreasing impact for
the relevant export markets of the countries under consideration. This is
a task for further research. It has to be borne in mind in such
analyses, however, that a major difference exists between the aggregate
view of all exporters and the individual country's point of view. Export
demand for the individual country's products will usually be much more
price elastic than aggregate world demand, and the individual country
Important contributions along these lines include the papers of Stern,
Newbery, Atkinson, Heady and Mitra, and Sah and Stiglitz in
Newbery and Stern [1987].
2
Some evidence is provided by Mabbs-Zeno and Krissoff [1990].180
may well find it attractive to expand even on a market which seems to be
"saturated" from a world market point of view.181
Appendix Tables
Table Al - PSEs in OECD Countries, by Country or Country Group and
by Commodities, 1979-1990 (a)
Percentage PSEs
1979-1986 1987 1988 1989(b) 1990(c)































































































































































(a) The PSE estimates are based on net percentage PSEs for livestock
production and on gross percentage PSEs as defined by Equation [19] for
crops. Net PSEs are computed by subtracting the amount of input tax-
ation, i.e., the farm feed adjustment, from the gross PSEs of livestock
production. - (b) Estimated. - (c) Provisional.
Source: OECD [c].182
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d] for domestic prices,
FAO [e] for border prices and Taylor [1989] as well as World
Atlas Agricultural Committee [ 1973] for internal transportation
costs.184

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], IMF [1990], Pick
[1978], and Table A2.186































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d] for producer prices,
FAO [e] for border prices and IMF [1990] for official exchange
rates.188
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], IMF [1990], Pick
[1978], and Table A4.190
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d] for domestic prices,
FAO [e] for border prices and World Atlas Agricultural
Committee [ 1973] for internal transportation costs.191
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], IMF [1990], Pick
[1978], and Table A6.192














































































































(a) The distortion factor was computed by dividing black market ex-









Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], IMF [1990] and
Pick [1978].193








































































































of decomposing variances is










































estimated loglinear trend. Moreover, they
a positive or negative sign. - (c) cpf, CPW
loglinear
— the 99








































































































in US$, respectively. -
trend multiplied by 100. The indices
percent level of significance of the
show whether the estimated coefficients carry
and CP|PW are defined ir Section C.II
Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d; e], IMF [1990] and
Table A2.194














































































































































































































(a) The method of decomposing variances is defined in Section C.II. Var stands
corrected variance
and border prices
in most cases (for exceptions see annotation (d))
in USS, respectively. - (b)
linear trend multiplied by 100. The indices +,
99 percent level of significance of














































the estimated loglinear trend. Besides they show whether
positive or negative sign. - (c)CP*. CPw
o
and CPTP are
C.II. - (d) Variance decomposition with uncorrected variances, as two out
showed no significant trend
Source: Own computations with data from FAO [ d; e], IMF [ 1990] and
Table A3.195
































































































of Table A9 are again valid. -

































































































three components showed no
Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d; e], IMF [1990] and
Table A4.196







































































































































































































































:hree components showed no
Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], FAO [e; f], IMF
[1990], Pick [1978], and Table A5.197






























































































































with uncorrected variances, as two out of three components showed no
significant trend.
Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], FAO [d; e], IMF
[1990], Pick [1978], and Table A6.198












































































of Table A9 are again valid. -














































































three components showed no
Source: Own computations with data from Cowitt [1986], FAO [d; e], IMF
[1990], Pick [1978], and Table A7.199









































































































of decomposing variances is
variance, PT and



































P. are producer price:






































































































Var stands for the
in USS and local currency, respec-
rate between USS and the local currency. - (b
standard deviation from the loglinear trenc
the 95 percent
multipliec
level and ++,— the 99 percent level of
linear trend. Moreover, they show whether
negative sign. - (c) CP?, CPw and CP*Pw are
l by 100. The
significance
the estimated coefficient.




of the estimated log-
; carry a positive or
Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d] and IMF [1990].200





























































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from FAO [d] and IMF [1990].201
































20.75++ 8.47++ 19.30- 16.67 86.50 -3.17
25.89++ 10.40++ 19.30- 16.14 55.56 28.30
36.21++ 29.48++ 15.10-- 66.25 17.40 16.35
21.58+ 8.14++ 26.51-- 14.23 150.84 -65.07
16.69++ 15.16++ 4.57 82.49 7.49 10.02
32.52 35.95++ 15.31-- 122.25 22.18 -44.43
45.23 59.91++ 91.36-- 175.41 408.01 -483.42
57.06++ 87.78++ 56.25-- 236.70 97.18 -233.88
56.48 58.92++ 84.76-- 108.82 225.20 -234.02
20.69++ 14.33++ 12.46-- 47.96 36.26 15.78
35.27++ 24.00++ 37.29-- 46.28 111.77 -58.05
52.82++ 41.02++ 24.91 60.33 22.23 17.44
17.65++ 12.62++ 7.69- 51.17 19.00 29.83
45.06+ 45.06+ 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
33.34++ 28.72++ 8.77 74.20 6.91 18.89
37.09++ 31.73++ 8.77 73.20 5.59 21.21
38.02++ 40.87++ 47.81-- 115.54 158.10 -173.64
34.95++ 53.53++ 56.07-- 234.53 257.37 -391.90
39.97++ 37.62++ 15.56- 88.59 15.17 -3.76
27.44++ 20.87++ 13.32-- 57.87 23.58 18.55
42.03++ 36.05++ 18.52-- 73.59 19.42 6.99
41.01 41.30++ 11.39-- 101.44 7.72 -9.16
of Table A15 are again valid.
















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Rahman [1990b]; Rukovo et al. [1991]; Thiele [1991b].203
Bibliography
ADELMAN, Irma, The World Distribution of Income. Referat auf der
Jahrestagung "Probleme und Perspektiven der weltwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung" des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, Travemiinde, 17.-19.
September 1984, mimeo.
AHLUWALIA, Montek S. , Frank J. LYSY, The Workings of Computable
General Equilibrium Models: With Special Reference to a Model on
Malaysia. N. P. 1983, mimeo.
ANDERSON, Kym, "Korea: A Case of Agricultural Protection". In: Terry
SICULAR (Ed. ), Food Price Policy in Asia: A Comparative Study.
Ithaca 1989, pp. 109-153.
—, Rod TYERS, "Agricultural Protection Growth in Advanced and Newly
Industrialized Countries". In: Allen MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES
(Eds. ), Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent World.
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference of Agri-
cultural Economists held at Buenos Aires, 24-31 August 1988.
Aldershot 1989, pp. 175-186.
ARDENI, Pier G. , "Does the Law of One Price Really Hold for Commodity
Prices?". American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 71,
1989, pp. 661-669.
ARIFF, Mohamed, Muthi SEMUDRAM, "Country Study Malaysia". In:
Sheila PAGE (Ed. ), Trade, Finance and Developing Countries.
Strategies and Constraints in the 1990s. New York 1990, pp. 23-55.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), Evaluating Rice Market Intervention
Policies. Manila 1988.
ASKARI, Hossein, John T. CUMMINGS, Agricultural Supply Response. A
Survey of the Econometric Evidence. New York 1976.
AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS,
Japanese Agricultural Policies. A Time of Change. Canberra 1988.
AVILLEZ, Francisco, Timothy J. FINAN, Timothy JOSLING, Trade, Ex-
change Rates, and Agricultural Pricing Policy in Portugal. World
Bank Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policy, Washington 1988.
BALASSA, Bela et al. , The Structure of Protection in Developing Coun-
tries. Baltimore 1971.
BALE, Malcolm D. , Agricultural Trade and Food Policy: The Experience
of Five Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Papers,
724, Washington 1985.204
BALE, Malcolm D. , Ernst LUTZ, "Price Distortions in Agriculture and
Their Effects: An International Comparison". American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 63, 1981, pp. 8-22.
BALISACAN, Arsenio M. , James A. ROUMASSET, "Public Choice of
Economic Policy: The Growth of Agricultural Protection". Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv, Vol. 123, 1987, pp. 232-248.
BATES, Robert H. , Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley,
L. A. , 1981.
BAUTISTA, Romeo M. , Production Incentives in Philippine Agriculture:
Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies. International Food
Policy Research Institute, Research Reports, 59, Washington 1987.
—, "Price and Trade Policies for Agricultural Development". The World
Economy, Vol. 13, 1990, pp. 89-109.
BERTRAND, Trent, Thailand - Case Study of Agricultural Input and
Output Pricing. World Bank Staff Working Papers, 385, Washington
1980.
BEYNON, Jonathan G. , "Pricism v. Structuralism in Sub-Saharan
Africa". Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 323-
335.
BINSWANGER, Hans P., Maw-Cheng YANG, Alan BOWERS, Yair
MUNDLAK, "On the Determinants of Cross-Country Aggregate Agri-
cultural Supply". Journal of Econometrics, Supplement on "Speci-
fication Testing in Limited and Discrete Dependent Variable Models",
Vol. 34, 1987, pp. 111-131.
BLANDFORD, David, Harry de GORTER, David HARVEY, "Farm Income
Support with Minimal Trade Distortions". Food Policy, Vol. 14,
1989, pp. 268-273.
BOADWAY, Robin W. , Neil BRUCE, Welfare Economics. Oxford 1984.
BOLLING, Christine H. , "Price and Exchange Rate Transmission
Rivisited: The Latin America Case". In: Colin A. CARTER, Walter
H. GARDINER (Eds.), Elasticities in International Agricultural
Trade. Boulder 1988, pp. 163-194.
—, Peru: An Export Market Profile. USDA, Agriculture and Trade
Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, Washington 1989.
BOND, Marian E. , "Agricultural Responses to Prices in Sub-Saharan
African Countries". IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 30, 1983, pp. 703-726.
BOVET, David, Laurian UNNEVEHR, Agricultural Pricing in Togo. World
Bank Staff Working Papers, 467, Washington 1981.205
BROWN, Gilbert T., "Agricultural Pricing Policies in Developing Coun-
tries". In: Theodore W. SCHULTZ (Ed.), Distortions of Agricultural
Incentives. Bloomington 1978, pp. 84-113.
BRUNO, Michael, "Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection:
Clarification and Synthesis". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80,
1972, pp. 16-33.
BURNIAUX, Jean-Marc, Franpois DELORME, Ian LIENERT, John P.
MARTIN, "Walras - A Multi-Sector, Multi-Country Applied General
Equilibrium Model for Quantifying the Economy-Wide Effects of Agri-
cultural Policies". In: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) (Ed. ), Modelling the Effects of Agricultural
Policies. (OECD Economic Studies, 13), Paris 1990, pp. 69-102.
BYERLEE, Derek, "The Political Economy of Third World Food Imports:
The Case of Wheat". Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Vol. 35, 1987, pp. 307-328.
--, Michael L. MORRIS, Calculating Measures of Protection: Is It Always
Appropriate to Use World Reference Prices? Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association
held 5-8 August 1990 in Vancouver, mimeo.
--, Gustavo SAIN, "Food Pricing Policy in Developing Countries: Bias
against Agriculture or for Urban Consumers?" American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 68, 1986, pp. 961-969.
CAHILL, Carmel, Wilfrid LEGG, "Estimation of Agricultural Assistance
Using Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Theory and
Practice". In: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) (Ed. ), Modelling the Effects of Agricultural
Policies. (OECD Economic Studies, 13), Paris 1990, pp. 13-43.
CAVALLO, Domingo, "Agriculture and Growth: The Experience of
Argentina, 1913-84". In: Allen MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES (Eds.),
Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent World. Pro-
ceedings of the Twentieth International Conference of Agricultural
Economists held at Buenos Aires, 24-31 August 1988, Aldershot
1989, pp. 122-138.
CHATTIN, Barbara, "Discussion of the paper 'Measuring Levels of Pro-
tection in Agriculture: A Survey of Approaches and Results' by T.
Josling and S. Tangermann". In: Allen MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES
(Eds. ), Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent World.
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference of Agri-
cultural Economists held at Buenos Aires, 24-31 August 1988.
Aldershot 1989, pp. 353-355.
CHILDS, Nathan W. , The World Rice Market - Government Intervention
and Multilateral Policy Reform. USDA, Economic Research Service,
Staff Reports, AGES 9060, Washington 1990.
CHRISTEN, Peter, Die Bedeutung der PSE/CSE fur die internationale
Handelsordnung dargestellt am Beispiel der Agrarpolitik. Diss. No.
1197, Hochschule St. Gallen, Grusch 1990.206
COMMANDER, Simon, Structural Adjustment and Agriculture: Theory and
Practice in Africa and Latin America. Surrey 1989.
CONWAY, Patrick J. , Malcolm BALE, "Approximating the Effective Pro-
tection Coefficient without Reference to Technological Data". The
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 2, 1988, pp. 349-363.
CORDEN, W. Max, The Theory of Protection. Oxford 1971.
CORSEPIUS, Uwe, Peru at the Brink of Economic Collapse: Current
Problems and Policy Options. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel
Discussion Papers, 153, September 1989.
COWITT, Peter (Ed.), World Currency Yearbook 1985. Brooklyn, N. Y. ,
1986.
CUDDIHY, William, Agricultural Price Management in Egypt. World Bank
Staff Working Papers, 388, Washington 1980.
DAVID, Christina C. , Determinants of Rice Price Protection in Asia.
IRRI Social Science Division Papers, 90-22, Manila 1990.
DEARDORFF, Alan V. , Robert M. STERN, Methods of Measurement of
Nontariff Barriers. University of Michigan, Department of Eco-
nomics, Research Seminar in International Economics, Ann Arbor
1984.
DETHIER, Jean-Jaque, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing
Policies in Egypt. Vol. I: The Country Study. Vol. II: Appendixes:
Data and Methodology. World Bank Comparative Studies, The
Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy, Washington 1989.
DIAS, Guilherm L. S. , Inflation and Agriculture: Ten Years of Inflation
and Government Debt. Invited Paper, XXI International Conference
of Agricultural Economists, Tokyo, August 22-29, 1991, mimeo.
DONGES, Juergen B. , "Zur Theorie der effektiven Protektion". Zeit-
schrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 131, 1975, pp. 231-
254.
DORNBUSCH, Rudiger, "Tariffs and Nontraded Goods". Journal of Inter-
national Economics, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 177-185.
—, "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Exchange Rates". Zeitschrift fur
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. 102, 1982, pp. 573-599.
DOROSH, Paul, Alberto VALDES, Effects of Exchange Rate and Trade
Policies on Agriculture in Pakistan. International Food Policy
Research Institute, Research Reports, 84, Washington 1990.
EDWARDS, Sebastian, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjust-
ment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries. Cambridge,
Mass. , 1989.207
ERZAN, Refik, Hiroaki KUWAHARA, Seratino MARCHESE, Rene
VOSSENAAR, "The Profile of Protection in Developing Countries".
UNCTAD Review, Vol. 1, 1989, pp. 29-49.
ETHIER, Wilfred, "Input Substitution and the Concept of the Effective
Rate of Protection". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80, 1972,
pp. 34-47.
FEI, John C. , Gustav RANIS, Development of the Labour Supply
Economy: Theory and Policy. Homewood, 111. , 1964.
FODERS, Federico, Resisting Orthodoxy in a Highly Distorted Economy:
Economic Policy in Peru. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working
Papers, 303, November 1987.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(FAO) [a], Agricultural Price Policies. Issues and Proposals. Rome
1987.
-- [b], Agricultural Protection and Stabilization Policies: A Framework of
Measurement in the Context of Agricultural Adjustment. C75/LIM/2,
Rome 1975.
— [c], Production Yearbook. Rome, various issues.
— [d], Statistics on Prices Received by Farmers. Rome, various issues.
— [e], Trade Yearbook. Rome, various issues.
— [f], World Crop and Livestock Statistics. Rome 1987.
GANS, Oshar, Das Konzept der effektiven Protektion als Analyse- und
Planungsinstrument. Forschungsstelle fur Internationale Agrarent-
wicklung e. V. , Diskussionsschriften, 4, Heidelberg 1985.
GARCIA, Jorge G. , The Effects of Exchange Rates and Commercial Policy
on Agricultural Incentives in Colombia: 1953-1978. International
Food Policy Research Institute, Research Reports, 24, Washington
1981.
—, Gabriel M. LLAMAS, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing
Policies in Colombia. World Bank Comparative Studies, The Political
Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy, Washington 1989.
GARDNER, Bruce L. , The Economics of Agricultural Policy. New York
1987.
GHATAK, Subrata, Ken INGERSENT, Agriculture and Economic Develop-
ment. Baltimore 1984.
GOLDIN, Ian, Gervasio de REZENDE, Agriculture and Economic Crisis:
Lessons from Brazil. OECD, Development Centre Studies, Paris
1990.208
de GORTER, Harry, David HARVEY, Agricultural Policies and the
GATT: Reconciling Protection, Support and Distortion. Contributed
Paper, Sixth European Congress of Agricultural Economists,
"European Agriculture in Search of New Strategies", The Hague,
3-7 September 1990, mimeo.
GOTSCH, Carl, Gilbert BROWN, Prices, Taxes and Subsidies in Pakistan
Agriculture, 1960-1976. World Bank Staff Working Papers, 387,
Washington 1980.
GREENAWAY, David, "Commercial Policy and Policy Conflict: An Evalu-
ation of the Incidence of Protection in a Non-Industrialized
Economy". The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,
Vol. 57, 1989, pp. 125-141.
—, Chris MILNER, "Estimating the Shifting of Protection across Sectors:
An Application to Mauritius". Industry and Development, 1986, No.
16, pp. 1-22.
—, —, "'True Protection' Concepts and Their Role in Evaluating Trade
Policies in LDCs". The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 23,
1987, pp.- 200-219.
—, — [1988a], "Intra Industry Trade and the Shifting of Protection
across Sectors". European Economic Review, Vol. 32, 1988, pp.
927-945.
—, — [1988b], "Some Features of 'True Protection': A Reply". The
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 24, 1988, pp. 122-125.
—, —, "The Estimation of 'True Protection': A Comment on the Smeets
Procedure". The Journal, of Development Studies, Vol. 26, 1990,
pp. 330-334.
GREENE, Duty D. , Terry L. ROE, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agri-
cultural Pricing Policies in the Dominican Republic. Vol. I: The
Country Study. Vol. II: Appendixes: Data and Methodology. World
Bank Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policy, Washington 1989.
GUILLAUMONT, Patrick, Adjustment Policy and Agricultural Develop-
ment. Plenary Paper, XXI International Conference of Agricultural
Economists, Tokyo, August 22-29, 1991, mimeo.
de HAEN, Hartwig, Hans-Bernd SCHAFER, "Agrarpolitische Ziel-Mittel-
Systeme in Entwicklungslandern - Versuch einer Systematisierung".
In: Wilhelm HENRICHSMEYER, Cay LANGBEHN (Eds.), Wirtschaft-
liche und soziale Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher agrarpolitischer
Konzepte. (Schriften der Gesellschaft fur Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
wissenschaften des Landbaues e. V. , 24), 1st edition, Mvinster-
Hiltrup 1988, pp. 417-432.209
HAMID, Naved, Ijaz NABI, Anjum NASIM, Trade, Exchange Rate, and
Agricultural Pricing Policies in Pakistan. World Bank Comparative
Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy,
Washington 1990.
HARWOOD, Joy L. , Kenneth W. BAILEY, The World Wheat Market - Gov-
ernment Intervention and Multilateral Policy Reform. USDA,
Commodity Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Staff
Reports, AGES 9007, Washington 1990.
HAYAMI, Yujiro, Japanese Agriculture under Siege. The Political
Economy of Agricultural Policies. Houndmills 1988.
--, Vernon W. RUTTAN, Agricultural Development: An International Per-
spective. Revealed edition, Baltimore 1985.
HERRMANN, Roland, "Agricultural Price Protection, Import Dependence
and Economic Development: The Case of Wheat". Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 152-167.
— [1990a], " Interdependenzen zwischen makrookonomischer Planung und
Agrarentwicklungsplanung in Entwicklungs landern". Agrarwirt-
schaft, Vol. 39, 1990, pp. 109-116.
— [1990b], "Wirkungen nationaler Agrarpolitiken auf den Agrarhandel
der Entwicklungslander und Moglichkeiten der Handelsliberalisie-
rung". In: Hermann SAUTTER (Ed. ), Konsequenzen neuerer han-
delspolitischer Entwicklung en fur die Entwicklungslander. (Schriften
des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, N. F. , Vol. 197), Berlin 1990.
—, Dieter KIRSCHKE, "The Analysis of Price Uncertainty: Theoretical
Issues and Empirical Measurement on the World Coffee Market".
Asian Economies, 1987, No. 62, pp. 24-44.
—, Peter M. SCHMITZ, "Stabilizing Producers' Revenues by Fixing Agri-
cultural Prices within the EC?" European Review of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 11, 1984, pp. 395-414.
—, Patricia SCHENCK, Manfred WIEBELT, "On the Measurement of Agri-
cultural Protection: How Price Uncertainty and Limited Substitution
Matter". Oxford Agrarian Studies, Vol. 19, 1991, No. 1, pp. 21-40.
—, Nasarudin SULAIMAN, Manfred WIEBELT, "How Non-Agricultural
Import Protection Taxes Agricultural Exports: A 'True Protection'
Analysis for Peru and Malaysia". Quarterly Journal of International
Agriculture, Vol. 29, 1990, No. 1, pp. 38-60.
HERTEL, Thomas W. [1989a], "Negotiating Reductions in Agricultural
Support: Implications of Technology and Factor Mobility". American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 71, 1989, pp. 559-573.
— [1989b], "PSEs and the Mix of Measures to Support Farm Incomes".
The World Economy, Vol. 12, 1989, pp. 17-27.210
HIEMENZ, Ulrich, Kurt von RABENAU, Effektive Protektion: Theorie und
empirische Bedeutung fur die westdeutsche Industrie. Tubingen
1973.
HONMA, Masayochi, Yujiro HAYAMI, "Structure of Agricultural Pro-
tection in Industrial Countries". Journal of International Economics,
Vol. 20, 1986, pp. 115-129.
HOUCK, James P., Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies. New York
1986.
HUFF, H. Bruce, Catherine MOREDDU, "The Ministerial Trade Mandate
Model". In: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) (Ed.), Modelling the Effects of Agricultural
Policies. (OECD Economic Studies, 13), Paris 1990, pp. 45-67.
HWA, Erh-Cheng, "The Contribution of Agriculture to Economic Growth:
Some Empirical Evidence". World Development, Vol. 16, 1988, pp.
1329-1339.
IMRAN, Mudassar, Ron DUNCAN, Optimal Export Taxes for Exporters of
Perennial Crops. World Bank, Commodity Markets Division, Division
Working Papers, WPS 10, Washington 1988.
INTAL, Ponciano S. , John H. POWER, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agri-
cultural Pricing Policies in the Philippines. World Bank Comparative
Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy,
Washington 1990.
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin.
London, various issues.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), Fund-Supported Programs,
Fiscal Policy, and Income Distribution. Occasional Papers, 46,
Washington 1986.
—, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1987 (1990, 1991).
Washington 1987 (1990, 1991).
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI), World Rice Sta-
tistics 1987. Manila 1988.
JACQUE, Laurent L. , Management of Foreign Exchange Risk. Theory and
Praxis. 4th printing, Lexington, Mass. , 1978.
JANSEN, Doris, Agricultural Prices and Subsidies in Zimbabwe: Benefits,
Costs and Trade-Offs. USAID/Zimbabwe Library, Harare 1982.
—, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Zambia.
World Bank Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agri-
cultural Pricing Policy, Washington 1988.
JENKINS, Glenn P. , Andrew LAI, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agri-
cultural Pricing Policies in Malaysia. World Bank Comparative
Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy,
Washington 1989.211
JONES, Christine, Michael ROEMER, "Editors' Introduction: Modeling and
Measuring Parallel Markets in Developing Countries". World Develop-
ment, Vol. 17, 1989, pp. 1861-1870.
JOSLING, Timothy, "Agricultural Protection and Stabilization Policies:
Analysis of Current Neomercantilist Practices". In: Jimmye S.
HILLMAN, Andrew SCHMITZ (Eds. ), International Trade and Agri-
culture: Theory and Policy. (Westview Special Studies in Inter-
national Economics and Business), Boulder 1979, pp. 149-162.
—, Developed-Country Agricultural Policies and Developing-Country
Supplies: The Case of Wheat. International Food Policy Research
Institute, Research Reports, 14, Washington 1980.
—, Stefan TANGERMANN, "Measuring Levels of Protection in Agri-
culture: A Survey of Approaches and Results". In: Allen
MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES (Eds. ), Agriculture and Governments
in an Interdependent World. Proceedings of the Twentieth Inter-
national Conference of Agricultural Economists held at Buenos
Aires, 24-31 August 1988. Aldershot 1989, pp. 343-352.
JUST, Richard E. , Darrell L. HUETH, Andrew SCHMITZ, Applied
Welfare Economics and Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. , 1982.
ten KATE, Adriaan, Measuring Nominal and Effective Protection: The
Case of Mexico. Aldershot 1987.
KISLEV, Yoav, "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap
Food Policies: Comment". American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 63, 1981, p. 280.
KNUDSEN, Odin, John NASH, "Domestic Price Stabilization Schemes in
Developing Countries". Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Vol. 38, 1990, pp. 539-558.
KOESTER, Ulrich, Theorie der Agrarmarktpolitik. Kiel 1980, mimeo.
—, Hartwig SCHAFER, Alberto VALDES, Demand-Side Constraints and
Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan African Countries. Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute, Washington 1990.
KRISHNA, Raj, "Some Aspects of Agricultural Growth, Price Policy and
Equity in Developing Countries". Food Research Institute Studies,
Vol. 18, 1982, pp. 219-260.
KRUEGER, Anne O. , "Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes: Theory
and Measurement". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80, 1972, pp.
48-62.
—, Exchange Rate Determination. Cambridge Surveys of Economic
Literature, Cambridge 1983.
—, "Trade Policies in Developing Countries". In: Ronald W. JONES,
Peter B. KENEN (Eds. ), Handbook of International Economics. Vol.
I. Amsterdam 1984, pp. 519-569.212
KRUEGER, Anne O. , "Some Preliminary Findings from the World Bank's
Project on the Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy". In:
Allen MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES (Eds. ), Agriculture and Govern-
ments in an Interdependent World. Proceedings of the Twentieth
International Conference of Agricultural Economists held at Buenos
Aires, 24-31 August 1988. Aldershot 1989, pp. 162-171.
--., Maurice SCHIFF, Alberto VALDES, A Comparative Study of the
Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policies. A Framework for
the Country Studies. Washington 1984.
—, —, —, "Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries: Measuring
the Effect of Sectoral and Economywide Policies". The World Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 2, 1988, pp. 255-271.
LEAMER, Edward E. , "Measures of Openness". In: Robert E. BALDWIN
(Ed. ), Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Chicago 1988, pp. 147-200.
LEWIS, W. Arthur, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of
Labour". Manchester School, Vol. 22, 1954, pp. 139-191.
LIENERT, Ian, "Quantifying Agricultural Policies in the Walras Model".
In: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) (Ed. ), Modelling the Effects of Agricultural Policies. (OECD
Economic Studies, 13), Paris 1990, pp. 103-130.
LIPTON, Michael, Why Poor People Stay Poor. A Study of Urban Bias in
World Development. London 1977.
LOFCHIE, Michael F. , "The Decline of African Agriculture: An Inter-
nalist Perspective". In: Michael H. GLANTZ (Ed.), Drought and
Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. Cambridge 1987, pp.
85-109.
LUTZ, Ernst, Yasmin SAADAT, "Issues Relating to Agricultural Pricing
Policies and Their Analysis in Developing Countries". Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 2, 1988, pp. 19-37.
—, Pasquale L. SCANDIZZO, "Price Distortions in Developing Countries:
A Bias against Agriculture". European Review of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 7, 1980, pp. 5-27.
MABBS-ZENO, Carl, Barry KRISSOFF, "Tropical Beverages in the
GATT". In: Ian GOLDIN, Odin KNUDSEN (Eds.), Agricultural
Trade Liberalization. Implications for Developing Countries. OECD,
Paris 1990, pp. 181-198.
MALAYSIA, Department of Statistics, 1978 (1983) Input-Output Tables
for Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur 1982 (1988).
—, Economic Planning Unit, 1971 Input-Output Table for Malaysia. Kuala
Lumpur 1973.Bibhothek
des Instituts fur WeltwirtschalJ 2i3
MANN, Arthur J., Manuel PASTOR, "Orthodox and Heterodox
Stabilization Policies in Bolivia and Peru: 1985-1988". Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 31, 1989, No. 4, pp.
163-192.
MARSHALL, C. F., The World Coffee Trade. Cambridge 1983.
MASTERS, William A. , "Trade Policy and Agriculture: Measuring the Real
Exchange Rate in Zimbabwe". Quarterly Journal of International
Agriculture, Vol. 30, 1991, pp. 21-36.
McCLATCHY, Donald, Sean CAHILL, "Cross-Commodity Trade Effects of
Agricultural Policies: Some Implications for the GATT". In: Allen
MAUNDER, Alberto VALDES (Eds. ), Agriculture and Governments
in an Interdependent World. Proceedings of the Twentieth Inter-
national Conference of Agricultural Economists held at Buenos
Aires, 24-31 August 1988. Aldershot 1989, pp. 293-301.
McINTIRE, John, "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap
Food Policies: Comment". American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 65, 1983, pp. 823-826.
MEESTER, Gerrit, "Discussion Opening on Contributions of Y. Mundlak
and A. Valdes". In: Allen MAUNDER, Ulf RENBORG (Eds. ), Agri-
culture in a Turbulent World Economy. Proceedings of the Nine-
teenth International Conference of Agricultural Economists held at
Malaga, 26 August-4 September 1985. Aldershot 1986, pp. 633-635.
MELLOR, John W. , Raisuddin AHMED, "Agricultural Price Policy for Ac-
celerating Growth". In: John W. MELLOR, Raisuddin AHMED
(Eds. ), Agricultural Price Policy for LDCs. Baltimore 1988, pp.
265-291.
de MELO, Jaime, Sherman ROBINSON, Product Differentiation and Trade
Dependence of the Domestic Price System in Computable General
Equilibrium Trade Models. World Bank, Development Research
Department, Economics and Research Staff Reports, DRD127,
Washington 1985.
MERGOS, George, "Relative Distortions of Agricultural Incentives: A
Cross-Country Analysis for Wheat, Rice and Maize". Agricultural
Administration and Extension, Vol. 24, 1987, pp. 195-211.
MICHAELY, Michael, Theory of Commercial Policy. Trade and Protection.
Chicago 1977.
MIETHBAUER, Thomas, Exportorientierung versus Importsubstitution:
Chancen und Erfahrungen einer Neuorientierung am Beispiel
Ghanas. Diplomarbeit, Christian-Albrechts-Universitat zu Kiel, 1990,
unpublished.
MILNER, Chris, "Empirical Analyses of the Costs of Protection". In:
David GREENAWAY (Ed. ), Current Issues in International Trade.
Theory and Policy. Houndmills 1985, pp. 119-137.214
MILNER, Chris, "Identifying and Quantifying Anti-Export Bias: The
Case of Cameroon". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 126, 1990, pp.
142-155.
MLAMBO, Kuphukile, "Exchange Rate Overvaluation and Agricultural
Performance in Zimbabwe: 1965-85". In: Godfrey MUDIMU, Richard
H. BERNSTEN (Eds.), Household and National Food Security in
Southern Africa. (University of Zimbabwe, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics and Extension, UZ/MSU Food Security Research
in Southern Africa Project), Harare 1989, pp. 243-258.
MONKE, Eric A. , Scott R. PEARSON, The Policy Analysis Matrix for
Agricultural Development. Ithaca 1989.
MOOD, Alexander M. , Franklin A. GRAYBILL, Duane C. BOES, Intro-
duction to the Theory of Statistics. McGraw-Hill Series in Probabil-
ity and Statistics, 3rd edition, Singapore 1974.
MOON, Pal-Yong, Bong-Soon KANG, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agri-
cultural Pricing Policies in the Republic of Korea. World Bank
Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing
Policy, Washington 1989.
MOSCHINI, Giancarlo, "Economic Issues in Tariffication: An Overview".
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 5, 1991, pp. 101-120.
MUNDLAK, Yair, Domingo CAVALLO, Rafael DOMENECH, Agriculture and
Economic Growth in Argentina, 1913-84. International Food Policy
Research Institute, Research Reports, 76, Washington 1989.
MURPHY, Eithne, "Comparative Advantage in Dairying. An Intercountry
Analysis within the European Community". European Review of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 16, 1989, pp. 19-36.
MURRAY, David, "Export Earnings Instability: Price, Quantity, Supply,
Demand?" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 27,
1978/79, pp. 61-73.
NEWBERY, David, Nicholas STERN (Eds.), The Theory of Taxation for
Developing Countries. A World Bank Research Publication, 2nd
paperback printing, New York 1987.
OFFICER, Lawrence H. , "The Purchasing Power Parity Theory of Ex-
change Rates: A Review Article". IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 23, 1976,
pp. 1-60.
OLGUN, Hasan, "Some Aspects and Consequences of the Agricultural
Price Interventions in Turkey". European Review of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 16, 1989, pp. 391-410.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD) [a], Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade. Monitoring
and Outlook --. Paris, various issues.215
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD) [b], National Policies and Agricultural Trade. Paris 1987.
— [c], Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy
Equivalents 1979-1990. OECD/GD (91) 128, Paris 1991.
OYEJIDE, T. Ademola, The Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies
on Agriculture in Nigeria. International Food Policy Research
Institute, Research Reports, 55, Washington 1986.
PANAGARIYA, Arvind, Maurice W. SCHIFF, Commodity Exports and Real
Income in Africa. World Bank, Country Economics Department,
Policy, Research and External Affairs, Working Papers, WPS 537,
Washington 1990.
PEARSON, Scott R. , Ronald K. MEYER, "Comparative Advantage among
African Coffee Producers". American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 56, 1974, pp. 310-313.
PETERS, George, "The Interpretation and Use of Producer Subsidy
Equivalents". Oxford Agrarian Studies, Vol. 17, 1988, pp. 188-218.
PETERSON, Willis L. , "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of
Cheap Food Policies". American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 61, 1979, pp. 12-21.
—, "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap Food
Policies: Reply". American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.
65, 1983, pp. 827-828.
—, "International Supply Response". Agricultural Economics, Vol. 2,
1988, pp. 365-374.
PICK, Franz (Ed. ), Pick's Currency Yearbook 1976-1977. New York
1978. __
PRASADA RAO, D. S. , William F. SHEPHERD, K. C. SHARMA, "A Com-
parative Study of~~ National Price Levels, Agricultural Prices and
Exchange Rates\ World Development, Vol. 18, 1990, pp. 215-229.
RAHMAN, Abdul A. A. [1990a], The Cocoa Industry in Malaysia. Institut
fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 449, November 1990.
— [1990b], Magnitude and Structure of Agricultural Price Protection in
Malaysia. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 455,
November 1990.
RAO, Mohan J. , "Agricultural Supply Response: A Survey". Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 3, 1989, pp. 1-22.
RAUSSER, Gordon C. , "Political Economic Markets: PERTs and PESTs in
Food and Agriculture". American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 64, 1982, pp. 821-833.216
RAUSSER, Gordon C. , Harry de GORTER, "The Political Economy of
Commodity and Public Good Policies in European Agriculture: Im-
plications for Policy Reform". European Review of Agricultural
Economics (Special Issue "Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the
European Association of Agricultural Economists" held in The
Hague, 3-7 September 1990, edited by Y. Leon), Vol. 18, 1991, pp.
485-504.
RECA, Lucio G. , Argentina: Country Case Study of Agricultural Prices,
Taxes and Subsidies. World Bank Staff Working Papers, 386,
Washington 1980.
RIETHMULLER, Paul, Ivan ROBERTS, L. Paul O'MARA, Graeme TIE,
Vivek TULPULE, Mahabub HOSSAIN, Nico KLIJN, Proposed
Strategies for Reducing Agricultural Protection in the GATT
Uruguay Round. A Synthesis and Assessment. Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, Discussion Papers, 90.6,
Canberra 1990.
ROBERTS, Donna, Paul TRAPIDO (Eds.), Government Intervention in
Latin American Agriculture, 1982-87. USDA, Agriculture and Trade
Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, Staff Reports, ACES
9152, Washington 1991.
ROBINSON, Peter, "Zimbabwe". In: Sheila PAGE (Ed.), Trade, Finance
and Developing Countries: Strategies and Constraints in the 1990s.
New York 1990, pp. 165-211.
RODRIK, Dani, "'Disequilibrium' Exchange Rates as Industrialization
Policy". Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 23, 1986, pp.
89-106.
ROEMER, Michael, "Simple Analytics of Segmented Markets: What Case
for Liberalization?" World Development, Vol. 14, 1986, pp. 429-439.
RUKOVO, Andrew, Tobias TAKAVARASHA, Rainer THIELE, Manfred
WIEBELT, The Profile of Agricultural Protection in Zimbabwe.
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 457, January 1991.
SAH, Raaj K. , Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Taxation and Pricing of Agri-
cultural and Industrial Goods. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Papers, 1338, Cambridge, Mass. , 1984.
SARRIS, Alexander, "Discussion of the paper 'Cross-Commodity Trade
Effects of Agricultural Policies: Some Implications for the GATT' by
D. McClatchy and Sylvester Cahill". In: Allen MAUNDER, Alberto
VALDES (Eds. ), Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent
World. Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference of
Agricultural Economists held at Buenos Aires, 24-31 August 1988.
Aldershot 1989, pp. 301-303.
SCANDIZZO, Pasquale L., Measures of Protection: Methodology, Economic
Interpretation and Policy Relevance. Lanham, Md. , 1989.217
SCANDIZZO, Pasquale L. , Colin BRUCE, Methodologies for Measuring
Agricultural Price Intervention Effects. World Bank Staff Working
Papers, 394, Washington 1980.
SCHAFER, Hartwig, Real Exchange Rates and Economic Performance: The
Case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ph.D. Thesis, North Carolina State
University, Department of Economics and Business, Raleigh 1989.
SCHEELE, Martin, Die politische Okonomie landwirtschaftlicher Einkom-
menspolitik im Rahmen der Agrarsozialpolitik in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Kiel 1990.
SCHENCK, Patricia, Bestimmungsgrunde der Protektion im Agrarbereich
- Eine internationale Querschnittsanalyse fur Weizen und Kaffee.
Referat auf der 32. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft fur Wirtschafts-
und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e. V. , " Internationale
Agrarpolitik und Entwicklung der Weltagrarwirtschaft", Gottingen,
30. 9. -2. 10. 1991, mimeo.
SCHIFF, Maurice W. , An Econometric Analysis of the World Wheat Market
and Simulation of Alternative Policies, 1960-80. USDA, Economic
Research Service, Staff Reports, AGES 850827, Washington 1985.
—, "Sector-Specific and Economywide Policies and Agricultural Incentives
in LDCs". In: Bruce GREENSHIELDS, Mar got BELLAMY (Eds.),
Government Intervention in Agriculture. Cause and Effect.
(IAAE Ocassional Papers, 5), Aldershot 1989, pp. 9-14.
SCHMITZ, Peter M. , How to Measure the Bias against Agriculture in
Developing Countries? Plenary Session Paper presented at the
Nineteenth Seminar of the European Association of Agricultural
Economists on "Producers and Consumers versus Agricultural and
Food Policies in Africa", Montpellier, May 29-June 2, 1989, mimeo.
SCHULTZ, Theodore W. , "On Economics and Politics of Agriculture". In:
Theodore W. SCHULTZ (Ed. ), Distortions of Agricultural Incen-
tives. Bloomington 1978, pp. 3-23.
SCHWARTZ, Nancy, Stephen PARKER, "Measuring Government Inter-
vention in Agriculture for the GATT Negotiations". American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 70, 1988, pp. 1137-1145.
SELL, Friedrich L. , "'True Exposure': The Analysis of Trade Liber-
alization in a General Equilibrium Framework". Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, Vol. 124, 1988, pp. 635-652.
—, "True Financial Opening Up": The Analysis of Capital Account
Liberalization in a General Equilibrium Framework. University of
GieBen, Faculty of Economics, Discussion Papers in Development
Economics, 9, GieBen 1990.
SIAMWALLA, Ammar, Suthad SETBOONSARNG, Trade, Exchange Rate,
and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Thailand. World Bank
Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing
Policy, Washington 1989.218
SINGH, Harsha V., "A Comment on Some Features of 'True Protection'".
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 24, 1988, pp. 117-121.
SJAASTAD, Larry A. , "Commercial Policy, 'True' Tariffs and Relative
Prices". In: John BLACK, Brian HINDLEY (Eds.), Current Issues
in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy. Papers of the Third Annual
Conference of the International Economics Study Group. London
1980, pp. 26-51.
SKULLY, David W. , Government Intervention in Agriculture: A
Regulatory Approach. USDA, Agriculture and Trade Analysis
Division, Economic Research Service, Staff Reports, AGES 9039,
Washington 1990.
SMEETS, Heinz-Dieter, "The 'True Protection' Concept - A Comment on
Greenaway and Milner". The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.
25, 1989, pp. 401-407.
STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, Reihe 5: Preise und Preisindizes im
Ausland. Wiesbaden, various issues.
STOCKMAN, Alan C. , "The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates".
Economic Review, Vol. 73, 1987, pp. 12-30.
STRAK, John, Measurement of Agricultural Protection. Trade Policy
Research Centre, Commercial Policy Issues, 6, London 1982.
STRYKER, J. Dirck, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing
Policies in Ghana. World Bank Comparative Studies, The Political
Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy, Washington 1990.
STURZENEGGER, Adolfo, Wylian OTRERA, Trade, Exchange Rate, and
Agricultural Pricing Policies in Argentina. World Bank Comparative
Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy,
Washington 1990.
SUMMERS, Ronald, Alan HESTON, "A New Set of International Com-
parisons of Real Product and Price Levels, Estimates for 130
Countries, 1950-1985". The Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 34,
1988, pp. 1-25.
TAMIN, Mokhtar, Sahatharan MEYANATHAN, "Rice Market Intervention
System in Malaysia: Scope, Effects and the Need for Reform". In:
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB)(Ed. ), Evaluating Rice Market
Intervention Policies. Manila 1988.
TANGERMANN, Stefan, Timothy E. JOSLING, Scott PEARSON, "Multi-
lateral Negotiations on Farm-Support Levels". The World Economy,
Vol. 10, 1987, pp. 265-281.
TAYLOR, Daphne S. , A Cross-Country Analysis of Food Grain Price Dif-
ferentials. University of Guelph, Department of Agricultural
Economics and Business and the Centre for Food Security, Guelph,
Ont. , 1989.219
THIELE, Rainer, Structure and Determinants of Price Protection in the
Rice Sector. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 448,
November 1990.
— [1991a], "Diskriminierung des Agrarsektors in Entwicklungslandern -
Ausmafi und wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen". Die Weltwirtschaft,
1991, H. 1, pp. 197-210.
— [1991b], Peruvian Agriculture: Recent History, Present Performance
and the Effects of Agricultural and General Economic Policies.
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 474, April 1991.
THOMSON, Anne M. , "Country Case Study Zimbabwe". In: Charles
HARVEY (Ed. ), Agricultural Pricing Policy in Africa: Four Country
Case Studies. London 1988, pp. 187-219.
TIMMER, C. Peter, Getting Prices Right: The Scope and Limits of Agri-
cultural Price Policy. Ithaca 1986.
--, "Analyzing Rice Market Interventions in Asia: Principles, Issues,
Themes, and Lessons". In: ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB)
(Ed. ), Evaluating Rice Market Intervention Policies. Manila 1988,
pp. 323-368.
—, "Indonesia: Transition from Food Importer to Exporter". In: Terry
SICULAR (Ed. ), Food Price Policy in Asia. Ithaca 1989, pp. 22-64.
—, How Does Indonesia Set Its Rice Price? The Role of Markets and
Government Policy. Paper presented at the International Conference
on the Economic Policy-Making Process in Bali, Indonesia,
September 6-9, 1990, mimeo.
TSAKOK, Isabelle, Agricultural Price Policy. A Practioner's Guide to
Partial-Equilibrium Analysis. Ithaca 1990.
TSHIBAKA, Tshikala B. , The Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate
Policies on Agriculture in Zaire. International Food Policy Research
Institute, Research Reports, 56, Washington 1986.
TULUY, Hasan, B. Lynn SALINGER, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agri-
cultural Pricing Policies in Morocco. World Bank Comparative
Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy,
Washington 1989.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), Sekretariat, Marketing and Processing of Coffee: Areas
of International Co-Operation. Geneva 1983.
UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
(UNIDO), Malaysia: Sustaining the Industrial Investment Momentum.
Industrial Development Review Series, Oxford 1991.
US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA), Rice Situation and Outlook
Report. Washington 1986.220
US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA), Government Intervention
in Agriculture. Measurement, Evaluation, and Implications for Trade
Negotiations. Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural
Economic Reports, 229, Washington 1987.
— [1988a], Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents:
Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-86. Agriculture and
Trade Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, Staff Reports,
AGES 880127, Washington 1988.
— [1988b], Global Review of Agricultural Policies. Agriculture and Trade
Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, Staff Reports, AGES
880304, Washington 1988.
—, Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Govern-
ment Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87. Agriculture and Trade
Analysis Division, Economic Research Service. Statistical Bulletins,
803 (edited by Alan J. Webb, Michael Lopez and Renata Penn),
Washington 1990.
VALDES, Alberto, "Impact of Trade and Macroeconomic Policies on Agri-
cultural Growth: The South American Experience". In: Inter-
American Develoment Bank (Ed. ), Economic and Social Progress in
Latin America. 1986 Report. Washington 1986, pp. 161-183.
—, Eugenia MUCHNIK, Hernan HURTADO, Trade, Exchange Rate, and
Agricultural Pricing Policies in Chile. Vol. I: The Country Study.
Vol. II: Appendixes: Data and Methodology. World Bank Com-
parative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing
Policy, Washington 1990.
VINCENT, David, "Effects of Agricultural Protection in Japan: An Econ-
omywide Analysis". In: Andrew B. STOECKEL, David VINCENT,
Sandy CUTHBERTSON (Eds. ), Macroeconomic Consequences of Farm
Support Policies. Durham 1989.
WESTLAKE, M. J. , "The Measurement of Agricultural Price Distortion in
Developing Countries". The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.
23, 1987, pp. 367-381.
WIEBELT, Manfred [1990a], The Shifting of Protection in Developing
Countries: A Comparative Analysis for Zimbabwe, Malaysia and
Peru. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working Papers, 441,
September 1990.
— [1990b], Some Preliminary Findings on the Sectoral Incidence of
Protection in Zimbabwe. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Working
Papers, 419, May 1990.
— [1991a], Boomende Exportmarkte und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung:
Eine allgemeine Gleichgewichtsanalyse fur Malaysia. Referat auf der
32. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialwis-
senschaften des Landbaues e. V., "Internationale Agrarpolitik und
Entwicklung der Weltagrarwirtschaft", Gottingen, 30.9.-2.10.1991,
mimeo.221
WIEBELT, Manfred [1991b], "The Impact of Industrial Protection on
Agriculture: A General Equilibrium Analysis for Peninsular
Malaysia". European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 18,
1991, pp. 61-83.
—, "The Sectoral Incidence of Protection and Zimbabwean Agriculture".
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 43, 1992, pp. 205-217.
WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT BEIM BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR ERNAH-
RUNG, LANDWIRTSCHAFT UND FORSTEN (BML), Aktuelle Frag en
der Ordnung des internationalen Agrarhandels. Schriftenreihe des
BML, Reihe A: Angewandte Wissenschaft, H. 362, Miinster-Hiltrup
1988.
WORLD ATLAS AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEE, World Atlas of Agriculture.
Vols. 1-4, Novara, Italy, 1973.
WORLD BANK, World Development Report 1982 (1986). Washington 1982
(1986).
—, Malaysia: Incentive Policies in Agriculture. Report No. 4792-MA, 3
vols. , Washington 1984.
—, Zimbabwe Country Economic Memorandum: Performance, Policies and
Prospects. Report No. 5458-ZIM, Washington 1985.
—, Malaysia: Matching Risks and Rewards in a Mixed Economy. Report
No. 7208-MA, Washington 1988.
—, Peru: Policies to Stop Hyperinflation and Initiate Economic Recovery.
A World Bank Country Study. Washington 1989.
—, World Development Report 1990 (1991). Oxford 1990 (1991).
ZACHAUS, Peter H. , Der Agrarsektor Nigerias unter dem EinfluB ge-
samtwirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen und des Strukturanpassungspro-
grammes der Weltbank. Diplomarbeit, Universitat GieBen, Institut
fur Agrarpolitik und Marktforschung, 1990, unpublished.